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Abstract
My thesis comprises three papers on individuals’ preferences over family com-
position and the degree to which these are culturally determined, or learnt.
Prices, Norms and Preferences:
The Influence of Cultural Values on Fertility
This paper investigates the influence of cultural values on fertility. High country
of origin fertility is associated with high fertility in the UK, in line with pre-
vious results. This is consistent with fertility preferences being a transmissible
(learnable) cultural value. However, I find that high fertility in the country of
origin is also associated with earlier childbearing. If timing is not accounted for,
this phenomenon could lead to an upward bias when estimating the importance
of cultural values.
Son Preference and Culture
I measure the sex preferences of immigrant women in the United Kingdom by
estimating the effect of family composition on birth hazard rates. International
comparisons of son preference are constructed, the first known to the author. A
theoretical model suggests that costs (eg, dowries) are unlikely to explain the
variation in outcomes between groups. Finally, women arriving in the UK at a
young age appear to have less distinct tastes, also consistent with a primarily
cultural, rather than economic, explanation for parental sex preferences.
Son Preference and Sex Ratios:
How many ‘Missing Women’ are Missing?
When parents prefer sons, heterogeneity in the probability of having sons can
lead to excess girls. I argue that this may lead to under-counting the number of
‘missing women’. Parents show significant differences in son preference between
countries. I exploit these differences to simulate sex ratios in the presence of
measured heterogeneity. Parents’ son preferences account for 1.5% of differences
between sex ratios worldwide (significant at 10%). The presence of this effect
may imply that sex ratios are more biased than previously estimated, since pre-
vious comparisons use benchmarks that already contain too few girls. Therefore
there may be more women missing due to discrimination than we thought.
3
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
Executive Summary
My thesis comprises three papers on individuals’ preferences over family com-
position and the degree to which these are culturally determined, or learnt
(Chapters 2–4). The latter two papers form the major contributions: I find
strong evidence that preference for sons is culturally driven, and show that son
preference can affect the sex ratio at birth. My first chapter sets out definitions
for the terms culture, values, and norms.
Prices, Norms and Preferences:
The Influence of Cultural Values on Fertility
Cultural values appear to influence the fertility of immigrants in the UK, but
birth timing effects may bias this result upward. I use the total fertility rate in
a woman’s country of origin as a proxy for her values. These rates significantly
predict immigrants’ fertility, supporting the findings of Ferna´ndez and Fogli
[2006]. Without accounting for timing effects, I estimate that an extra child per
woman in the country of origin is associated with 0.116 extra children for an
immigrant in the UK.
This result would indicate that cultural values play a role in forming indi-
viduals’ preferences over family size. However, immigrants from high-fertility
countries start families younger, so at the time of measurement they have more
children relative to their expected total. This leads to an upward bias on the
coefficient on originating country fertility. Since a variety of other factors are
also expected to contribute an upward bias, the absolute effect of cultural val-
ues would appear to be small. Such a conclusion would imply that the costs
of childrearing are of primary importance in determining family size, according
with Becker et al. [1990] and Galor and Weil [2000].
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Son Preference and Culture
I present theoretical and empirical results that support a cultural, rather than
economic, explanation for parents’ sex preferences. This contribution inno-
vates in the growing literature on cultural values since few authors have studied
culturally-driven behaviour in environments where prices matter. To the extent
that son preferences reflect discrimination more generally, my findings suggest
that cultural barriers are an important factor in retarding development out-
comes for girls.
This paper measures the sex preferences of immigrant women in the United
Kingdom by estimating the effect of family composition on birth hazard rates. I
know of no previous attempts to measure parents’ preferences so that they can
be compared between countries. I use hazard rate estimation to measure the
difference in fecundity between women already having sons and those already
having daughters; there are strong differences in behaviour between country
groups, with some displaying strong preferences for sons (eg, India, Pakistan,
Somalia), and others preferences for daughters (Germany).
My theoretical model [after Leung, 1991] suggests that costs (dowries or
expected support in old age) are unlikely to explain the variation in behaviour
between groups. A common explanation for son-preferring behaviour is that
daughters are more expensive or can provide less support [Das Gupta et al.,
2002]. If this were true, then women who already have daughters are poorer
than those with sons. Since children are a normal good, those having daughters
will have fewer children in the future. However, this contradicts the empirical
findings, so I conclude that costs do not drive the observed behaviour. Moreover,
women arriving in the UK at a young age appear to have less distinct tastes,
which is consistent with parents’ sex preferences being a cultural value that is
acquired over time.
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Son Preference and Sex Ratios:
How many ‘Missing Women’ are Missing?
When parents prefer sons, heterogeneity in the probability of having sons can
lead to excess girls. Son preference implies that parents will reduce childbearing
after having boys, the extreme case being a ‘stopping rule’ whereby a woman has
children until a son is born. If all women have the same probability of having
a son, the sex ratio (number of boys per girl) is not affected by this behaviour.
However, if son-probabilities are heterogeneous, women who have boys with
low probabilities will have larger families on average. Therefore the proportion
of girls in a son-preferring population will be higher than the ‘biological’ level
resulting with no son preference. Heterogeneity is necessary and sufficient for
parental decisions to affect the aggregate sex ratio; homogeneous models cannot
display this effect in large populations [Leung, 1988].
The key contribution is my estimation of the real-world implications of this
finding. First, I derive a new econometric estimator to measure the underlying
probabilities of women having boys, under the assumption that individuals have
fixed probabilities of bearing sons. I measure significant heterogeneity: ten
percent of women have probabilities of having boys that are less than 42% or
more than 61%. Homogeneity is strongly rejected.
Finally, I simulate the effect of son preferences — as measured for immigrant
women in the UK — on sex ratios worldwide. Under the heterogeneity I esti-
mate, preferences account for 1.5% of differences in population sex ratios. The
presence of this effect may imply that sex ratios are more biased than previously
estimated, since previous comparisons [eg, Oster, 2005] use benchmarks that al-
ready contain too few girls. Therefore there may be more women missing due
to discrimination and mortality than we thought. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first quantitative demonstration of the influence of cultural values on
an important demographic outcome.
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Preface
[N]o significant behaviour has been illuminated by assumptions of
differences in tastes. [Stigler and Becker, 1977]
Since the inception of economics as a discipline, authors have regarded both
differences in people’s preferences and social interactions between individuals
as crucial to their understanding of human behaviour. However, while other
social scientists, notably sociologists, are well aware of the role tastes play and
the importance of informal sanctions and rewards in people’s lives, modern
economists have largely neglected these topics. Broadly speaking, these are the
values, or individual preferences, and norms, social equilibria, with which this
thesis is concerned.
In general, economists have taken a ‘beneath the lamp-post’ approach, con-
fining models to situations where values and norms can be easily ignored. Re-
strictions include representative agent assumptions and that people do not care
about the actions of their peers. We have been massively successful in under-
standing the world with such models, and this success has fed the view that
we need not expand our horizons. As a result, any economic investigation into
tastes promises to be received with some scepticism, and combined with the
inherent difficulty of such research, the rejection from Stigler and Becker is a
handy justification to bypass the topic altogether.
Unfortunately, we have ignored many interesting cases. The fear is that, in
dealing with more ‘social’ topics, economics will struggle to maintain its rigour.
That concern is fair. However, I do not believe the correct approach is to let
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restrictions confine our research or prohibit us from investigating more complex
sociological topics. Instead, as a discipline, we should be more open to applying
the rigorous methods we have developed to culturally driven phenomena.
Fortunately, the discipline is now making progress on several fronts. Theo-
rists are developing our ideas of socialisation, and there is a growing empirical
literature trying to establish the impact of culture on outcomes, particularly
in areas such as parental preferences. However, I believe there are three large
holes in our current knowledge. I will describe each separately, though they are
tightly interconnected issues.
Social Interactions
Thanks to work such as Bisin and Verdier [2000], economists are becoming more
comfortable with the idea that parents may decide to socialise their children,
and the decision optimises parents’ utility. Such models have fruitful applica-
tions, such as describing the evolution of unemployment claimants in European
countries since the second world war [Michau, 2008]. But this work still depends
on a ‘single meme’ idea of culture: people are type-A by default, and one may
choose to socialise one’s child to type-B. Researchers have not cracked open
the mechanism of the socialisation process, or how values are transmitted and
assimilated. Our best guess is ‘habit formation’. But, as an example, this ex-
planation cannot inform us about how a young girl decides to wear a headscarf.
Though we can model this choice as a taste (she receives utility from wearing
it), a strategic decision (her family will punish her otherwise), or a combina-
tion of both, we do not yet have a conception of how these interact. Such a
theory might explain how she disliked wearing it when young, but over time it
became part of her identity. Understanding the mechanism may help explain
the decisions she takes in bringing up her own daughter.
Macroeconomists understand the need for such explanations: witness the
wealth of literature on ‘social capital’. I propose this theory should have a
coherent microfoundation based on interpersonal interactions.
16
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Building that foundation will be a difficult task; Chapter 1 represents my
attempt — not to take — but merely to pave the first step of the journey. The
aim is to break apart the concept of a norm is and explore what it entails for its
subjects. More than being a ‘convention’ or ‘rule’, I maintain that the actions
of a follower of a norm must be utility-maximising. The outcome of the norm
must then constitute an equilibrium in which both subjects and non-subjects
optimise with respect to the sanctions and rewards imposed by each other.
The empirical components of this thesis unfortunately shed no light on
whether or not behaviours are driven by values (individuals’ preferences) or
norms (social interactions based on individuals’ preferences). For example, in
Chapter 3, I cannot distinguish between the hypotheses that (a) women have
preferences for sons and (b) women dislike shame and some communities are
ashamed of women who bear only daughters.1
Costs and Culture
The majority of empirical work on culture has either attempted to control for
or eradicate the influence of prices,2 or have considered situations where costs
are irrelevant.3 Perhaps this was inevitable: the first priority was to establish
whether people’s backgrounds do indeed affect their behaviour. Culture does
matter, and it is a topic worthy of economists’ time. But what’s the surprise?
From my perspective, the interaction between prices and preferences is key.
When can behaviour be said to be driven by costs, and when do values matter?
In Chapter 3, I look at son preference amongst immigrants to the UK. Under the
assumption that children are a normal good, son-preferring behaviour cannot
be driven by high costs of raising girls. If girls were expensive, women with
1In terms of utility functions, I cannot discern u = uB(B) + uG(G) from u = uB+G(B +
G)+ v(r); r = f(B). In the latter case, a woman only cares about the number of her children
(B +G), not the sex composition (B,G). However, she receives a social reward r for having
boys.
2For example, in Chapter 2 I look at women from different backgrounds but who live in the
United Kingdom. Costs of raising children are plausibly equal across groups, and educational
dummies control for different levels of human capital.
3Fisman and Miguel [2007] consider diplomats whose parking tickets do not have to be
paid; Manning and Roy [2007] investigate national identity, which is costless.
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daughters rather than sons would be poorer. Thus, controlling for family size,
normality implies that women with daughters would have lower fertility. The
opposite is observed, so I conclude that a taste for sons, and not expensive
daughters, drives the biased behaviour.4
One implication of Chapter 3 is that scholarships or other subsidies for girls
might promote son-biased fertility behaviour. More work such as this is required
to fully understand behaviour when preferences are put at odds with prices, since
otherwise we cannot quantifiably predict the effects of our policy tools.
Implications
I intend ‘implications’ in two ways. First, cultural values shape the world we
live in, and, as economists, purport to explain. It is therefore surprising that
so little an attempt has been made to measure the impact and implications of
those values.
Chapter 4 is such an attempt. I take the levels of son preference amongst
immigrants in the UK and demonstrate that their behaviour significantly pre-
dicts sex ratios in their countries of origin. A preference for sons leads to an
excess of girls.5 The effect I measure is small (but probably a lower bound).
However, we are likely to have underestimated the number of women missing
due to discrimination.
This finding is minor, but non-trivial. There are countless other ways in
which cultural values affect outcomes substantively: both for good (when they
discourage corruption or support education, for example) but also for worse,
when they engender discrimination or promote a lax attitude to sexual health.
Examples abound. Quantitative research, alas, does not.
The second implication of cultural economics concerns policy. Suppose, as in
the case of sexual discrimination, we determine an outcome is culturally driven.
4High costs/low benefits of raising girls could contribute to a social norm in which sons
are required for ‘honour’, leading to a social preference for sons, as sketched in Footnote 1.
5Women are heterogeneous in the probability of having a boy at any given birth (call this
p). Suppose women prefer sons, and have children until they have a son. Heterogeneity implies
that low-p women expect larger families than high-p women. Thus more children are born to
low-p women, and there are relatively more girls born than if parents had no sex preferences.
18
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From a policy perspective, what are our options? Education is an obvious
contender. But then the interactions between individuals must be properly
understood. The well-meaning teacher might advocate sexual equality in the
classroom, but what about the effect of discriminatory treatment at home or in
the community? Until we have a coherent model of such situations, economics
will confined to areas where cultural values are unimportant.
My larger point is more subtle: there are moral considerations to bear in
mind when dealing with cultural phenomena. At some level, an individual is the
product of his experiences, views, preferences and beliefs. If we seek to affect
these, we must acknowledge that we will change the individual. The policy-
maker now assumes a degree of moral authority, and, while I have no problem in
principle, this represents a colossal shift from amorally setting economic policy.
And in practice, problems appear swiftly.
Final thoughts
It was not my original intention to write a thesis about culture. However, as
the results of each paper became clear, the next question simply stood out. I
have therefore presented my work in chronological order, except for Chapter 1:
as I worked on Chapter 2, I was struck by the need to put formal definitions to
the concepts I was dealing with.
As this rough explanation tries to convey, I believe a rigorous theory of cul-
ture is possibly the biggest outstanding gap in economists’ knowledge. Though
minor in its reach, I hope this work will help others close that gap in the coming
years.
Jas Ellis
London, September 2008
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Chapter 1
Culture, Values and Norms
In this paper I formally define a social norm to be a general equilibrium
outcome amongst agents who hold preferences over each others’ behaviour.
My definition makes clear the distinction between the substance of a norm
and its embodiment. This approach makes clear the difference between
cultural values and norms. I close with a brief discussion of the implica-
tions of norms and values when addressing policy questions.
1.1 Introduction
Of the many interpretations for the word ‘culture’, I take the broad definition
provided by Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982], defining it to be the ‘activities, val-
ues, and behaviour of an individual that are acquired through instruction and
imitation’. While many species exhibit such traits [Findlay et al., 1989], the
extent to which cultural traits affect behaviour is undeniably unique to humans
[Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1982; Higgs, 2000].1
The present paper builds a new definition of social norms and provides a
framework for analysing cultural phenomena in an economic setting. In partic-
ular, I codify the distinction between cultural values and norms. I argue that a
norm is best viewed as a general equilibrium outcome amongst agents who hold
preferences over each others’ behaviour.
1Perhaps unsurprisingly, social scientists seem much more ready than biologists to propose
this uniqueness [See Tomasello, 1998, quoted in Dekker, 2001, p. 82].
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The major contribution of this paper is the positive construction of a norm
basis, which is a set of values that underlie the norm. These values may be
thought of as preferences held by individuals. The norm is then the behavioural
outcome within a community when some (or all) individuals hold the basis
values. This is a very general definition which encompasses those of previous
authors. I believe this definition will allow researchers to explicitly frame the
quantitative modelling of cultural phenomena by making clear which aspects
of normed behaviour are relevant in which cases. I provide two very simple
examples.
While previous work by sociologists (particularly Morris [1956]) has provided
a coherent definition of a norm for that discipline, to the best of my knowledge
economists are yet to broach the topic substantively.2 I therefore lean heavily
on previous work to construct my new definition and do not lay claim to the
broad ideas encompassed within this paper. The novelty of this work is to apply
an axiomatic approach to build a framework that is amenable to microeconomic
modelling. The construction is inspired by Allison [1992].
1.2 Culture
The definition of ‘culture’ given above comprises two components: a set of
properties (‘activities, values, and behaviour’), and a transmission mechanism
(‘acquired through instruction or imitation’). Considered in this fashion, culture
has been the focus of a wide body of literature, spanning Biology, Economics,
Anthropology, and Sociology, and particularly Memetics, for which this two-
part definition is a founding concept. Memeticists attempt to explain cultural
phenomena by considering the evolution ofmemes, which are small transmissible
‘units’ of culture, analogous to genes in Genetics (this concept is due to Dawkins
[1989]).3 Bisin and Verdier [2005] provide an inexhaustive summary of the
2Young [2008] outlines the topic informally.
3However, the status of Memetics as a discipline is as yet unresolved. Though the concept
of a meme is not in itself unhelpful, Holdcroft and Lewis [2000] provide a thorough critique
to the purely memetic view of culture, concluding ‘there is a serious question whether there
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literature.
By applying this analogy, Biologists have been particularly insightful.4 In
Genetics, traits (or phenotypes) pertaining to morphology and behaviour are
controlled by genes, which are transmitted through sexual or asexual reproduc-
tion. (Florini [1996, pp. 367] provides a deeper discussion of these mechanisms.)
This leads to a natural definition for a cultural property (ie, a meme): it is sim-
ply a phenotype that is transmitted through instruction or imitation [Cavalli-
Sforza et al., 1982]. The analogy is completed by permitting mutation during
transmission.5
The class of memes relevant to this discussion are those which I shall call
values, following Morris [1956].6 Whereas almost any kind of abstract idea can
constitute a meme, a value imparts a behavioural constraint. From an economic
perspective, this may be because the value affects one’s utility function; or it
may be better understood as a constraint on the choice set. Having the value
‘I must have many children’ might be best represented as the former, whereas
‘thou shalt not steal’ evokes the latter. However, stealing could also be thought
of as yielding an arbitrarily large negative utility. This formulation recalls the
‘economics of identity’ of Akerlof and Kranton [2000].
For the purposes of this analysis, a value is the most basic component of
preferences, since I am only concerned with memes that impart a behavioural
outcome. Since the major objective here is to distinguish a value from a norm,
I will follow the ethos of Set Theory and abstain from formally defining a value.
is available . . . a theory of meaning that would afford to memes the kind of robust status that
memetics demands of them’.
4See, eg, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [1981, 1983]; Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982]; Findlay et al.
[1989]; Guglielmino et al. [1995].
5Note that mutation of DNA base pairs is very rare [Florini, 1996, footnote 10, p. 372];
most of the variety across populations results from the recombination of several genes due to
sexual reproduction. However, innovation resulting in the mutation of memes is very common
[Dawkins, 1989, p. 323–4, in Florini, 1996].
6I shall explicitly define the terms under discussion; there are ambiguous definitions in the
literature, and some authors appear to draw no distinction between values and norms. Morris
[1956] provides a coherent picture; see page 25.
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1.2.1 Cultural Transmission
Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982] distinguish three transmission modes for memes be-
tween individuals, which they label following conventions in Epidemiology:
• Vertical Transmission from parents to their children.
• Horizontal Transmission between individuals of the same generation.
• Oblique Transmission from individuals of the parental generation to those
in the filial generation who are not their children.
Plainly, Genetics is concerned with vertical transmission only, with genes
passed on solely through DNA [Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1983].
Though it has been argued [Harris 1998, in Dekker 2001] that vertical trans-
mission of cultural traits is negligible, the empirical evidence strongly refutes
this. Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982] assess the correlations between the beliefs of
young adults, their peers, and their parents, observing stronger vertical then
horizontal transmission for several classes of value, especially religious belief.7
The finding of Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006] — that the number of one’s siblings is
significant in predicting one’s own fertility — also points to vertical transmission
of fertility values, though they fail to make this interpretation.
The different transmission mechanisms result in different distributional and
dynamic outcomes, as can be seen in Table 1.1. These relate primarily to the
rate of spread through the population and the equilibrium heterogeneity. The
key insight of this literature is that cultural dynamics have the potential to
produce more complex outcomes than genetic dynamics alone [Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman, 1983; Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza, 1984].
More recently, economists have modelled cultural transmission as purpose-
ful socialisation decisions made within families.8 Parents are usually assumed
to be altruistic toward their offspring, and choose to socialise their children if
7Guglielmino et al. [1995] provide further examples, as does Shennan [2000, p. 813].
8Examples include Bisin and Verdier [2000, 2005]; Tabellini [2007b]; Michau [2008].
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Table 1.1: Modes and rates of cultural transmission, reproduced from Cavalli-
Sforza et al. [1982].
Ratio of
transmitters
to receivers:
Many to one One to few
(few to few)
One to many
Example: Social class or
caste influences
Vertical (par-
ent to child)
Horizontal Social Hierar-
chies
Teacher/student
Social Leaders
Mass media
Rate of Cul-
tural Change:
Lowest −→ −→ −→ Highest
Population
heterogene-
ity:
Little acceptance
of variants; be-
tween and within
population hetero-
geneities are low.
Persistence of variation (sta-
ble polymorphic equilibrium
not uncommon); between
and within heterogeneities
are high.
Rapid flux; between popu-
lation heterogeneity high;
within population hetero-
geneity low.
they think this will maximise their welfare (often parents show ‘imperfect empa-
thy’, and can only evaluate the effects of socialisation form their own socialised
perspective).
1.3 From Values to Norms
1.3.1 Values
The discussion so far has focused on memes and individual values, and their
transmission. In this section I relate this concept to norms, which are necessarily
collective [Morris, 1956].
There exist many definitions of the term norm, and a considerable amount of
disagreement: Gibbs [1965] cites no fewer than seven — somewhat contradictory
— definitions (including those of Morris [1956] and Homans [1950]). Moreover,
as Gibbs notes [p. 587], these are generally ambiguous. Here it is my intention
to construct a more precise definition that is suitable as a micro-foundation for
economic models.
Whereas values are not necessarily observable externally, it is generally held
that norms must be [Morris, 1956; Allison, 1992; Florini, 1996]. That is, they
need to involve values that are made visible through behaviour. However, norms
are more than simply ‘behavioural regularities’ [Florini, 1996, p. 364]. Such a
regularity might merely result from a commonly held value.
Succinctly, I take a norm to be “a set of intersubjective understandings
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readily apparent to actors that makes behavioural claims on those actors”
[Finnemore, 1994, in Florini, 1996, p. 364]. Allison [1992] takes a very simi-
lar line (citing Homans [1950]). As a direct comparison, a value (as I define it)
is merely an ‘understanding that makes a behavioural claim on its subject’.
Morris [1956] provides a clear distinction between values and norms:
[V]alues are individual, or commonly shared conceptions of the de-
sirable, ie, what I and/or others feel we justifiably want — what
it is proper to want. On the other hand, norms are generally ac-
cepted, sanctioned prescriptions for, or prohibitions against, others’
behaviour, belief, or feeling, ie, what others ought to do, believe,
feel—or else. Values can be held by a single individual; norms can-
not. Norms must be shared prescriptions and apply to others, by
definition. Values have only a subject—the believer—while norms
have both subjects and objects—those who set the prescription, and
those to whom it applies. Norms always include sanctions, values
never do. [Morris, 1956]
It is clear then that visible behaviours are a fundamental component of
norms: without observable actions being taken, sanctions cannot be applied.
This fact prompts a first-principles construction of a norm from constituent
values. I shall follow the approach taken by Allison [1992], who introduces the
idea of splitting a norm into component parts.
1.3.2 Defining a Norm
Morris’s description highlights the two major classes of values held by a norm’s
subjects. First, there is the observable behaviour, so there must be a value man-
dating or a taste for that behaviour. Second, the subject’s behaviour towards
others is dependent on whether they display that behaviour, and therefore there
must be some values pertaining to those sanctions or rewards. This motivates
the first two components of the following definition, which are necessary. As
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discussed in the previous section, the subjects of some norms also have a explicit
taste for the spread of the norm, so transmission values may also be components
of the norm’s values. Finally, there also may (or may not) be unobservable val-
ues attached to the norm. I package these values as a single unit, which I call a
basis, since they will define many of characteristics the norm.
Definition 1. The basis of a norm is a set of values, N , consisting of the
following components:
• One or more values mandating some observable behaviour (I denote the
set of these by X).
• One or more values entailing sanctions against those in whom X is not
observed and/or rewards for those in whom X is observed (Y ).
• Zero or more values explicitly prescribing transmission of N (T ).
• Zero or more non-observable values (Z).
The basis of a norm is just a set of beliefs; one must mandate some observable
behaviour and one must mandate sanctions or rewards of others, given their
behaviour. The individual holding these beliefs acts as Morris describes.
Values corresponding to transmission of the norm (T ) may be included,
but need not be; they may either be observable or not observable. (Bisin and
Verdier [2000, 2005]’s socialisation process fits in here.) Naturally, sanctioning or
transmitting behaviours may either be observable or not observable, so Y, T ⊆
X ∪ Z(= N). It will be helpful to define the set of ‘core’ observable values
(ie, not related to sanctions or transmission), X˜ = X\(Y ∪ T ), and similarly
Z˜ = Z\(Y ∪ T ).
In economic terms, the components of this definition can be considered as
facets of the utility function, with any sanctions or rewards being seen as alter-
ations to the choice sets of other agents. Thus, the set of values imparts both
behavioural restrictions on the subject directly, and also incentives on others.
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Definition 2. Amongst a number of individuals, a norm is the equilibrium
behavioural outcome due to some (or all) agents holding a basis of values that
satisfies Definition 1.
Restated, the existence of a norm in a group requires some agents to hold
some belief or otherwise have preferences about how they should behave, in-
cluding behaviours that provide incentives for others (sanctions or rewards).
Those not holding this set of beliefs are constrained in their behaviour by these
incentives. The resulting outcome, with each agent taking into account their
preferences and these incentives, is what I call a norm.
This definition is general enough to encompass those given by Morris [1956],
Homans [1950], and others, and offers a clear direction for theoretical (mod-
elling) work. In particular, the ‘intersubjectivity’ of Finnemore [1994] derives
from the simultaneous imposition of the sanctions/rewards by subjects and the
decisions taken by all objects who are aware of the norm. The resulting outcome
must be an equilibrium in which all agents maximise their utility with respect
to the constraints placed upon them by others.
Young [2008] makes a less formal definition, that a norm a “customary rule
of behaviour that coordinates our interactions with others”. However, my defi-
nition is more basic, in that coordination is a (possible) outcome, not a funda-
mental component. My more formal approach from first principles makes clear
precisely where a norm is different to commonly held preferences or behavioural
regularities: it is the beliefs about others’ behaviour.
There are two non-neoclassical elements to my definition. First, I allow
agents to have arbitrary preferences about each others’ behaviour, and these
preferences motivate the sanctions subjects apply to others. Fortunately, no new
ideas will be needed to formally model such situations, since this can be treated
as a type of externality. On the other hand, preferences must be malleable in
some sense, which I have not defined. Habit-forming and deliberate socialisation
are two possible mechanisms that have been modelled previously [Bisin and
Verdier, 2000, for example].
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1.3.3 Examples
Two examples demonstrate the generality of my definition. First, it is rare
for users of public transport in London to speak to one another. For some
this results from a preference for travelling in silence, though this is not true
for everyone. Consider this as a norm. The value mandating the observ-
able behaviour is the preference for not talking: X˜ = {‘travel in silence’},
and this also applies when not observed by others: Z˜ = {‘travel in silence’}.
Meanwhile, transgressors — regardless of their preferences — are punished,
so Y = {‘respond rudely to those who talk to you’}. This punishment may or
may not be observed by others, depending on the context. Finally, T = ∅. T is
empty since I make no explicit attempt to convey the norm to others: I don’t
necessarily want you to like travelling in silence. However, I may transmit these
values to some by example. A Euler diagram representing the relationships
between X, Y and Z can be found in Figure 1.1, Panel (A).
The norm then, is the equilibrium outcome within the population, some
of whom hold values N = X ∪ Z, and others who do not, but are nonetheless
affected by the incentives imposed by those holdingN . That is, if you attempt to
speak to someone, you risk sanction if that person holds N . On public transport
in London, there appear to be a sufficient number of ‘holders’ to support a
no-talking equilibrium, with occasional infractions and sanctions. Elsewhere,
though there may be individuals holding the basis N , they may not be enough
to support such an outcome.
A second example would be the norm of a hypothetical religious group that
is evangelical. Here, religious practice is observable, though of course the fun-
damental beliefs are not. Moreover, evangelism is prescribed and is observ-
able. So here we have X˜ = {‘practise religion’} (eg, attend worship); Y =
{‘shun those not practising’}; Z = {‘true religious belief’}. T = {‘evangelise’}
(and T ⊆ X). Supposing the sanction is also observable, we have Y ⊆ X, and
X = X˜ ∪ Y ∪ T . Panel (B) in Figure 1.1 demonstrates this example. Note that
Y ∩ T 6= ∅: evangelistic behaviour and sanctions may coincide. Here, the norm
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Figure 1.1: Euler diagrams representing basis values for norms for (A) not
talking to fellow passengers on public transport and (B) an evangelical sect.
See Section 1.3.3 for details of the examples. X is those values that mandate
observable practices; Y denotes values prescribing sanctions or rewards; Z is
the set of unobservable values; and T is those values mandating transmitting
behaviours.
X Z
Y
T = ∅
(A)
X Z
Y
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
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(B)
is the equilibrium level of religious practise within a community.
1.4 Equilibrium Outcomes
Morris [1956] presents a typology of norms (reproduced in Table 1.2) breaking
down 17 key dimensions along which norms may be compared. Many of these
derive from the values comprising the norm as discussed above. However, not all
do. For example, knowledge of the norm by objects (those to whom the norm
applies) will depend on the number of subjects (those holding the values) in
the population. In short, this is a property of the general equilibrium outcome
(though it need not be static).
The innovation here is to draw a distinction between the set of values com-
prising the norm, the basis, and the manifestation of the norm within a pop-
ulation. A norm that is held by a small number of people in one society may
constitute the same values as another norm prevalent elsewhere, but the effects
on the behaviour of both subjects and objects may well be different, especially
for objects who are not subjects.
In some sense, once can consider the basis of norm as exogenous to the
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of norms, from Morris [1956]. The following annota-
tions are mine: ‘I’ corresponds to properties intrinsic to the norm as a set of
values, whereas ‘G’ denotes properties that will depend on general equilibrium
effects in the population, or the manifestation of the norm. See the discussion
on page 30.
I. Distribution of the norm
Extent of knowledge of the norm
(1) By subjects (those who set
the norm)
G
(2) By objects (those to whom
the norm applies)
I,G
Extent of acceptance or agreement with the
norm
(3) By subjects I
(4) By objects I,G
Extent of application of the norm to objects
(5) To groups or categories I
(6) To conditions I
II. Mode of enforcement of the norm
(7) Balance of re-
ward/punishment
I
(8) Severity of sanction I
(9) Enforcing agency I,G
(10) Extent of enforcement (spe-
cialised or universal)
I
(11) Source of authority I
(12) Degree of internalisation by
objects
I,G
III. Transmission of the norm
(13) Socialisation process I/I,G
(14) Degree of reinforcement by
subjects
I,G
(15) Amount of conformity at-
tempted by objects
G
IV. Conformity to the norm
(16) Amount of deviance by ob-
jects
G
(17) Kind of deviance I,G
environment,9 and the prevalence and outcomes of the norm as endogenous and
depending on the environment in which the norm resides. Thus, in the final
column in Table 1.2 I categorise each property. Either the property is intrinsic
(‘I’) — that is, specified completely by the basis of the norm, or the property
depends on the manifestation of the norm (the general equilibrium outcome,
‘G’) — these outcomes include the number of subjects holding the norm, their
distribution amongst the general population, and other factors.
Extent of the norm amongst subjects (property 1) is necessarily a general
equilibrium outcome, since this quantity is simply the number of people hold-
ing the values that constitute the basis of norm. The number of subjects will
be a dynamic outcome of the transmission process, which will depend on the
constituent values themselves — but only indirectly, through the prevalence
rate.
Conversely, knowledge of the norm by objects (property 2) will depend di-
rectly on the intrinsic nature: if the values do not mandate strong sanctions
against non-subject objects (perhaps if subjects are rewarded instead) and
9Exogeneity is highly unlikely in the strict sense — the basis must have originated from
somewhere, and most likely evolved into its observed form for some reason. See the discussion
on page 32 and in Young [2008].
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prevalence is low, knowledge of the norm amongst these would be expected
to be low. It should be evident that any measure relating to objects will de-
pend somewhat on the prevalence of the norm at least, and is hence denoted
‘G’. However, the intrinsic values of the norm will still matter: a rare norm
that mandates evangelism would be better known than a rare norm mandating
secrecy, say. Therefore ‘I’ applies here too.
Finally, the transmission process (property 13) is of note. Transmission cer-
tainly depends on the values of the norm, especially if there are values mandating
efforts to teach the norm. However, it may also depend on the general equi-
librium: some norms become institutionalised. Rather than being transmitted
chaotically between individuals, there are structures formed specifically to (say)
teach the constituent values. This institutionalisation changes the transmission
process, and whether this happens (and how) will depend on the manifestation
of the norm. However, many norms are not institutionalised, and continue to
be transmitted in their endogenous fashion.
It is implicit in this discussion that, by my definition, the values of a norm
can be held by a single individual; however, this does not contradict Morris’s
1956 description (see page 25). All that is required is that there be only one
subject that holding the constituent values. A norm itself, though, is a property
of groups, corresponding to equilibrium behaviour. (But note that a single
subject, if sufficiently powerful, may be able to impart sufficient incentives for
a norm to be observed in a group).
In any case, it is unlikely that a norm’s values can be held by only one
individual in practice: the values must spread, otherwise the norm itself will
become extinct before too long. One successful example is Mormonism, founded
by Joseph Smith Jr. in the early 19th century. At its inception, the number of
subjects was just one: Smith himself.
To summarise, I differentiate two concepts: the value, which is a belief that
imposes a behavioural constraint, and the norm which is an equilibrium outcome
in which some agents have several bundled values. Some of these values must
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imply observable behaviours, and some must mandate enforcing behaviour on
others. There may also be allied non-observable values or values implying efforts
to transmit or teach the norm.
At the population level, a norm’s effects will depend on its prevalence. At
any instant, the collective efforts of the subjects of the norm will impose a set
of incentives for all in the society, and transmission will partly arise from this.
1.5 Development of Norms
One outstanding issue is the reason for the existence of any norms. The prevail-
ing explanation is simple: evolutionary advantage.10 The evolutionary process
can be considered in the usual — Darwinian — sense [eg, Allison, 1992; Mark,
2002; Young, 2008], in which populations having certain norms are more suc-
cessful than others. Hence the world we observe is populated by groups who
are made more successful due to their norms.11
One rationale for such behaviour is the case of some externality, so that
individual choices lead to a socially inefficient outcome. Several well known
mechanisms allow the social surplus to be maximised, such as taxation schemes
and the introduction of missing markets. But norms can also fulfil this role,
with interacting sanctions ensuring each actor behaves cooperatively. If children
exert an externality on others (either positive or negative), fertility norms may
constitute a means of achieving the most efficient fertility rate for the society.
Additionally, norms may assist decision-making even when there are not
coordination problems. If agents are unable to ascertain the full consequences of
their actions, prevalent values and/or norms may entail that chosen behaviours
are not detrimental. Naturally, societies having such values will be advantaged.
Florini [1996, p. 379] cites the example of heuristic rules in chess; these provide
10Proponents include Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982]; Allison [1992]; Florini [1996]; Henrich
[2001]; Mark [2002].
11There is also a more sophisticated evolutionary interpretation: the memetic point of view
applies the concept of natural selection to memes, values, and norms themselves. In this
context, a successful norm is one which is prevalent. This view presents people as merely
being the substrate for values, which may indeed harm its subjects, analogously to a parasite.
See Holdcroft and Lewis [2000] for a full explanation and comments.
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a short cut, allowing the player to avoid considering each possible branch of the
game-tree. These rules can help successful decision making even if the player
does not understand the reasoning behind the rule. Similarly, norms can impart
knowledge very cheaply, to save individuals from costly experimentation.
1.5.1 Diversity
If one expects the evolution of norms that are adapted to benefit a society,
it is not unreasonable to expect that different societies will develop different
norms, according to the environment they face. One conceivable outcome is the
divergence of fertility rates between different populations.
However, such reasoning is not essential in explaining differences in norms
between populations. Theoretical and simulation-based work by Findlay et al.
[1989] demonstrates that cultural systems exhibit more complicated dynam-
ics than solely biological systems, often resulting in multiple stable equilibria.
Though that research considers values alone, norms, via their incentive struc-
tures in equilibrium, create further potential for arbitrary self-sustaining (focal)
equilibria, implying that differing environments are not a necessary require-
ment for differing norms. The existence of social norms are therefore likely to
be strongly history-dependent.
1.6 Discussion
The arguments here highlight the distinct problems faced by the researcher seek-
ing to explain social phenomena when cultural forces are in evidence. However,
having acknowledged the distinction between values and norms allows the im-
plications of each to be drawn more specifically. The difference lies in the fact
that interactions affect individuals’ behaviour within groups where norms are
present. Values affect only the individual holding them.
One major question arises: do values-driven outcomes ever occur without
norms? This question is an empirical one, and has thus far gone unanswered by
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social scientists. But I hypothesise that the answer is no. Without a norm, there
is little opportunity for a value to be transmitted. Insofar as one’s preferences
are formed in a particular way by socialisation, rather than being physiologically
determined, they must be picked up from — or moulded in reference to — one’s
social environment. As an example, it is hard to conceive that son preference
is transmitted simply as a value alone without social interactions [Das Gupta
et al., 2002].
If values alone drove a behaviour, policy implications would be simple in
practice, despite the moral concerns raised when preferences are to be changed.
For example, addressing discrimination due to son preference is relatively clear-
cut: policy should strive to teach that boys and girls are of equal worth, and
the time to implement this teaching would be at a young age, when preferences
are more malleable. This is indeed a moral position, based on the axiom that
discrimination due to gender is obscene. It is not hard to find a consensus on
an issue such as this. However, what, if anything, should be done about son
preference when it truly does not lead to discrimination? Some would argue
that this too is obscene, though far less agreement would be found.12
The moral questions do not disappear when the policy question addresses
norms, but the practical problems certainly increase. With a strong norm in
place, a locally stable equilibrium exists, so any attempt to alter outcomes must
overcome the stabilising forces. If, say, son preferences are strongly reinforced
by all members of a community, education alone is unlikely to have a significant
impact. Moreover, if a policy is implemented from outside the community, there
may be a negative reaction to the external influence.
This paper’s aim is to push forward our understanding of values and norms
in a manner that is helpful for economists. The discipline is at last making great
strides in the field of cultural interactions, particularly in theoretical work. Fu-
ture empirical work should consider social forces in more detail, and particularly
attempt to identify when social factors are quantitatively important, as in Chap-
12To my mind, the ‘moral authority’ wielded by the policy-maker becomes more obvious
when one considers one’s preferences as one’s identity, as Akerlof and Kranton [2000] do.
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ters 3 and 4. However, we must bear in mind the moral dilemmas that policy-
making involves. Usually, policy action affects incentives: the costs people face.
If values and norms are deemed to cause unwanted outcomes, policy-makers will
find themselves needing to alter who people are.
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Chapter 2
Prices, Norms and
Preferences:
The Effect of Cultural
Values on Fertility
This paper investigates the influence of cultural values on fertility. First,
I compare the fertility of immigrants in the UK with fertility in their
countries of origin, before extending my analysis to consider the effect of
differential birth timing on the measurement of fertility.
High country of origin fertility is associated with high fertility in the UK,
in line with previous results. This is consistent with fertility preferences
being a transmissible (learnable) cultural value. However, I find that high
fertility in the country of origin is also associated with earlier childbearing.
If timing is not accounted for, this phenomenon could lead to an upward
bias when estimating the importance of cultural values.
36
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
2.1 Introduction
There are large differences in fertility rates between countries. In Somalia, the
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is over seven births per woman; in Hong Kong it
is close to one.1 Many explanations for these differences have been proposed,
including: opportunity costs in childrearing and women’s relative wages [Galor
and Weil, 1996, 2000; Wolf, 2006], returns on human capital [Becker et al.,
1990; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003], child mortality rates [Becker and Barro,
1988; Barro, 1991], family policies [Neyer, 2003], economic risks [Pommeret and
Smith, 2004], ‘altruistic’ reasons [Becker and Tomes, 1976; Becker and Barro,
1988; Ellis, 2006], and provision for care in old age [Neher, 1971; Ehrlich and
Lui, 1991; Morand, 1999; Ellis, 2006].
This paper investigates the influence of cultural values on fertility. That
culture does — or at least, has the ability to — influence fertility decisions
is self-evident: witness the Shaker movement, whose chastity led to eventual
extinction. This is an extreme example; however, many societies have norms or
otherwise prevailing values that influence choices about the number and timing
of births.
Following Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005, 2006], I compare the fertility of im-
migrants in the UK with fertility in their countries of origin. High country of
origin fertility is associated with high fertility in the UK, in line with Ferna´ndez
and Fogli’s results and consistent with fertility preferences being a transmissible
(learnable) cultural value. However, I then extend my analysis to consider the
effect of differential birth timing on the measurement of fertility. I find that
high fertility in the country of origin is also associated with earlier childbearing,
possibly leading to an upward bias when estimating the importance of cultural
values if timing is not accounted for.
When comparing high-fertility immigrants with low-fertility immigrants, the
former have their children when younger. If children are counted when women
are still fertile, high-fertility immigrants have had some of their children, and
1World Bank Development Indicators (1997); see Table 2.2.
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are measured as having larger families, while low-fertility women are yet to have
theirs. This biases up the estimated effect of cultural background on completed
fertility, since the low-fertility women catch up in later years, and the final
fertility gap is smaller than the gap that is measured.
2.1.1 Empirics
The methodology taken in this paper follows that of Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005,
2006], matching data on immigrants into Britain from the UK Labour Force
Survey with data (from World Development Indicators) from their country of
origin. The basic specification regresses the fertility of the individual on the
origin-country fertility rate. (Full details of methodology are to be found in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
There are two identifying assumptions: first, I assert that these women have
differing values regarding desired fertility, and the origin-country fertility rate
proxies for this. The second assumption requires that prices and external incen-
tives are the same for different immigrant groups. This is unlikely in practice,
but several observable differences can be controlled for (eg, educational attain-
ment gives an indication of the opportunity costs of childrearing).2
This paper presents several improvements on previous work. First, the LFS
dataset is both larger and better suited to this task than the General Social
Survey and US Census data used in Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005] and Ferna´ndez
and Fogli [2006] respectively. My base sample contains 11,081 observations,
compared to their samples of 6,774 and 1,145. Moreover, all women in my
dataset are first-generation immigrants, and I have information on their date
of arrival into the UK. In Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006], the women’s antecedents
may have been in the US for several generations. I discuss this further in Section
2.2. Also, a much wider selection of countries is represented in my sample.
Second, and more importantly, I consider heterogeneity in birth timing be-
2It should be observed that the majority of the unaccounted mechanisms would lead to an
upward bias of the estimated coefficients for cultural values. See Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
38
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
tween different groups. As my analysis in Section 2.4 indicates, this is likely to
bias up Ferna´ndez and Fogli’s estimates, since they interpret these coefficients
as differences in completed fertility. The strength of cultural norms provides an
upper bound for the role of policy in shaping fertility trends — if these norms
are very strong, policy will be ineffective. My results, indicating less impor-
tance for cultural norms, suggest a greater role for policies acting through price
channels.
2.1.2 Identification
The benefit of this methodology is that, by studying women of different ‘cultural
origins’ within the same environment, greater validity is lent to comparisons be-
tween groups. Were those groups observed in differing environments (their orig-
inal countries), they would face different prices and norms and no comparison
would be readily appropriate. The same idea is applied by Fisman and Miguel
[2007] to another cultural sphere: corruption, or adherence to protocol. Their
quasi-experiment depends on agents (UN diplomats) being separated from their
cultural brethren and placed in a common environment (New York). Because
of diplomatic immunity, parking fines levied on diplomatic cars were unenforce-
able; payment depended on diplomats’ own values. Most importantly, decisions
to pay fines are taken without facing the pressures of any norms prevalent in
their home environment.
There are two essential components for interpreting such work. The first is
the existence of a norm in the country of origin, or at least a prevailing value
that is transmitted to the agent. The value prescribes a fertility behaviour,
or can alternatively be considered as instilling particular preferences. Since
women take their values from their originating countries, there is a diversity
of values amongst the subjects of the study and, moreover, these values are
correlated with the values held in their origin countries. The second component
is observation in a common environment. This (hopefully) entails that, when
the agents come to act, they face a common set of prices and norms, and the
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differing effects of the values they hold can be ascertained.
2.1.3 Related Work
This work links several strands of research. Lam [1986], Kremer and Chen [2000]
and De la Croix and Doepke [2003] suggest that, besides the aggregate fertility
rate, fertility differentials between groups matter for both social mobility and
income inequality. These authors concentrate on differentials by income. How-
ever, differences between ethnic groups may play a similar role, especially if they
reinforce income-driven effects. For example, (poor) immigrants may choose to
have many children for both cultural and financial reasons. This could feasibly
be perceived as problematic by the native majority, especially in countries with
generous social welfare systems.
A second strand includes work on social norms such as Manning and Roy
[2007], who investigate the degree to which immigrants describe themselves as
British (they too use data from the LFS). They measure (predictably) that
immigrants are more likely to call themselves British over time, but they find
the perhaps surprising result that those from poorer countries seem to do so at
a faster rate.
This raises the question of whether other social determinants, such as fertility
norms, also converge over time. However, the age-specific nature of fertility may
make analysis difficult. This matter is further complicated by the effects found
by Andersson [2001] of elevated birth probabilities for most immigrant groups
shortly after arrival in Sweden. His interpretation is that “migration and family
building are interrelated processes” [Andersson, 2001, p. 1], though citizenship
eligibility might be expected to play a role in this.
2.1.4 Implications
The empirical work presented in this paper has implications in a number of
areas. The effects of the fertility rate on macroeconomic growth are highlighted
by Young [2005a,b], who studies the implications of the fertility response to
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the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Young states that the fertility
decline he observes could simply be a price effect in response to labour scarcity
[2005a, p. 424]. Regardless, his long run predictions for per-capita consumption
depend on this fertility decline, and even a small influence via cultural channels
could have non-trivial long-term effects.
Conversely, many developed countries currently face below-replacement fer-
tility (see eg, Billari and Kohler [2002]; Neyer [2003], and Table 2.2 in this pa-
per). Dixon and Margo [2006] highlight some of the implications of low fertility
in Britain, and discuss some of the remedial options available to policy-makers.
The first pillar of their argument is that, regardless of intent, government policy
affects fertility decisions, and that fertility ‘side effects’ should be borne in mind.
Indeed, they go on to suggest the government should be more direct in ‘promot-
ing’ fertility. Such a policy was introduced in Quebec and is studied by Milligan
[2002]. However, if culturally-derived preferences or incentives play a large role
in fertility choices, price-based policies may be infeasible or too expensive.
2.2 Data and Methodology
2.2.1 Variables
The objective of this paper is to quantify the effects of culture — in the forms
of individual values and collective norms — on fertility decisions.3 For this,
three key things are needed: a sample exhibiting a variety of cultural values,
some quantification of these values, and some measurement of the outcome in
a common — or at least, comparable — environment. I shall address each in
turn.
Variation: The focus of this study is immigrant women. Coming from dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds, it is hoped that they hold different cultural values,
transmitted to them in their original countries. This transmission could act
3I use the term ‘decision’, although it is not expected that this is always made consciously;
by this I mean only that people choose between different behaviours (eg, contraceptive use or
abstinence) that affect the probability of a birth at different costs.
41
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
via any of the vertical, horizontal and oblique modes (from parents, peers or
the community, respectively; see Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982]), either simply as a
learnt value, or through incentives existing due to a norm.
Quantification: In any country, the total fertility rate (TFR) represents
the number of women choosing to have children at the time of measurement.4
Each parental decision is itself the outcome of a process that involves parents’
preferences, the prices they face (including the institutional framework), and
non-price incentives imposed by others — not to mention chance. Variations in
TFR between countries will be driven by all of these factors.
However, it would be surprising if the true underlying values were not pos-
itively correlated with the number of births. Thus, TFR represents, to some
degree, the fertility preferences — that is, values — of the population, and
those which we expect the immigrant to hold. Therefore, following Ferna´ndez
and Fogli [2005, 2006], I use country of origin TFR as a measure for these values.
Naturally, there will be heterogeneity in the values held by individuals of the
country; indeed, there will be considerable variation in actual fertility outcomes.
But empirically this heterogeneity is hard to separate from unobservable factors
or stochastic components. Therefore I take the TFR to be merely indicative
of the individual’s preferences, and so appropriate care must be taken when
making inferences.
Environment: While the quantification of fertility preferences is vague, other
factors relevant to individuals’ fertility can be measured more directly. One
of the most commonly cited fertility determinants is the opportunity cost of
childrearing. This underlies the human capital and wage arguments of Becker
et al. [1990], de la Croix and Doepke [2003], Galor and Weil [1996, 2000], and
many others. If children require a considerable amount of maternal time, higher
wage rates mean a higher level of forgone income.
Estimating this forgone income (effectively the price of a mother’s time)
4TFR represents the total number of children born to a hypothetical woman whose be-
haviour at any age is the current behaviour of women that age. It will coincide with the
completed fertility rate (total children born to the cohort currently ending their fertile years)
when fertility patterns are stable over time.
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presents considerable difficulties, since it is a joint outcome with the fertility
decision itself. However, educational attainment is unaffected by one’s fertility,
and presents a measure of the mother’s human capital, and hence opportunity
costs. The literature cited suggests that a mother’s human capital will be neg-
atively correlated with her fertility. Since women are, in general, more likely
to remain at home to raise children, husbands’ income is more often used as a
measure for household income. The same arguments can be made for fathers’
forgone income as for mothers, but here income effects may be expected to be
dominant [Becker et al., 1990; Galor and Weil, 1996, 2000]. That is, higher in-
come and higher wage rates make children more affordable (presuming children
are a normal good). However, there may be concerns that paternal income is
endogenous because of assortative matching between high-capital partners.
Other factors that might be expected to affect fertility, such as access to
family planning technologies or infant mortality (as suggested by Barro [1991])
can reasonably be neglected when considering women in a developed country
such as the UK. Contraceptives and abortion are available widely, and so use
of these can be expected to be a woman’s own choice, even if norms — perhaps
enforced by husbands — may discourage such behaviour in some communities.
In addition, infant mortality is low in the UK (though it is feasible the some
groups from developing countries have higher rates than the native population
[Troe, 2008]).
In sum, the identifying assumption is that the economic costs of raising
children are equal for all groups in my sample, or at least that these costs are
not correlated with fertility in the country of origin. I will consider the validity
of this assumption in Section 2.5.
2.2.2 Existing Work
Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005, 2006] suggest that cultural values matter in women’s
fertility decisions. The former paper uses data from the United States’ 1970 Cen-
sus, focusing on women born in the US but whose fathers were not. They define
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‘country of origin’ to be the father’s country of birth. They restrict their sam-
ple to married women aged 30–40, resulting in 6,774 observations after omitting
women from various countries.5 Their remaining sample contains women having
origins in 25 different countries. However, 16 of these are European, and four
of the others are members of the OECD.6
In the latter paper, they use data from the US General Social Survey (GSS).
This dataset contains variables covering fertility and ethnic origins, in the form
of a question “From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors
come?” They restrict attention to women born in the US to control for country
differences such as educational systems. Taking observations from 1977, 1978,
1980 and 1982–1987, they select their sample to include only married women
aged 29–50. They again make restrictions on country of origin, similar to those
discussed in footnote 5. Here they are reduced to 14 countries, of which 11 are
European, a further two OECD but not European (Canada and Mexico), and
finally Russia.
The proxy Ferna´ndez and Fogli use for ‘cultural values’ is 1950 Total Fertility
Rate (TFR) in country of origin.7 They state that this is the earliest data
appropriate, and it is intended to represent TFR at the time of respondents’
ancestors’ migration. In this case, timing assumption is arguable; respondents
ancestors may have migrated hundreds of years previously. Indeed, only 8% of
respondents claimed “American” or “American Indian” heritage [Ferna´ndez and
Fogli, 2006, footnote 7, p. 554]. However in mitigation, the authors indicate that
the distribution of national TFRs is highly stable [Ferna´ndez and Fogli, 2006,
pp. 560].
5They exclude all women whose fathers born in countries that became centrally planned
economies after World War II, reasoning that these women’s parents must have been in the US
by 1940. Therefore their emigrating parents would not have experienced the transformation
to communism, and TFR in 1950 does not ‘capture the correct culture for these individuals’
[Ferna´ndez and Fogli, 2005, p. 10]. They also exclude countries with fewer than 15 observa-
tions.
6The remainder are Cuba, China, Lebanon, the Philippines and Syria.
7TFR attempts to measure the number of children a woman is expected to have ‘by the end
of her childbearing years’. It is be calculated as the sum of age-specific fertility rates, weighted
by the probability of reaching each given age. It does not, however, denote the completed
(ie, actual) fertility of any cohort of women, and is affected by changes in birth timing, as
highlighted by Bongaarts and Feeney [1998]. I will discuss timing further in Section 2.4.
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2.2.3 The Labour Force Survey
I use household data obtained from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) between
1996 and 2005 and proxy data from the World Bank Development Indicators
dataset. The LFS is a rolling panel conducted every quarter with each house-
hold appearing in five ‘waves’, and contains variables detailing employment,
education, income, family status, ethnicity and religion.8 Whilst there are some
disadvantages, the LFS data are superior to the US Census data and GSS in
several ways.
2.2.3.1 Disadvantages of the LFS
First and foremost, the LFS does not contain data on respondents’ ancestry;
in my data, country of origin is known only for first generation immigrants. I
believe that this disadvantage of the LFS data is more than compensated by
the ability to focus solely on a single generation of immigrants who have a rela-
tively consistent history in the UK. Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005] focus on second
generation immigrants, but if there were heterogeneity in matching between
groups (ie, some nationalities are more likely to find a partner within their own
group), then the cultural transmission would also feasibly be heterogeneous,
since women reporting some nationalities would be more likely to have both
parents of that nationality.9 The reporting of origin in Ferna´ndez and Fogli
[2006] is even more restricted, because the GSS data cannot discern how long
ago respondents’ ancestors arrived. In some cases this may have been hundreds
of years ago, so 1950 TFR may be an inappropriate proxy for their cultural
values. By taking only first-generation immigrants, I ensure that the women in
question have comparable circumstances.
A second disadvantage is that the LFS does not contain ‘raw’ fertility data,
8I take household responses from the first wave only.
9I am able to test for heterogeneity in matching rates. In my sample, 46% of women
have husbands from the same country of origin. Across countries, the average proportion of
husbands of the same origin is 0.40 with a standard deviation of 0.24. Singapore is lowest
(0.028) and Albania is highest (1.00). This suggests there may be heterogeneity in transmission
of values.
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for example in the form of birth histories or a number-of-births variable. To
circumvent this, an identifying assumption must be made: I assume that all
children live with their mothers [as in Gangadharan and Maitra, 2003].10 That
is, I take the number of a woman’s children in the household to be the number
of that she has had. Implicitly, childhood mortality is assumed to be zero. Non-
trivial mortality will only cause identification problems if there is heterogeneity
in mortality rates amongst immigrants from different countries.11 It is likely
that infant mortality would be higher for those immigrants from less-developed
countries, where fertility is typically higher [Troe, 2008]. This would tend to
bias down the coefficient on country of origin TFR, making it harder to find
a significant positive result. However, since mortality is low in general, this is
unlikely to be problematic.
2.2.3.2 Censoring
To reiterate, I define a woman’s fertility to be the number of her children and
stepchildren aged below 15 who live in her household. I label this variable
CHILDREN. This is likely to be accurate for younger women: they are not old
enough to have children who are older than fifteen. However, attenuation may
occur with older women, particularly for those groups who have children earlier.
This could have implications when considering birth timing factors (see Section
2.4). The effect can be considered as a ‘censoring’ of the data (cf. Greene [1997,
§19.9.2, pp. 936]).
In several regression specifications (see Tables 2.3, 2.6 and 2.8) large squared-
age coefficients indicate declining completed fertility with age at the upper end
of the sample range. Possibly older cohorts simply had fewer children. How-
ever, this finding is more likely to reflect either censoring of the data as older
children leave home, or that the a quadratic model is unsuitable for such a wide
age sample. The former is more likely and the results in Ferna´ndez and Fogli
10I treat stepchildren in exactly the same way as children, reasoning that for each woman
living with a stepchild, there is a woman not living with her child.
11 In computing TFR estimates I also neglect adult mortality. Therefore I simply compute
TFR as a sum of age-specific fertility rates.
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[2006] do not show this effect (Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005] does not report age
coefficients). Further, as can be seen in Figure 2.2, women appear to have chil-
dren swiftly once they begin a family, and then childbearing tails off. Thus,
the total number of children is increasing, but at a diminishing rate, suggesting
a quadratic is appropriate. However, all results presented here are robust to
eliminating women over 39. I attempt to address some of these issues in Section
2.4.
2.2.3.3 Advantages of the LFS
Most importantly, the LFS is a large survey. The years 1996–2005 record 1.15
million people, of which almost 80,000 were born abroad. I present results
using almost all 11,081 married women in aged 30–49; this compares favourably
with Ferna´ndez and Fogli’s samples of 6,774 from the US Census [2005] and
of 1,177 from the GSS [2006].12 Various summary statistics can be seen in
Table 2.1. GTFR is my proxy for fertility norms, the Total Fertility Rate
in the country of origin, taken from the World Bank Development Indicators
(1997), and DEGREE, FE, AL and GCSE are indicators of highest educational
attainment, taken from the LFS variable HIQUALD. Husband’s gross pay is
measured in thousands of pounds per annum, and is derived from the LFS
variables GRSSWK and GRSSWK2 (gross weekly pay in first and second jobs
respectively).
The LFS also captures immigrants from many more countries than the GSS:
89 compared with fourteen. Moreover, my sample includes a wide variety of
currently developing countries (see Table 2.2); in the GSS sample the majority
of original countries — and the majority of sample respondents — are from
western Europe. Only one has a instrumented TFR of above four (Mexico, with
6.87 children per woman), and only a further three have values above three.
The mean 1950 TFR is 3.01, with a standard deviation of 1.20. In my sample
12Following Ferna´ndez and Fogli, I disregard countries with fewer than ten observations
(though all results are robust to their inclusion). However, I have not eliminated women from
the former communist bloc as those authors do: their reasoning is not applicable for the time
periods relevant to my sample.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics, women born abroad aged 30–49, Labour Force
Survey 1996–2005. GTFR is my proxy for fertility norms, taken from the World
Bank Development Indicators. DEGREE, FE, AL and GCSE are indicators of
highest educational attainment. Husband’s gross pay measured in thousands of
pounds per annum.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
CHILDREN 1.48 1.264 0 9 11081
GTFR 3.126 1.498 1.087 7.25 11081
AGE 39.179 5.654 30 49 11081
DEGREE 0.123 0.328 11081
FE 0.062 0.241 11081
AL 0.065 0.246 11081
GCSE 0.086 0.28 11081
Husband’s DEGREE 0.201 0.4 11081
Husband’s FE 0.048 0.214 11081
Husband’s AL 0.12 0.326 11081
Husband’s GCSE 0.056 0.229 11081
Husband’s gross pay 29.497 26.388 0.26 663.416 4370
the values are 3.13 and 1.50, respectively. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship
between my sample’s mean fertility and country of origin TFR.
For simplicity, I use 1997 TFR as my proxy for fertility preferences. The
window for arrivals in the LFS sample is 1946–2005.13 This is certainly smaller
than the ‘arrival window’ Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006] are faced with, which is
feasibly several hundred years since they cannot focus on a single generation
of immigrants. Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005]’s sample also has a large arrival
window.
Unfortunately the resolution of the country of origin data is not perfect: not
all countries may be identified uniquely. I therefore take means of TFRs for
‘grouped’ countries. The groupings are given in Appendix A.1, page 145.
13Women aged 29–50, interviewed between 1996 and 2005. Restricting by age at arrival
would further reduce this window.
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Table 2.2: Country Statistics. See note on Table 2.1. Fertility denotes the mean
number of children of immigrants from each country, as plotted in Figure 2.1.
Country groups are explained in Appendix A.1.
Code Obs. GTFR Fert. Code Obs. GTFR Fert.
AGO 17 7.00 1.58 MEX 22 2.64 0.90
ALB 15 2.52 2.06 MLT 87 1.83 1.16
ARG 13 2.62 0.84 MMR 17 3.30 1.29
AUS 233 1.77 1.35 MUS 86 2.04 1.26
AUT 18 1.36 1.00 MWI 60 6.43 1.63
BEL 30 1.60 1.83 MYS 167 3.26 1.25
BGD 536 3.30 2.55 NGA 204 6.00 1.92
BGR 20 1.09 1.05 NLD 88 1.53 1.56
BIH 11 1.60 1.45 NOR 27 1.86 1.22
BRA 49 2.27 0.97 NZL 108 1.96 1.25
BRB 24 1.75 1.33 PAK 1034 5.00 2.22
CAN 183 1.55 1.15 PHL 235 3.64 1.06
CHE 43 1.48 1.20 POL 126 1.51 0.92
CHI 18 1.75 1.38 PRT 102 1.46 1.15
CHL 15 2.25 1.26 ROM 26 1.32 0.88
CHN 132 1.90 1.09 RUS 55 1.23 0.87
COL 51 2.70 1.13 SDN 26 4.90 2.30
CYP 198 2.00 1.38 SGP 181 1.63 1.29
CZE 18 1.17 1.66 SLE 29 6.06 1.62
DEU 522 1.35 1.38 SOM 31 7.25 3.00
DNK 43 1.75 1.11 SVK 12 1.43 0.50
DZA 20 3.50 1.80 SWE 53 1.52 1.35
EGY 39 3.55 1.53 THA 61 1.90 0.81
ESP 97 1.15 1.21 TTO 54 1.75 1.40
ETH 19 5.86 0.89 TUR 152 2.72 1.36
FIN 32 1.75 1.15 TZA 126 5.60 1.34
GHA 122 4.50 1.63 UGA 195 6.60 1.38
GRC 23 1.31 1.08 UKR 22 1.30 1.00
GUY 39 2.45 0.97 USA 428 1.97 1.32
HKG 239 1.08 1.29 VNM 53 2.40 1.54
HRV 15 1.69 1.13 YUG 75 1.74 1.69
HUN 20 1.38 0.85 ZAF 301 3.00 1.28
IDN 20 2.75 0.90 ZAR 11 6.70 2.81
IND 1529 3.30 1.32 ZMB 91 5.60 1.60
IRN 113 2.80 1.46 ZWE 144 3.96 1.50
IRQ 49 4.70 1.95 GRP02 36 5.60 1.22
ITA 170 1.22 0.98 GRP03 29 3.00 1.44
JAM 193 2.70 1.06 GRP04 109 5.30 1.69
JPN 137 1.38 1.05 GRP07 46 3.10 1.23
KEN 577 4.70 1.34 GRP08 99 5.70 1.88
KOR 39 1.60 1.35 GRP09 27 4.60 1.11
LBN 27 2.50 1.66 GRP10 203 1.72 1.31
LBY 38 3.80 2.26 GRP12 35 4.45 2.11
LKA 207 2.15 1.30
LTU 18 1.39 0.55 Av. 124.5 2.89 1.38
MAR 37 3.10 1.64 Std. 214.4 1.63 0.45
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Figure 2.1: Mean fertility of immigrants in UK versus TFR in country of ori-
gin. Fit lines are (a) weighted by size of country group in my sample, and (b)
unweighted.
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2.3 Regression Specifications and Results
2.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares
Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006] run several ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions
of the following form:
Zisjt = β0 + β′1Xi + β
′
2Y˜i + β
′
3Z˜j + fs + γt + isjt.
Here, Zisjt is the fertility of a woman i, who lives in region s, is of ancestry
j, and is interviewed in year t. Xi contains individual characteristics depending
on the specification and Z˜j is the cultural values proxy: country of origin TFR
(I label this variable GTFR). γt is the year-of-survey fixed effect. Here, I do not
consider regional effects (fs). Yi is the number of siblings the woman herself
has, a factor which I also do not investigate here.
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2.3.1.1 Regression Model
My comparable regression model is:
Zijt = β0 + β′1Xi + β
′
2Z˜j + γt + ijt.
The terms are:
Zijt The number of children of a woman i, who lives in region s, is of
ancestry j, and is interviewed in LFS wave t. I label this variable
CHILDREN.
Xi Individual characteristics of woman i, depending on the specification.
Z˜j My proxy for fertility norms, the Total Fertility Rate of country j.
This variable is labelled GTFR.
γt Survey-wave fixed effect.
ijt Error term.
Control variables used include AGE and AGE2, the woman’s age and squared
age; indicators DEGREE, FE, AL and GCSE denoting the woman’s education
(a degree, further education, A-Level and GCSE attainment (or equivalent)
respectively); husband’s educational attainment indicators; and her husband’s
gross pay (measured in thousands of pounds sterling per annum).14
The coefficient of interest is β2, which measures the power of the fertility
proxy in explaining fertility outcomes amongst the women in my sample.
β0, the constant term, is a measure of the baseline number of children that
the women in my sample have. If age controls are included in Xi, it will reflect
the number of children a woman has had at age 30, since the sample contains
women of age 30–49. The actual expected number of children will be a linear
transformation also involving the age coefficients from β1. It must be noted that
this is a completed fertility measure. I will return to this in Section 2.4.15
14Husbands’ income is chosen to avoid endogeneity between fertility and women’s income.
See the discussion on Page 43.
15In particular, see the discussion on page 65 concerning the interpretation of coefficients.
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2.3.1.2 Results
Table 2.3 presents OLS results, with robust standard errors accounting for clus-
tering at the country of origin level. With only the cultural proxy included in the
regression (column (1)), Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006] find it to be statistically sig-
nificant at better than 1%, with a coefficient of 0.166. In the same specification
I estimate this coefficient to be 0.146, also significant at 1%. (Time dummies
are included for all 40 waves, as is a constant term, though these coefficients are
not reported).
Where available, I use the same controls as Ferna´ndez and Fogli: age (AGE),
squared age (AGE2) and dummies for highest educational attainment (derived
from the LFS variable HIQUALD). These are DEGREE, FE, AL and GCSE,
representing degree level, further education level, A-Level or GCSE attainment
respectively. Controlling for age and education (Table 2.3, column (2)) they
find this falls slightly to 0.117 (still significant at 1%); I find a value of 0.144,
significant at 0.1%.
Quantitatively, this coefficient value corresponds to an increase of 0.23 chil-
dren for a standard deviation increase in GTFR (1.63). This is about half of
the standard deviation of the fertility across country groups (0.45).
The age controls are also significant at 0.1% as would be expected and have
the expected signs: the age coefficient is positive — older women have had more
children, and the squared-age coefficient is negative suggesting (predictably)
that the rate of childbearing declines with age.
The education dummies all have negative signs and are jointly significant at
5%. However, only DEGREE and AL are individually significant, at the 1% and
5% level respectively. Note that these two coefficients are quantitatively quite
large (-0.282 and -0.244), suggesting that women having these qualifications
tend to have a quarter of a child fewer.
With GTFR ranging between 1.087 and 7.25 (Table 2.1), country of origin
fertility is the largest factor in predicting individuals’ fertility besides age, dom-
inating education. These findings support the argument that cultural values are
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Table 2.3: Ordinary Least-Squares regressions, family size on TFR rate in coun-
try of origin. A constant term and wave dummies are included in each regression.
Standard errors account for clustering at the country of origin level (White)
[Greene, 1997, pp. 503].
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
GTFR 0.146∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.0452) (0.0419) (0.0405) (0.0379)
AGE 0.720∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0339) (0.0483)
AGE2 -0.00992∗∗∗ -0.00996∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗
(0.000394) (0.000383) (0.000579)
DEGREE -0.282∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.265∗∗
(0.105) (0.0745) (0.0824)
FE -0.144 -0.0968 -0.0153
(0.105) (0.0818) (0.0937)
AL -0.244∗ -0.192∗ -0.136
(0.112) (0.0896) (0.0915)
GCSE -0.126 -0.0737 -0.0698
(0.104) (0.0855) (0.0743)
Husband’s DEGREE -0.0948 -0.0436
(0.0757) (0.0979)
Husband’s FE -0.145 -0.0678
(0.0805) (0.107)
Husband’s AL -0.189∗ -0.169
(0.0834) (0.100)
Husband’s GCSE -0.138 -0.0834
(0.0865) (0.122)
Husband’s gross pay 0.00118
(0.00114)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 4370
R2 0.035 0.166 0.169 0.144
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.4: Correlations between educational controls for women and their hus-
bands. Note that the indicator is 1 for the highest level of qualification only.
NONE corresponds no qualification.
Variables DEGREE FE AL GCSE NONE
Husband’s DEGREE 0.45 0.09 0.06 -0.02 -0.38
Husband’s FE 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.07 -0.15
Husband’s AL -0.03 0.03 0.11 0.13 -0.13
Husband’s GCSE -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.12 -0.10
Husband’s NONE -0.34 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 0.50
significant in determining family size preferences.
My estimates of the GTFR and age coefficients are robust to including
women’s husbands’ characteristics (Table 2.3, columns (3) and (4)). Dummies
for husbands’ education all appear negatively, with A-Level attainment having
5% significance (column (3)). This finding is unexpected, since if fathers do
not undertake childcare, higher paternal earnings would expand the household
budget set without increasing opportunity costs, as in Galor and Weil [1996,
2000]. However, there is a high level of correlation between husbands’ and
wives’ education (Table 2.4) — there is some degree of assortative matching.
Assortative matching entails that the coefficients on husbands’ education
partly identify their wives’ education. In Table 2.3, column (3), women’s educa-
tion dummies are all reduced in magnitude (they become more positive) when
husbands’ education is included, though significance levels are unchanged. The
minor increase in the R2 statistic is consistent with this story. As such, hus-
band’s education may act negatively because educated men marry educated
women (who have fewer children), even though husbands’ human capital may
have a positive effect on fertility in itself.
In Table 2.3, column (4), husbands’ income is included in the regression.
Husband’s gross pay enters positively but insignificantly. This mirrors the find-
ing by Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006]. The positive effect is previously documented
[Butz and Ward 1979; Heckman and Walker 1990, in Galor and Weil 1996] and
is predicted by the models of Galor and Weil [1996, 2000]. Though insignificant,
the positive coefficient is consistent with paternal education having a positive
54
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
effect on fertility which is dominated by assortative matching with educated
women.
The influence of women’s age and education are robust to inclusion of hus-
bands’ income, and small changes to the education coefficients are attributable
to the smaller subsample. Results are very similar when specification (3) is run
on the sample of model (4) (regression not reported).
2.3.1.3 Fixed Effect Models
Table 2.5 presents OLS results with country of origin dummies included, rather
than country of origin fertility. The fit of each model (measured by the R2
statistic) can be used to infer the explanatory power of the culture proxy. With
each set of controls, the more general specification improves model fit by around
8 percentage points, with the country of origin dummies being significant at
better than 0.1% in each case. On its own, the proxy GTFR explains 3.5% of
fertility differences between women (Table 2.3, column (1)), or roughly a third
of the differences between country groups. Other factors make up two-thirds of
between-group differences.
Standard deviations of the country dummies lie in the range 0.41–0.47 for the
various specifications in the table. As in the previous specification, differences
in fertility between country groups are larger than the effects of any other factor
in the regressions, except age.
In the alternative models with country dummies, coefficients on women’s
education all become less negative, with A-Level education becoming insignifi-
cant and both DEGREE and GCSE increasing by around 0.13, about half their
magnitude. This result suggests there are differences in levels of education be-
tween country groups that are not correlated with GTFR. The country dummies
identify some of the educational differences.
Husbands’ education coefficients also become more positive; they are sta-
tistically insignificant (column (3)). Moreover, these coefficients are essentially
insignificant economically. In this case, including husbands’ education does not
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Table 2.5: Ordinary Least-Squares regressions, family size on country of origin
dummies. Wave dummies are included in each regression. Standard errors
account for clustering at the country of origin level (White) [Greene, 1997, pp.
503].
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGE 0.737∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(0.0307) (0.0304) (0.0473)
AGE2 -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.01000∗∗∗
(0.000353) (0.000351) (0.000569)
DEGREE -0.153∗∗ -0.160∗∗ -0.221∗∗
(0.0502) (0.0484) (0.0728)
FE -0.0125 -0.00719 0.0399
(0.0500) (0.0495) (0.0677)
AL -0.125 -0.114 -0.116
(0.0643) (0.0613) (0.0782)
GCSE 0.00128 0.0157 -0.00218
(0.0454) (0.0444) (0.0600)
Husband’s DEGREE 0.00521 0.0217
(0.0406) (0.0763)
Husband’s FE -0.0509 -0.0138
(0.0548) (0.0892)
Husband’s AL -0.0738 -0.0901
(0.0428) (0.0673)
Husband’s GCSE -0.0462 -0.0214
(0.0463) (0.0811)
Husband’s gross pay 0.00205∗∗
(0.000752)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 4370
R2 0.119 0.241 0.241 0.224
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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increase the R2 statistic at all, suggesting a high correlation in educational
attainment both within couples and within country groups.
With country fixed effects, husbands’ income is significant at the 1% level
(Table 2.3, column (4)). Relative to the baseline model with the culture proxy,
the point estimate coefficient is almost doubled, and all the educational dum-
mies are more positive. As with education, income levels are likely to be differ-
ent between country groups. Across the whole sample, income is statistically
insignificant, but once group differences are accounted for with fixed effects,
income is significant.
The magnitudes of the fixed effect coefficients, along with the lesser im-
portance of education is consistent with significant differences in family size
preferences across groups. Transmitted values, as proxied by country of ori-
gin fertility, appears to comprise a non-trivial component of these differences.
Nonetheless, there are sizeable group-specific factors that are not captured by
the proxy. Future work will investigate these differences more fully, particularly
with respect to sample selection issues.
2.3.1.4 Problems
Econometrically, a linear specification is unsatisfactory. The number of children
a woman has is likely to be better modelled as a discrete, count-based data
generating process. I shall now consider some of these specifications, following
the discussion in Greene [1997, §19.9] and Wooldridge [2002, §19.2]. Young
[2005a,b] demonstrates some applications of this model to fertility.
2.3.2 Poisson Count
2.3.2.1 Regression Model
In the Poisson count model, the dependent variable takes a Poisson distribution
with mean (and hence variance) whose logarithm is a linear combination of the
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independent variables.16 That is,
Zijt ∼ Poisson(µijt)
Where logµijt = β0 + β′1Xi + β
′
2Z˜j + γt.
Conveniently, the estimates have the same interpretation as those in a log-
linear regression.
The coefficient estimates may computed numerically by the maximum like-
lihood method. It should be noted the Poisson model necessarily implies het-
eroskedasticity, since if Z ∼ Poisson(µ), then Var(Z) = E(Z) = µ.
Even in the case that the dependent process is not Poisson, the coefficient
estimates found by (pseudo-)maximum likelihood estimation are robust to a
number of misspecifications. Particularly, they are unchanged under the gener-
alisation that Var(Z) = σ2 E(Z) for constant σ2. If σ2 > 1 this is described as
‘over-dispersion’ Wooldridge [2002, p. 647]. However, although the coefficient
estimates are unchanged, the standard errors must be adjusted upwards.
Conversely, if σ2 < 1 (under-dispersion), the standard errors derived by
pseudo-maximum likelihood are robust. There are a number of tests for over-
dispersion (recorded in Wooldridge [2002, pp. 655] and Greene [1997, §19.9.3,
pp. 937]). I have found no evidence of over-dispersion in my sample; most tests
indicate a small degree of under-dispersion.
2.3.2.2 Results
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 records the results of these Poisson regressions with the same
independent variables as the OLS regressions in Tables 2.3 and 2.5 respectively,
again with clustered errors at the country of origin level. In each case the fit is
slightly better than its OLS counterpart, according to the predicted values test
(Pseudo-R2) given by Wooldridge [2002, p. 653].
The coefficients cannot be compared directly with those from the OLS but
16The Poisson distribution with parameter µ has probability mass function f(k) = e
−µµk
k!
.
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Table 2.6: Poisson regressions, family size on TFR rate in country of origin.
A constant term and wave dummies are included in each regression. Standard
errors account for clustering at the country of origin level (White) [Greene, 1997,
pp. 503].
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
GTFR 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.0937∗∗∗ 0.0912∗∗∗ 0.0804∗∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0237) (0.0231) (0.0232)
AGE 0.637∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗
(0.0559) (0.0550) (0.0451)
AGE2 -0.00877∗∗∗ -0.00881∗∗∗ -0.00908∗∗∗
(0.000724) (0.000712) (0.000567)
DEGREE -0.200∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
(0.0660) (0.0478) (0.0567)
FE -0.103 -0.0695 -0.0149
(0.0695) (0.0553) (0.0651)
AL -0.172∗ -0.136∗ -0.100
(0.0707) (0.0575) (0.0627)
GCSE -0.0891 -0.0533 -0.0419
(0.0647) (0.0541) (0.0497)
Husband’s DEGREE -0.0681 -0.0325
(0.0471) (0.0649)
Husband’s FE -0.106∗ -0.0501
(0.0515) (0.0704)
Husband’s AL -0.134∗ -0.125
(0.0535) (0.0684)
Husband’s GCSE -0.0968 -0.0650
(0.0546) (0.0812)
Husband’s gross pay 0.000829
(0.000871)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 4370
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.175 0.178 0.151
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.7: Poisson regressions, family size on country of origin dummies. A
constant term and wave dummies are included in each regression. Standard
errors account for clustering at the country of origin level (White) [Greene,
1997, pp. 503].
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGE 0.650∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0445)
AGE2 -0.00892∗∗∗ -0.00894∗∗∗ -0.00901∗∗∗
(0.000644) (0.000644) (0.000569)
DEGREE -0.109∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗
(0.0346) (0.0335) (0.0520)
FE -0.0119 -0.00726 0.0243
(0.0348) (0.0343) (0.0453)
AL -0.0883∗ -0.0799 -0.0846
(0.0428) (0.0409) (0.0542)
GCSE 0.00112 0.0120 0.00818
(0.0286) (0.0284) (0.0418)
Husband’s DEGREE 0.00178 0.0176
(0.0278) (0.0514)
Husband’s FE -0.0430 -0.0134
(0.0380) (0.0583)
Husband’s AL -0.0575 -0.0730
(0.0300) (0.0475)
Husband’s GCSE -0.0360 -0.0206
(0.0302) (0.0516)
Husband’s gross pay 0.00149∗∗
(0.000530)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 4370
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.254 0.0254 0.233
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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the pattern of significance is very similar, as are the relative magnitudes. GTFR
is statistically significant at 0.1% in each specification.
Quantitively, these results suggest that a one (group) standard deviation
increase in GTFR (1.63) explains an increase in fertility of 13–14%. As with
the OLS regressions, the economic significance of the culture proxy dominates
all other factors except age. Again, country fixed effects improve the fit of the
model by around 8 percentage points, with GTFR alone explaining 3.4% of
family size differences, consistent with a role for cultural values in determining
fertility preferences.
2.4 Heterogeneous Birth Timing
Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006] take some steps to address the dynamic nature of
fertility: they restrict the sample to older women (ages 29–50), and they in-
corporate age and squared-age controls. In Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005] they
consider only women aged 30–40. Ideally one would consider only ‘completed
fertility’, looking at older women, so that any timing differences would be ac-
counted for. However, in the sample age range, women are still fertile. Hence,
coefficient estimates may be biased or misleading if birth timing is heterogeneous
and systematically correlated with the cultural proxy.
Figure 2.2 indicates this may be the case: it appears that women from
high-TFR countries reach their highest fertility in the 20–25 age band, whereas
women from low-TFR countries reach their peak between 25 and 30. This
comparison does not control for factors such as education, but this illustration
suggests that further investigation is appropriate.
There is another potential problem deriving from birth timing: differing
patterns of fertility after thirty are seen, implying heterogeneity in birth rates
in the 30–40 age band. This is likely to bias the measurement of completed
fertility differences, because age coefficients will not correctly capture continuing
fertility for all groups. It is not clear that Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006] will be
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Figure 2.2: Trends in birth timing. Data plotted are the age-specific fertility
rates for immigrants, grouped by TFR in their country of origin.
TFR estimates for each group are the sum of the 5-year rates (see the discussion
in Footnote 11, page 46). This is equal to the integral of the relevant curve.
Not only do high-TFR countries (third and top quartiles) have more children,
their peak fertility appears to be earlier (25–30 as opposed to 30–35).
Note that raw data is plotted: there are no controls for educational attainment
or other factors; these may be correlated with the TFR proxy.
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immune from this problem if similar trends were shown in their data. Indeed,
is possible that Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005] will be more susceptible, since their
sample includes only women in that age range.
Here, I test for this effect by including the interaction between age and the
TFR instrument as a regressor in a Poisson regression. An alternate specification
would allow different countries of origin to have different age coefficients (a
random growth model).
2.4.1 Concerns
Birth timing may be heterogeneous for several reasons. Education might be
expected to be a major factor, since women may defer childbearing until it is
completed. Earnings and the expected path of future income may also play a
role, and this may be ambiguous: women might decide to have children when
their financial constraints are less, but also they may delay childbearing if the
present opportunity cost is very high.
These effects are also likely to work though husbands’ earnings, recalling
the contribution of Galor and Weil [1996]. In their model, increases in women’s
wages increase the opportunity cost of childrearing and reduce fertility. Con-
versely, men’s wages relate only to the size of the budget set, and higher male
wages make children more ‘affordable’: fertility increases in male earnings.
Finally, another reason for heterogeneous birth timing may be differing pref-
erences — that is, cultural values. It is appropriate for any work considering
culture and fertility preferences to consider preferences regarding timing; how-
ever neither Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005] nor Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2006] mentions
this.
2.4.2 Implications
If women from low-TFR countries have children earlier, this will bias up the
estimated differences in completed fertility. The mechanism for this is simple:
selecting a sample of women aged 30 and older, the regression model used entails
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that the constant term and coefficient on GTFR together reflect fertility at age
30, with the age coefficients reflecting time trends as if common to all women.
As an example, consider the hypothetical case that the cultural proxy was
entirely uncorrelated with completed fertility, but a high proxy were related
to early fertility. A regression including only women in the middle of their
fertile years would record a positive coefficient on GTFR, since those with a
high proxy would have ad their children early, before the time of measurement
and the others would not yet have had their children. Conversely, a regression
with only older women would report zero: the true effect of GTFR on fertility.
The positive estimate is only due to timing, not aggregate fertility. If between-
group timing differences are present in the data, the interpretation of the GTFR
coefficient must be re-examined.
2.4.3 Testing
Here, I test for a time-shift correlated with GTFR by including the interaction
between age and the TFR instrument as a regressor in a Poisson regression.
I append two terms, GTFR*AGE, and GTFR*AGE2, taking account of the
interactions with age and squared age respectively.
First, the AGE coefficient is likely to increase, since the baseline woman (low
GTFR) is expected to have children at a faster rate in the sample age range.
The interaction coefficient will correspondingly take a negative sign, since high-
GTFR women are expected to have fewer children between 30 and 50.
By allowing separate trends for high- and low-GTFR women, I expect the
former to be fitted a flatter cumulative fertility with age, and the latter a steeper
profile. This results in a wider gap between the predicted fertilities at age 30
— ie, a larger GTFR coefficient. But since the trends converge, the gap in
completed fertility is now smaller. The effect on the constant term will depend
on the identity ‘baseline’ woman, ie, the normalisation used. I will return to
this in Section 2.4.3.3.
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2.4.3.1 Normalisation
Up to this point, I have followed Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005, 2006] to allow a
direct comparison of my results. However, the interpretation of the constant
term is not immediately obvious in their framework. I therefore make a number
of normalisations.
First, I normalise the cultural proxy GTFR by subtracting the value for
Britain (1.73) to construct the variable GTFRN. The objective is to put in con-
text the constant term and age coefficients for a hypothetical British woman.17
Secondly, I normalise age by subtracting 30, the lower bound of my sample,
constructing the variable AGEN, squaring this to make AGEN2. Along with
the above, this now gives a very simple interpretation of the constant term. In
a linear regression it is the expected number of children a British woman aged
30, and in a Poisson regression it is the logarithm of this expectation.
Note that these linear transformations do not alter the fundamental regres-
sion framework. To see this, observe that the spans 〈GTFR,AGE,AGE2, 1〉 and
〈(GTFR−1.73), (AGE−30), (AGE−30)2, 1〉 are the same, since (AGE−30)2 =
AGE2−60(AGE)+900. Another way of putting this is that the new coefficients
will be bijection of the old coefficients.18
2.4.3.2 Results
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.8 records the results from OLS and Poisson
regressions with interaction terms between age and my cultural proxy. Columns
(1) and (3) show results from regression without interactions. These two are
transformations of the regressions in Table 2.3 column (2) and Table 2.6 column
(2) respectively, following the preceding discussion. All regressions here include
educational controls and sample wave dummies (not reported).
While interaction terms themselves are only significant in the Poisson model,
17This woman is hypothetical in the sense that she has ‘British preferences’ but was born
abroad. The baseline woman might alternately be considered to be from France (inc. Monaco)
(TFR 1.73) or Serbia and Montenegro (TFR 1.74).
18A simple algebraic manipulation shows that estimated coefficients on GTFR and GTFRN
will be the same, as will the coefficients on AGE2 and AGEN2. βAGEN = βAGE + 60βAGE2.
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Table 2.8: OLS and Poisson regressions with fertility rate-age interaction. Wave
and educational dummies are included in each regression. Standard errors ac-
count for clustering at the country of origin level (White).
For reference, columns (1) and (3) record analogous regressions to those in Table
2.3 column (2) and Table 2.6 column (2) respectively; refer to the discussion on
normalisation (page 65).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
GTFRN 0.144∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.0937∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.0419) (0.0707) (0.0237) (0.0378)
AGEN 0.125∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0124)
AGEN2 -0.00992∗∗∗ -0.00999∗∗∗ -0.00877∗∗∗ -0.00982∗∗∗
(0.000394) (0.000513) (0.000724) (0.000705)
GTFRN*AGEN -0.0118 -0.0150∗∗
(0.00642) (0.00507)
GTFRN*AGEN2 0.0000423 0.000646∗
(0.000242) (0.000277)
Constant 1.391∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.158∗
(0.116) (0.0956) (0.0768) (0.0744)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 11081
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.9: Predicted fertility deriving from regressions (2) and (4) from Table
2.8; no educational dummies are used. Note that predicted fertility declines
between 35 and 40; this follows from large squared age coefficients relative the
age coefficients, and may reflect censoring in the data (see page 45).
Age 30 35 40
OLS ‘Britain’ (GTFRN = 0) 1.26 1.71 1.67
Kenya (GTFRN = 1.97) 1.74 2.08 1.93
Difference 0.48 0.37 0.26
Poisson ‘Britain’ (GTFRN = 0) 1.17 1.80 1.69
Kenya (GTFRN = 1.97) 1.59 2.18 1.94
Difference 0.42 0.38 0.25
they are jointly significant at 0.1% in the OLS model and at 0.5% in the Poisson
model.
When the interaction terms are added, the GTFRN coefficients increase by
roughly 70%. Also in line with predictions, the AGE coefficient increases with
the interaction terms having opposite signs to the age terms. It remains signif-
icant in each specification. This might be taken as evidence that the cultural
proxy is more important than previously thought. However, a more careful
consideration these results suggests the opposite is true for completed fertility.
Table 2.9 shows predicted fertility for two women, one being a hypothetical
British woman (GTFRN = 0), and the other being, say, Kenyan (GTFRN ≈
2). (No educational dummies are applied.) It is predicted that the fertility
difference is less for older women than those aged 30. This reflects the fact
that the GTFRN interaction terms have the opposite signs to the plain age
coefficients. However, these figures must be treated with caution, since declining
total fertility suggests data problems, for example the censoring of children of
older women (see page 45).
2.4.3.3 Explanation
It appears that the model of Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005, 2006] is insufficient
to explain the fertility trends observed in my data. The evidence presented
here suggests that a part of the measured fertility differences across groups may
result from differences in birth timing and not differences in total fertility.
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Figure 2.3: A simple model of fertility dynamics.
α represents the constant term in found in the regression, β the coefficient on
GTFRN and γ the coefficient on age. δ denotes the GTFRN-age interaction.
Quadratic age terms are ignored.
The αˆ, βˆ and γˆ terms stylise the fitted coefficient values if an interaction term
is not included in the regression.
//
OO
Age
Fertility
30 40


































iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
α
α+ β α+ γ
α+ β + γ − δ
αˆ
αˆ+ βˆ αˆ+ γˆ
αˆ+ βˆ + γˆ
Though it appears that immigrants from high-TFR countries have had more
children at the age of 30, this trend is reversed as immigrants from low-TFR
countries catch up later. Figure 2.3 shows a stylised model of this. The dark
lines represent linear fertility trends for women from a low-TFR country and a
high-TFR country. At age 30, the fertility difference is β. However, by age 40
the gap narrows to β − δ.
The dotted lines in Figure 2.3 represent the model that Ferna´ndez and Fogli
fit, with a fixed fertility gap at all ages. The same age profile is fitted for both
groups: this is too steep for the high-TFR women, and too shallow for the low-
TFR women. The fitted profiles are then too close at 30 and too far apart at
40 (β− δ < βˆ < β). In this example, the predicted difference in both completed
and age-30 fertility is βˆ. However, the true difference in completed fertility is
β − δ. We see that interpretation of the GTFR coefficient is dependent on the
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timing of fertility within the sample.
With the normalisation I use in my regressions (explained in Section 2.4.3.1),
the constant term corresponds to predicted fertility at 30 for a ‘British’ woman.
Her fertility was previously overestimated. In the diagram, this corresponds to
αˆ > α.
2.4.3.4 Simulation
I conduct a simple simulation to estimate the effects of misspecifying the re-
gression model. If the interaction terms formed part of the true data-generating
process, what would be the estimated coefficients if it was estimated without
interaction terms?
To try and answer this hypothetical question, I generated 1000 predicted
values using the constant, GTFRN, age and interaction coefficients for both the
OLS and Poisson models. I took AGEN and GTFRN drawn from U[0, 10] and
U[0, 2] respectively (corresponding to ages 30–40 and GTFR between 1.73 and
3.73). I ignore education and wave coefficients.
I then regressed these predicted values on a constant, GTFRN and the age
terms only. This gives predicted coefficients for Ferna´ndez and Fogli’s spec-
ification, assuming the data-generating process truly involves the interaction
terms.
Table 2.10 records the results of this exercise. While not matching the
original estimates exactly, in each case the bias is towards that found in the
‘No Interaction’ regressions. This further suggests that birth timing and not
absolute differences in completed fertility rates may be driving Ferna´ndez and
Fogli’s results and my earlier estimates.
2.4.3.5 Summary
There is evidence that heterogeneity in birth timing may result in misleading
results if it is not controlled for. Indeed, if cultural values act systematically
on birth timing, the effect of the those norms on family size may have been
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Table 2.10: Actual and simulated regression coefficients, indicating bias in es-
timates without controls for birth timing. ‘Predicted’ estimates derive from
regressions (2) and (4), Table 2.8. AGE and GTFRN are drawn from U[0, 10]
(corresponding to ages 30–40) and U[0, 2] respectively with no education or wave
coefficients.
‘No Interaction’ estimates are repeated from regressions (1) and (3), and ‘Inter-
action’ estimates are repeated from regressions (2) and (4).
No Interaction Predicted Interaction
OLS GTFRN 0.144 0.187 0.246
AGEN 0.125 0.129 0.141
AGEN2 -0.00992 -0.00993 -0.0999
Constant 1.391 1.320 1.255
Poisson GTFRN 0.0937 0.0997 0.156
AGEN 0.111 0.119 0.135
AGEN2 -0.00877 -0.00915 -0.00982
Constant 0.260 0.221 0.158
overestimated in previous work.
2.5 Conclusion
My results indicate that culture (as instrumented by country of origin TFR
from the World Bank Development Indicators) does play a role in the fertility
decisions of immigrants in the UK (recorded in the Labour Force Survey). I
extend the linear regression model used by Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005, 2006] to
a Poisson specification which is better suited to count data.
By including culture-age interaction terms in my regressions, I test for sys-
tematic differences in birth timing that are correlated with the culture proxy,
and find statistically significant evidence for this. I argue that failure to account
for timing can result in overestimation of the influence of culture on completed
fertility.
Survival analysis would provide a robust way to deal with such timing issues.
Hazard rate estimation has been used extensively to study son preference.19 In
that literature, the method takes women with a given number of children and
assesses the likelihood that a woman has a further child, given the number of
19Examples include Leung [1988]; Gangadharan and Maitra [2003], and Chapters 3 and 4
of this thesis.
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sons so far. Here, the dependent variable would be fertility rate in the country
of origin. An additional benefit is the reduction in censoring problems when
children leave home, since it is the age gaps between children that are relevant.
In sum, whilst cultural values do have a significant predictive effect for fertil-
ity, they do not appear to explain the whole story, since immigrants’ fertility is
certainly different to that in their countries of origin. There are also differences
in fertility rates between groups that are not attributable directly to fertility
norms, though these may relate to other cultural institutions, such as childrea-
ring practices. Institutional structure may act by affecting implicit prices and
surely play a significant role; further study is required to properly establish the
importance of fertility values amongst these other factors.
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Chapter 3
Son preference and Culture
This paper measures the sex preferences of immigrant women in the
United Kingdom by estimating the effect of family composition on birth
hazard rates. International comparisons of son preference are constructed,
the first known to the author. I argue that aggregate sex ratio statistics,
as exploited in existing research, are inadequate for cross-sectional com-
parisons.
I construct a theoretical model which suggests that costs (eg, dowries)
are unlikely to explain the variation in outcomes between groups. Both
the model and data are supportive of a cultural, rather than economic,
explanation for cross-country variation in sex preferences. Finally, women
arriving in the UK at a young age appear to have less distinct tastes, also
consistent with a primarily cultural explanation of parental sex prefer-
ences.
3.1 Introduction
Parental sex preferences are considered to be a primary factor in retarding
development outcomes for girls [United Nations, 1994, 2000; Das Gupta et al.,
2002]. However, the underlying causes of preferential behaviour are still subject
to much debate, with some researchers finding a primary role for cultural and
social influences [see, for example, Das Gupta et al., 2002; Das Gupta, 2005],
though others suggest economic factors are the major cause [eg, Burgess and
Zhuang, 2000; Qian, 2006].1
1A third strand of research highlights the potential of biological explanations for skewed
sex ratios [Graffelman and Hoekstra, 2000; Norberg, 2004; Oster, 2005, 2006; Matthews et al.,
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This paper assesses the fertility outcomes due to the sex preferences of im-
migrant women in the United Kingdom. By estimating birth hazard rates for
country groups, I provide the first comparable microeconometric estimates of
son preference for a range of countries. I argue that aggregate sex ratio statistics,
as exploited in previous research, are an inadequate measure of sex preferences,
and cross-sectional comparisons in particular are untenable.
Considerable differences in son preference are observed between groups in
the sample, and income does not appear to account for these differences. In
addition, a neoclassical model of fertility indicates that relative costs of boys
and girls are unlikely to explain the findings. Finally, women arriving in the
UK at a young age appear to have less distinct tastes. The data and theory are
consistent with a primarily cultural explanation of parental sex preferences.
I identify variation in ‘cultural values’ by grouping women by country of
origin. This assumes that, to some degree, their preferences or expectations
are formed at an early point in life and retained from then on.2 I estimate
the birth hazard rates of women with fixed effects (country dummies) for each
group. Then, by interacting the country dummies with the number of boys
already in each family, estimates of son preference are found for each group.
The coefficients on these interaction terms measure the reduction in the hazard
rate due to having an extra son, keeping family size constant.3
The identifying assumption is that the relative costs of girls and boys are
equalised across groups — likely to be the case for women living in the UK. How-
ever, the overall cost of children need not be equalised across groups. The in-
clusion of non-interacted country dummies accounts for differing fertility trends
between the groups, including differences due to costs.
Many groups I observe do reduce their fertility after having sons.4 I term
2008].
2Similarly to Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005, 2006] and Fisman and Miguel [2007]. Chapter
2 considers the caveats to this approach in more detail. I make no attempt to fully capture
cultural effects; ‘country of origin’ merely provides a source of variation in women’s values.
3The theoretical model of Section 3.2 rationalises this approach to measuring son prefer-
ences.
4Almost all authors find that parents have preferences for sons when measured this way
[eg, Leung, 1988; Gangadharan and Maitra, 2003; Das Gupta, 2005].
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this the ‘Big Sister Effect’ (BSE), since more children will end up with older
sisters than older brothers. If prices are equal, greater preference for sons does
result in a positive Big Sister Effect since the marginal value of a future child
is higher for women with daughters.
Conversely, higher costs for girls lead to a ‘big brother effect’, contrary to
what is observed in the data. As my theoretical model demonstrates, if girls
are more costly, women having girls are poorer, all else equal. Thus, if children
are a normal good, onward fertility should be lower for the women with girls.
Das Gupta et al. [2002] argue that girls are indeed more expensive due to dowries
or a lesser ability to provide care in old age; this argument applies particularly
in son-preferring countries such as India or China. So if the price differential is
positively correlated with a son preference, my measure of the big sister effect
is downward biased. Thus, given the significant differences in the BSE between
groups (robust to controlling for income) cultural values are likely to play an
important role — they outweigh the price effects. This story is consistent with
the weaker effects observed for young arrivals to the UK, who had less time
immersed in their originating country.
In summary, I observe strong levels of son preference amongst some country
groups, such as Bangladesh, India, Kenya and Pakistan. Conversely, women
from most rich countries (eg, Germany), show insignificant preferences or a slight
preference for daughters (Australia, Canada). I contend that this preferential
behaviour cannot be explained by differences in the relative prices of girls, and
so must derive from differences in individuals’ preferences.
Literature
To date, few studies have attempted to find explanations for the differences in
parental sex preferences across countries. Indeed, to best of my knowledge, no
study even measures the levels of son preferences accurately. This stems chiefly
from a lack of appropriate data. An exception is Das Gupta et al. [2002], though
this sociological study only surveys India, China and South Korea.
74
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
Most studies assessing sex preferences focus on single countries. However,
as Goodkind [1999] and Hank and Kohler [2002] note, findings are not usually
comparable due to the variety of methodologies used.5 However, macro-level sex
ratio statistics are readily available for many countries and regions, and these
have been used by authors such as Oster [2005]; Qian [2006] and Dubuc and
Coleman [2007]. Unfortunately aggregate measures are difficult to interpret in
terms of parental sex preferences, since they are subject to ambiguous biases
when birth-progression decisions are accounted for. This caveat is raised by
Leung [1988]; the result dates back to Weiler [1959] and Goodman [1961]. In
Chapter 4, I simulate the effect of observed behaviour on sex ratios, and con-
clude that population sex ratios are inappropriate for comparing son preferences
between countries.
I follow the example of Leung [1988] and Gangadharan and Maitra [2003] in
estimating the effect of existing family composition (number of sons) on birth
hazard rates for different groups. Whereas they consider only a few ethnic
groups, I am able to study women originating from a large number of countries.
I believe my estimates are the first internationally comparable measures of son
preference.
In contrast to sex preferences, fertility behaviour has received a considerably
greater amount of attention.6 The most recent addition to our understanding of
worldwide fertility differences is the recent work by Ferna´ndez and Fogli [2005,
2006] on the relevance of cultural factors. These papers, like Chapter 2, use
surveys of immigrant women in given country, exploiting country of origin to
provide variation in cultural background. Though culture is a robustly signifi-
cant predictor of influence, the estimated effects are not great, suggesting that
5Microeconometric techniques include surveying attitudes to sons [Hank and Kohler, 2002;
Pande and Astone, 2007], birth parity progression analysis [Leung, 1988; Heckman andWalker,
1990; Gangadharan and Maitra, 2003; Das Gupta, 2005], family expenditure studies [Bhalotra
and Attfield, 1998; Burgess and Zhuang, 2000]. The latter two techniques assess the effect of
family composition on parental decisions over future fertility and household spending, respec-
tively.
6Examples abound: Barro [1991]; Galor and Zang [1997]; Ahn and Mira [2002]; Billari and
Kohler [2002]. Along with many within-country studies at the micro level, these studies have
allowed fertility trends to be comparatively well understood. Fertility is a component of many
mainstream macroeconomic models.
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prices dominate the differences in preferences regarding quantity of children. I
apply the approach of these papers to investigate the influence of cultural values
on son preference.
Despite the growing theoretical literature on cultural values,7 empirical re-
search on this topic lags behind. Apart from the work on fertility described
above, work such as Manning and Roy [2007] and Fisman and Miguel [2007]
has considered the influence of cultural background on national identity and
car parking habits, respectively. However, these studies consider non-costly be-
haviours.8 I believe this paper is the first to explicitly consider the interaction
between cultural values and the economic environment.
3.2 Theory
This paper seeks to establish the cultural influences on parental sex preferences.
The model presented here has two aims: first, to outline the interaction between
prices and the measurement of son preference, and second to rationalise the
econometric framework used in Section 3.4.
3.2.1 Micro-founding fertility models
Fertility decisions are taken sequentially, and at any point, the sex composition
of the family is known. Then, if parents have preferences over the sex of their
offspring, the probability of having another child will depend on the current
composition.
This concept encompasses a range of ‘stopping rule’ models, which suppose
that parents continue to have children until some criterion is met: having a son,
say. These models have been studied at length by Sheps [1963]. One general
result is that, in a population with homogeneous probability of a male birth,
the aggregate sex ratio converges to that probability as the population becomes
7Eg, Bisin and Verdier [2000, 2005]; Tabellini [2007b,a].
8Fisman and Miguel’s diplomats are not required by law to pay parking fines.
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large [Leung, 1988].9
Leung [1991] proposes an alternative modelling approach: parents choose, in
each period, the probability that they have a child at that time. He constructs
a neoclassical consumption model which is then solved as a standard dynamic
programming problem.
Without differentiating between the sexes, Leung’s model provides some
plausible predictions. Generally, the probability of birth increases with income
and decreases with the cost of children. This is borne out empirically by Heck-
man and Walker [1990], and reflects the findings of Galor and Weil [1996, 2000].
Children are a normal good, with fertility increasing with income when all else
is equal.10
When girls and boys are distinguished, parents may be allowed to prefer one
sex over the other. Under some conditions, if parents prefer boys, then having
had more boys reduces the probability of birth, holding the current number of
children constant [see Leung, 1991, p. 1082].
Intuitively, diminishing marginal returns for each sex imply that, at a given
family size, having more boys reduces the marginal return to a further boy.
Son preference entails that each boy makes a greater contribution to parental
utility than each girl. Although having more boys also increases the marginal
return to a further girl, the son preference means that this is more than more
than offset by the decrease in the marginal return of a extra boy. Hence the
marginal benefit of an extra child diminishes, and so does the optimal birth
probability. Another way to see this is to observe that boys carry more weight
when considering the effective number of children. Thus, increasing the number
of boys increases the effective number of children, holding the total number of
children constant. The implication of this result for the birth probability is
9In small populations, a male-favouring stopping rule in fact leads to higher numbers of
females. However, simulated results suggest that convergence is fast [Leung, 1988]. In Chapter
4, I prove that in the case of heterogeneous probabilities, excess girls will be present also in
large populations.
10Higher wages increase the costs of rearing children, and this effect dominates to give low
fertility in rich households and economies [Wolf, 2006]. This finding does not contradict the
assumption that children are normal, as in the models of Leung [1991]; Galor and Weil [1996,
2000]; Kim [2005].
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testable, and underlies the sex-preference tests using the progression ratio, OLS
birth intervals and hazard rates.
Leung is forced to make several unintuitive assumptions on the parental
utility function in order to solve for the parents’ value function algebraically.
Further, since both boys and girls are perfect complements for consumption,
questions concerning prices and preferences cannot be answered. His model
yields few predictions that can be taken to the data.
Rather than taking a particular form for the utility, I simplify the model
by eliminating the dynamic component. This does not change the economic
intuition behind the model, but simplifies matters considerably. As a result, I
need only assume that parental utility is additively separable in its arguments.
This reduced model is analogous to the final period of Leung’s model without
his restrictive assumptions.11 However, I am able to derive the effect of differing
prices for boys and girls.
3.2.2 Model
I construct a one-period model in which parents maximise their expected utility
with respect to the probability of having a further child (h). Initially, they have
an endowment of (B0, G0, Y ) ∈ R3+, where B0 and G0 are the initial numbers
of boys and girls respectively, and Y is income. Girls and boys cost PG ∈ R+
and PB ∈ R+ respectively.12
Utility comprises two additive components: a standard utility part relating
to the number of children (B and G) and consumption (C), and a component
representing the disutility of fecundity. This latter term is expressed as a func-
tion W of the birth probability h, as in Leung [1991] and Kim [2005].
Assumption 1. U : R3+ → R and −W (.) : [0, 1] → R are bounded, twice con-
tinuously differentiable and strictly concave. U is increasing in each of its ar-
11The intuition behind my model is not affected by the static formulation. I am able to
construct a simulation of a dynamic extension, which confirms that my analytical results hold
more generally.
12Following the literature, I take the existing number of children to be continuous. Note,
however, that childbearing outcomes are discrete.
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guments.
Assumption 2. For some h∗ ∈ (0, 1), W ′(h) < 0 for all h ∈ [0, h∗) and
W ′(h) > 0 for all h ∈ (h∗, 1]. Further, let W ′ → ∞ as h ↗ 1 and W ′ → −∞
as h↘ 0.
Assumption 2 follows from the notion that it is costly to set the fertility
probability at extreme values. h∗ represents the ‘natural’ fecundity rate. The
latter criterion of the assumption ensures that corner solutions are ruled out.
A child is born with probability h and this will be a boy with known ex-
ogenous probability pi. Therefore the final family composition is given by the
following rule:
 B
G
 =
 B0
G0
+H

 0
1
+Π
 1
−1


Where H ∼ Bernoulli(h) is a random variable indicating childbirth, and
Π ∼ Bernoulli(pi) is a random variable (latently) indicating a boy.
To summarize, parental utility is U˜
def
= U(B,G,C) − W (h). The budget
constraint is standard: PBB+PGG+C ≤ Y , with PB and PG being the prices
of having children of either sex. Consumption is numeraire. To ensure that
expected utility is defined, a further assumption is required, providing that a
child of either sex is affordable.
Assumption 3. Y −PB(B0+1)−PGG0 > 0 and Y −PBB0−PG(G0+1)) > 0.
Parents’ problem
As stated, parents maximise their expected utility with respect to the proba-
bility of childbirth, subject to a budget constraint. Thus, the parents’ problem
is:
h(B0, G0) = argmax
h
 E[U(B,G,C)−W (h)]s. t. PBB + PGG+ C ≤ Y

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This expression may be rewritten to remove the expectation operator. By
Assumption 1, the budget constraint will always hold, so this may also be sub-
stituted. Let Y0
def
= Y − PBB0 − PGG0 denote initial disposable income.
h(B0, G0) = argmax
h

hpiU(B0 + 1, G0, Y0 − PB)
+ h(1− pi)U(B0, G0 + 1, Y0 − PG)
+ (1− h)U(B0, G0, Y0)
−W (h)

The first three terms within the braces are the probabilities of having a boy
(hpi), girl (h(1− pi)), or no child (1− h), respectively, multiplied by the utility
obtained in each case. The fourth term is the fecundity penalty.
The first order condition (FOC) is therefore
W ′(h) = piU(B0 + 1, G0, Y0 − PB)
+ (1− pi)U(B0, G0 + 1, Y0 − PG)
− U(B0, G0, Y0)
Assumption 2 provides that there will be a solution with h ∈ (0, 1). The
second order condition for this to be a maximum is −W ′′(h) < 0, which follows
from the concavity of −W (.) (Assumption 1).
The reasoning behind this condition is simple: the marginal disutility of
fecundity must equal the expected marginal utility of an extra child. W ′ is
monotonically increasing by Assumption 1, so a higher expected marginal utility
of an extra child is associated with higher fertility.
In order to derive predictions from this model, I make the use of the following
separability criterion.
Assumption 4. Let U(B,G,C)
def
= αBu(B) + αGu(G) + u(C) for some in-
creasing, bounded, twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave function
u : R+ → R and αB , αG ∈ R+.
The coefficients αB and αG reflect the parents’ underlying preferences for
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sons and daughters. Under Assumption 4, the first order condition becomes:
W ′(h) = pi [αBu(B0 + 1) + αGu(G0) + u(Y0 − PB)]
+ (1− pi) [αBu(B0) + αGu(G0 + 1) + u(Y0 − PG)]
− αBu(B0) + αGu(G0) + u(Y0)
The separability criterion simplifies my analysis but is not necessary for my
major result, Prediction 3.
3.2.3 Model Predictions
Definition 3. The ‘Big Sister Effect’ (BSE) is
∆(B0)
def
= − ∂h
∂B0
∣∣∣∣
B0+G0=N0
The object of interest is ∆, which gives the marginal decrease in the proba-
bility of birth with an extra son, for a given total number of children.13 This is
the object that is observed when progression rates or hazard rates are compared
between women having different family compositions after a given number of
children. It is usually measured to be positive, with more children having older
sisters than older brothers. Women having more sons are less likely to have
further children, implying that the expected marginal value of an extra child is
lower when a woman has more sons.
The implications of the model hence depend on the sign of ∆. Taking the
derivative of the FOC with respect to B0 results in the following:
∆(B0) =
−1
W ′′(h)

αBpi [u′(B0 + 1)− u′(B0)]
− αG(1− pi) [u′(N0 −B0 + 1)− u′(N0 −B0)]
+ αC(PG − PB) [piu′(Y0 − PB)
+ (1− pi)u′(Y0 − PG)− u′(Y0)]

(3.1)
13The Effect can also be considered as the marginal increase in the probability of birth with
an extra daughter: ∆ = ∂h
∂G0
˛˛˛
B0+G0=N0
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Thus, the sign of ∆ is the opposite to the term in parentheses, since −W (.)
is concave. The first two terms in square brackets are negative, since u(.) is
concave (Assumption 4). Therefore u′(x + 1) < u′(x) for all x ∈ R+, and so
∆ depends positively on αB and negatively on αG. This leads to the first two
predictions of this model.
Prediction 1. Ceteris paribus, the Big Sister Effect is higher when sons yield
higher utility (higher αB).
Prediction 2. Ceteris paribus, the Big Sister Effect is lower when daughters
yield higher utility (higher αG).
The intuition in each case is simple. When a family of given size (N0)
contains fewer boys, the marginal value of a future boy (u(B0 + 1)− u(B0)) is
higher. At the same time, there are more girls, so the marginal value of a future
girl (u(N0 − B0 + 1) − u(N0 − B0)) is lower. The change in marginal value of
a future child is thus ambiguous. However, if boys are more preferred (larger
αB), the change in marginal value of a future child becomes dominated by the
boys term. That is, it becomes more positive: the Big Sister Effect increases.
The situation is symmetric for girls.
Returning to Equation 3.1, it can be seen that the third term in square
brackets is positive. Girls and boys have positive prices, so u′(Y0−PB), u′(Y0−
PG) > u′(Y0). Therefore the weighted sum piu′(Y0 − PB) + (1− pi)u′(Y0 − PG)
is greater than u′(Y0). Therefore we have:
Prediction 3. The Big Sister Effect is decreasing in the girl-boy price differ-
ential (PG − PB).
Prediction 3 says that if girls cost more than boys, the Big Sister Effect is
lower than when costs are equal. When girls are more expensive, families having
more girls are poorer than those of the same size but with more boys. Children
are a normal good, so the richer family has higher fecundity. The Effect is
negative.
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It must be noted that this implication depends only on the formulation of
the utility function with respect to consumption. Thus this result is robust
to the relaxation of Assumption 4 so that U(B,G,C)
def
= u(B,G) + v(C) for
neoclassical u and v.
The generality of the intuition behind Prediction 3 suggests that price-based
explanations for son preference in fertility decisions, such as the existence of
dowries, are unlikely to dominate. It requires only that children are a normal
good. If large dowries are required for daughters, families already having many
girls should be expected to have fewer further children. The opposite is seen to
be true in the data, suggesting that underlying preferences may be even stronger
than have previously been measured.
3.2.4 Testing the predictions
The quantity ∆, the Big Sister Effect, is the marginal decrease in fecundity with
an extra son, controlling for the total number of children. This formulation
provides the basis for the empirical tests used in this paper. At a given birth
parity (number of children), I test for the change in the birth hazard rate with
an extra son.
With several distinct groups in my dataset, son preferences can be mea-
sured for each by including interactions between group dummy variables and
the number of sons. The resulting coefficient can be interpreted as a change in
the hazard associated with having one more boy. Negative coefficients imply a
positive Effect.
As can be seen in Equation 3.1 (page 81) and Predictions 1–3, a more pos-
itive Big Sister Effect in one group implies a combination of the following: (a)
the group has a stronger taste for sons (Prediction 1); (b) a weaker taste for
daughters (Prediction 2); or (c) the group faces a lower girl-boy price differential
(PG − PB) (Prediction 3), that is, girls are relatively cheaper.
The advantage of conducting empirical work with UK data is that childrea-
ring costs are generally high [Wolf, 2006], and not obviously different for boys
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and girls. Equivalently, the girl-boy price differential is feasibly nil. This would
leave inter-group differences in the BSE entirely down to variation in preferences
due to different cultural values.
It is possible to argue that relative costs of raising girls and boys may not be
equal amongst different cultural groups, such as immigrants from different coun-
tries. Indeed, it is usually argued that groups displaying strong son preferences
face relatively higher prices for girls (positive girl-boy differential) [Das Gupta
et al., 2002]. This is due to dowries or less ability to provide old-age support.14
However, Prediction 3 gives that the effect of a positive girl-boy price dif-
ferential will be to reduce the Big Sister Effect. The implication is that under
equalised prices the Effect would be even stronger. If there is a correlation
between higher prices for girls and stronger innate preference for sons, cross-
cultural differences as estimated later in this paper will be downward biased.
Finally, it should be noted that these price-based arguments pertain only to
son preference as measured by onward fertility measures. If neonatal mortality
or educational attainment differentials are used as a measure of son preference,
as in Qian [2006], a positive response to the price differential would be expected,
as is found in that paper: when female wages rise, girls’ mortality decreases.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 The Labour Force Survey
The source of data for this study is the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). This
is a quarterly survey of households, typically recording data for some 120,000
individuals. The LFS is conducted as a rolling panel with households appearing
for five consecutive quarters, or waves.
From 1996, a family relationship matrix is available for each household,
14Das Gupta et al. state that greater costs for girls are actually a cause of son preference,
a claim which cannot be reconciled at the individual level with the neoclassical intuition
presented here. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that some general equilibrium model might
support this hypothesis.
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allowing children to be matched to their parents. Hence, birth histories may be
constructed for each woman, by sorting her children by date of birth.15
Amongst the LFS data are various personal attributes, including country of
origin and year of arrival for immigrants. Also present are variables recording
education, jobs, income, religion and ethnicity. Where a spouse or cohabiting
partner lives in the household, he can be identified using the household rela-
tionship tables and his records paired up with the woman’s.
In the LFS, some questions are only asked once. Since the time between first
and last waves is small in terms of fertility cycles (12 months), and many of the
variables of interest are constant, I take only replies from first-wave responses
from quarter 1, 1996 to quarter 4, 2005. This records 1,157,739 individuals, of
which 27,544 are born abroad, female and aged 16–55.
3.3.2 Summary statistics
Summary statistics are listed in Table 3.1, grouped by birth parity. Throughout
this study, comparisons are restricted to women with a given number of children,
or ‘parity level’. This is common in the literature and negates the influence of
general birth spacing effects. Women are included in the sample at all parities
up to the total number of their children at the time of survey.
In order to reduce the incidence of spurious country coefficients, only coun-
tries represented by more than 100 women are included in these tables and any
calculation. This does not greatly reduce the overall sample size but significantly
drops the number of coefficients in the regressions. This has the added benefit of
reducing computation time: including dummy variables for small country groups
makes the estimation problem difficult to solve, since the objective function has
a shallow curvature at the maximum.16
Reported ages (variable AGE) correspond to the age at entry into the rele-
15These birth histories are necessarily net of mortality. The oldest child younger than 16
will be considered the woman’s first, ie, of parity one. Gangadharan and Maitra [2003] take
the same approach, concluding that the implications are negligible [see p. 383] provided that
standard errors are computed to account for arbitrary heteroskedasticity (frailty).
16Not all countries of origin in the LFS are identified uniquely. Three groups of countries
appear in my regressions. They are:
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics, women born abroad, aged 16–55 (UK Labour
Force Survey 1996–2005).
(a) Parity 1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
AGE 26.34 5.22 14 51.5 13223
AGECAME 20.29 11.03 0 55.58 13112
GRSSPAY 27.25 26.59 0.26 663.42 3915
SONS 0.53 0.5 0 1 13223
EXPOSURE 60.9 76.83 1 472 13223
PROGRESSED 0.69 0.46 0 1 13223
DEGREE 0.09 0.29 0 1 13223
FE 0.06 0.24 0 1 13223
AL 0.07 0.25 0 1 13223
GCSE 0.1 0.3 0 1 13223
(b) Parity 2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
AGE 28.56 5 15.42 48 7704
AGECAME 19.6 10.85 0 54.25 7630
GRSSPAY 26.96 28.76 0.26 663.42 2215
SONS 1.05 0.72 0 2 7704
EXPOSURE 73.99 71.72 1 396 7704
PROGRESSED 0.45 0.5 0 1 7704
DEGREE 0.08 0.27 0 1 7704
FE 0.06 0.23 0 1 7704
AL 0.06 0.24 0 1 7704
GCSE 0.1 0.29 0 1 7704
(c) Parity 3
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
AGE 29.37 4.81 17 47.83 2343
AGECAME 20.23 9.65 0.08 54.25 2317
GRSSPAY 18.9 15.22 0.26 100 506
SONS 1.53 0.88 0 3 2343
EXPOSURE 66.3 63.18 1 333 2343
PROGRESSED 0.47 0.5 0 1 2343
DEGREE 0.04 0.19 0 1 2343
FE 0.03 0.17 0 1 2343
AL 0.04 0.19 0 1 2343
GCSE 0.06 0.24 0 1 2343
86
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
vant parity. First births occur at a mean age of 26.3 years, second births at 28.5
years and third births at 29.3 years.17 Age at arrival in the UK (AGECAME)
seems regular across the three subsamples, at about 20 years.
Education levels are slightly lower than UK averages (recorded in dummy
variables DEGREE, FE, AL, and GCSE, corresponding to degree level, further
education, A-Levels and GCSE equivalents respectively).18 At parity 1, only
31% of women have GCSE or higher qualifications. At parity 2, the figure is
30% but this falls to 16% at parity 3. The UK average for women in this age
range is 34%.19
When the woman’s spouse is present in the household, I can match his
details with the woman. Husbands’ gross annual income at the time of survey
is denoted as GRSSPAY, measured in thousands of pounds. As with education,
women at parities 1 and 2 are similar (means of £27,000 per year — equal to
the survey average), with parity 3 women having poorer husbands (£18,000).
This variable is chosen over women’s own income to avoid possible simultaneity
issues between work and childbearing decisions. However, basic results do not
depend on this selection, and husbands’ income is more often reported.20
The number of sons a woman has already had is denoted by SONS. At
parities 1, 2 and 3 the means are 0.53, 1.05 and 1.54, respectively. Sex ratios
are slightly elevated at earlier parities: these figures correspond to 1.13, 1.11
and 1.05 boys per girl. The usually cited ‘natural’ ratio is 1.06. Little inference
Grp02 ‘Other Caribbean Commonwealth’: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, The, Do-
minica, Grenada, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines.
Grp04 ‘Other Africa’: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Togo.
Grp08 ‘Other Middle East’: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen.
17The differences between ages at birth understate birth spacing intervals for individual
women, since those having more children are likely to have started younger. Indeed, mean
ages at first and second births conditional on a third birth are 23.3 and 26.0 respectively.
18Educational dummies are derived from the LFS variable HIQUAL D.
19Author’s calculation from LFS.
20Though a woman’s current husband may not be the father of (all) her children, this
variable is nonetheless useful in proxying the woman’s lifetime budget constraint.
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can be made from these differences, however: aggregate level sex ratio statistics
are subject to biases in both directions. See Appendix B.1.
Important variables for the survival analysis are PROGRESSED, indicating
whether a woman continues to a higher birth parity, and EXPOSURE, the
time at risk.21 This latter figure measures the time the woman remains at
the relevant parity before either having another child (progressing to the next
parity), or the data are censored, ie, the survey occurs before a subsequent birth.
PROGRESSED is one when exposure terminates in birth, and zero if exposure
terminates at the survey.
3.3.3 Country differences
Table 3.2 lists the countries included in my regressions. For the first birth
(parity 1), proportions of sons differ across country groups, ranging from 0.470
(Mauritius) to 0.584 (Zimbabwe). These figures represent sex ratios of 0.89 and
1.40 boys per girl respectively.
The sex of a given child does not depend on parental decisions, so the aggre-
gate sex ratio at a given parity is not subject to biases due to sex preferences.22
Thus the sex ratio at first birth is a measure of the biological sex ratio.
Despite seemingly wide disparities between countries in the first birth sex
ratios, they are not statistically different, with an F-test yielding a p-value of
0.31. This result stands in contrast to Oster’s assertion [2005, pp. 1170] that
some country groups display higher biological sex ratios.
In later regressions, I split my sample by spouses’ income, and by age at ar-
rival. RICH indicates women above the median income, and YOUNG indicates
arrival in the UK before the age of 10. POOR and OLD are respective comple-
ments. The number of women in each subgroup are given in the middle columns
of Table 3.2. With the restriction that 100 observations are present from each
21Time at risk neglects ten months after a birth to account for post-partum amenorrhoea
and a further pregnancy, following Leung [1988].
22Population sex ratios are subject to biases due to parental decision-making (see Appendix
B.1 and Chapter 4).
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics by country. YOUNG indicates arrival before age
10. RICH indicates above median income (spouse’s) (at the relevant parity).
(a) Parity 1
Subgroup sizes PROGRESSED
Country N SONS POOR RICH YOUNG OLD 0 Sons 1 Son
AUS 242 0.475 32 70 90 151 0.638 0.687
CAN 188 0.548 84 104 0.659 0.680
NZL 110 0.582 23 86 0.630 0.547
KEN 661 0.557 96 119 168 487 0.792 0.712
UGA 263 0.532 55 208 0.732 0.679
TZA 156 0.506 28 128 0.714 0.582
ZMB 122 0.574 40 81 0.635 0.657
ZWE 197 0.584 38 159 0.622 0.600
GHA 256 0.473 14 239 0.704 0.653
NGA 341 0.499 33 304 0.789 0.771
JAM 459 0.523 110 336 0.525 0.571
GRP02 119 0.538 37 80 0.618 0.516
BGD 980 0.557 170 31 116 854 0.818 0.837
IND 1976 0.551 366 289 280 1676 0.753 0.703
LKA 246 0.545 60 53 30 216 0.616 0.604
HKG 297 0.582 68 227 0.661 0.630
MYS 187 0.503 53 134 0.796 0.702
SGP 205 0.507 161 42 0.693 0.702
CYP 283 0.569 147 132 0.697 0.708
MLT 115 0.565 84 29 0.720 0.600
MUS 115 0.470 12 103 0.607 0.574
ZAF 345 0.513 41 106 92 252 0.655 0.616
GRP04 186 0.511 17 167 0.670 0.653
USA 402 0.483 30 122 65 335 0.702 0.624
PAK 1558 0.538 200 99 199 1342 0.849 0.807
CHN 138 0.514 5 132 0.463 0.507
JPN 111 0.532 2 109 0.577 0.525
PHL 247 0.555 57 45 1 246 0.500 0.599
IRN 147 0.578 7 140 0.661 0.612
GRP08 156 0.526 50 106 0.797 0.768
FRA 237 0.498 25 79 23 213 0.580 0.619
ITA 209 0.488 61 148 0.486 0.627
NLD 110 0.482 14 95 0.684 0.717
DEU 842 0.517 137 172 518 312 0.600 0.625
POL 149 0.550 3 145 0.507 0.402
PRT 178 0.500 8 169 0.528 0.494
ESP 120 0.525 13 107 0.561 0.492
YUG 113 0.496 1 112 0.667 0.714
TUR 236 0.564 13 222 0.631 0.677
SOM 221 0.507 0 221 0.826 0.857
(b) Parity 2
Subgroup sizes PROGRESSED
Country N SONS POOR RICH YOUNG OLD 0 Sons 1 Son 2 Sons
AUS 147 1.014 57 89 0.278 0.329 0.368
CAN 121 1.017 55 66 0.324 0.255 0.278
KEN 478 1.059 56 98 131 342 0.551 0.242 0.267
UGA 176 0.983 41 135 0.383 0.259 0.386
ZWE 115 1.052 29 86 0.318 0.323 0.286
GHA 167 1.012 12 153 0.500 0.528 0.425
NGA 247 1.012 24 221 0.643 0.500 0.593
JAM 246 1.089 66 173 0.542 0.320 0.257
BGD 764 1.082 130 31 74 683 0.714 0.704 0.668
IND 1371 1.062 217 244 221 1132 0.529 0.335 0.353
LKA 140 1.043 19 121 0.132 0.207 0.318
HKG 179 1.140 43 135 0.432 0.262 0.306
MYS 131 1.015 42 89 0.306 0.246 0.395
SGP 137 1.073 113 23 0.188 0.317 0.238
CYP 193 1.119 102 88 0.325 0.333 0.365
ZAF 206 1.039 57 148 0.340 0.286 0.259
GRP04 116 0.940 11 103 0.679 0.448 0.476
USA 253 0.949 36 216 0.338 0.323 0.379
PAK 1221 1.039 125 94 151 1056 0.735 0.702 0.671
PHL 126 1.143 1 125 0.130 0.194 0.171
GRP08 115 1.043 34 81 0.630 0.607 0.500
FRA 129 1.023 15 114 0.353 0.259 0.243
ITA 111 1.036 40 71 0.321 0.294 0.156
DEU 494 1.036 62 123 312 174 0.390 0.283 0.355
TUR 147 1.116 11 135 0.400 0.287 0.333
SOM 174 1.011 0 174 0.739 0.725 0.750
(c) Parity 3
Subgroup sizes PROGRESSED
Country N SONS POOR RICH YOUNG OLD 0 Sons 1 Son 2 Sons 3 Sons
KEN 148 1.331 39 105 0.483 0.177 0.167 0.190
NGA 123 1.472 8 114 0.588 0.422 0.319 0.357
BGD 490 1.602 39 448 0.628 0.556 0.615 0.487
IND 500 1.528 68 74 87 408 0.433 0.280 0.247 0.205
PAK 812 1.539 70 63 81 721 0.670 0.620 0.550 0.636
DEU 153 1.516 111 39 0.125 0.175 0.226 0.286
SOM 117 1.590 0 117 0.917 0.600 0.755 0.563
89
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
group in any regression, there are sufficiently many women for the coefficients to
be identified on the interaction terms RICH*Country and POOR*Country. All
subgroups are large enough for OLD*Country, though some YOUNG*Country
terms will not show strong identification.
3.3.4 Son Preferences
Table 3.3 reports progression rates with respect to existing family composition.
After two or three children, significant differences in the progression rates —
the proportion of women having a further child — are observed between women
with sons and women with daughters. At each parity, women having no sons are
more likely to continue having children, though negligible differences are seen
between women having more than one son.
However, looking more closely reveals great differences between country
groups. The final columns of Table 3.2 list progression rates by current number
of sons. Differences are not typically great at parity 1, but increase with birth
order. For example, 92% of Somali women with three daughters go on to have
another child, compared with 56% of those with three sons.
For clarity, statistics for India and Germany are collected in Table 3.4. For
Indian women, the largest group in my sample, son preference is very strong at
all parities. Conversely, for German women, there appears to be a reasonable
preference for daughters at parity 3. Note that in these cases, the number
of boys does indeed matter, not just the presence of a son (or daughter, for
Germans). The following section seeks to assess these country differences more
thoroughly.23
23After having two children, German women are less likely to have another if they have had
one of each sex. This behaviour suggests a preference for a mixed family, as found by Hank
and Kohler [2002] for German women. Here I focus on preferences for sons.
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Table 3.3: Birth parity progression rates, whole sample.
Number of Boys
Children 0 1 2 3
1 0.70 0.69 – –
2 0.52 0.43 0.44 –
3 0.57 0.46 0.47 0.45
Table 3.4: Birth parity progression rates, Indian and German women.
(a) India
Number of Boys
Children 0 1 2 3
1 0.75 0.70 – –
2 0.53 0.34 0.35 –
3 0.44 0.27 0.27 0.20
(b) Germany
Number of Boys
Children 0 1 2 3
1 0.60 0.63 – –
2 0.38 0.26 0.36 –
3 0.12 0.17 0.25 0.26
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Regression specification
This paper follows the example of Leung [1988] and Gangadharan and Maitra
[2003], who study the son preferences of different ethnic groups in Malaysia and
South Africa, respectively. I, however, group immigrants to the UK by country
of origin. I test for parental sex preferences using a Proportional Hazards model
of childbearing with the current number of boys included as a regressor, as
discussed in detail in Appendix B.2. Reported coefficients relate proportional
changes in hazard rates to unit changes in the independent variables. Negative
values imply lower hazards at all points in time and hence longer transition and
lower future fertility.
Specifically, the hazard rate for woman i at time t is θi(t) = λiθ0(t), where
λi is the proportional hazard rate for woman i. My most basic regression takes
the form log λi = β′Xi + δSONSi.24 Coefficients are estimated using the Cox
partial likelihood method, with θ0 left unspecified. A negative coefficient on
the number of boys in the family, SONS, implies a preference for sons. This
deduction follows the theoretical model presented in Section 3.2; women with
boys are more likely to cease having children.
To account for life-cycle effects such as spacing of births, controls for the
woman’s age (AGE) and squared age (AGE2) are included in Xi. Since educa-
tion is known to influence fertility, dummies for highest educational attainment
(DEGREE, FE (further education), AL (A-Level) and GCSE) are also used, to
account for different fecundity amongst differently educated women.
3.4.2 Initial Regressions
Table 3.5 Column (1) reports regressions without country fixed effects or SONS,
so describes fertility only. The age coefficient is positive at parity 1, suggesting
24By including only women with the same number of children in any regression (restricting
to a single parity), total family size is controlled for.
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Table 3.5: Birth hazard rate regressions for immigrant women in the UK.
Coefficients relate proportional changes in hazard rates to unit changes in
the independent variables. Negative values imply lower hazards: θi(t) =
exp(β′Xi + δSONSi)θ0(t).
(a) Parity 1
(1) (2)
AGE 0.140∗∗∗ (0.0193) 0.141∗∗∗ (0.0193)
AGE2 -0.00351∗∗∗ (0.000360) -0.00353∗∗∗ (0.000360)
DEGREE 0.147∗∗∗ (0.0387) 0.147∗∗∗ (0.0387)
AL -0.120∗∗∗ (0.0441) -0.123∗∗∗ (0.0441)
FE -0.0257 (0.0457) -0.0308 (0.0457)
GCSE -0.0469 (0.0356) -0.0480 (0.0356)
SONS -0.0847∗∗∗ (0.0210)
Observations 13223 13223
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(b) Parity 2
(1) (2) (3)
AGE -0.103∗∗∗ (0.0361) -0.104∗∗∗ (0.0360) -0.102∗∗∗ (0.0360)
AGE2 -0.000120 (0.000648) -0.000112 (0.000647) -0.000160 (0.000647)
DEGREE -0.0489 (0.0746) -0.0553 (0.0745) -0.0498 (0.0745)
AL -0.375∗∗∗ (0.0819) -0.375∗∗∗ (0.0819) -0.380∗∗∗ (0.0819)
FE -0.304∗∗∗ (0.0859) -0.312∗∗∗ (0.0859) -0.314∗∗∗ (0.0859)
GCSE -0.351∗∗∗ (0.0643) -0.352∗∗∗ (0.0643) -0.351∗∗∗ (0.0643)
SONS -0.154∗∗∗ (0.0242)
ONEBOY -0.350∗∗∗ (0.0413)
TWOBOYS -0.309∗∗∗ (0.0462)
Observations 7704 7704 7704
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(c) Parity 3
(1) (2) (3)
AGE -0.195∗∗∗ (0.0648) -0.196∗∗∗ (0.0649) -0.201∗∗∗ (0.0648)
AGE2 0.00192∗ (0.00109) 0.00191∗ (0.00110) 0.00197∗ (0.00109)
DEGREE -0.993∗∗∗ (0.261) -1.014∗∗∗ (0.261) -1.036∗∗∗ (0.261)
AL -0.689∗∗∗ (0.226) -0.742∗∗∗ (0.227) -0.724∗∗∗ (0.227)
FE -0.519∗∗ (0.222) -0.556∗∗ (0.222) -0.562∗∗ (0.222)
GCSE -0.784∗∗∗ (0.175) -0.793∗∗∗ (0.175) -0.790∗∗∗ (0.175)
SONS -0.181∗∗∗ (0.0355)
ONEBOY -0.437∗∗∗ (0.0945)
TWOBOYS -0.556∗∗∗ (0.0950)
THREEBOYS -0.599∗∗∗ (0.115)
Observations 2343 2343 2343
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
that older women are more likely to have second children. However, this effect
is diminishing, as the squared age coefficient is negative. The peak hazard is at
40 years. Feasibly younger women are in less of a hurry to have more children,
whereas older women may not have more than one.
Various education effects are significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on
DEGREE is positive and significant (1%) at parity 1, and the value of 0.147
(Table 3.5, Column (1)) implies a 16% increase in the hazard rate relative to
women without high school qualifications.25 The coefficient is negative at parity
2. Conversely, at parity 3 the coefficient is -0.993, suggesting a 63% reduction
25exp(0.147) = 1.16.
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(significant at 1%). The theoretical literature suggests that higher levels of
human capital reduce fertility since the opportunity cost of childrearing is higher
(eg, Galor andWeil [1996, 2000]). The evidence presented here accords with this:
educated women are significantly less likely to have more than three children.
However, they also have tighter birth spacing — they have a second child sooner
— possibly to allow a quicker return to work.
When SONS is included, the coefficient is negative and significant at 1% for
each parity. The higher the parity, the larger the effect per son. After a first
child, the coefficient of -0.0847 implies a reduction in the birth hazard of 8%
when women have a son instead of a daughter. After three boys, the hazard
is reduced by 42% relative to a woman with three daughters.26 This suggests
a high degree of preference for sons amongst the sample overall (see Table 3.2,
page 89).
A strong preference for sons is also seen when dummies for family compo-
sition (ONEBOY, TWOBOYS and THREEBOYS) are included in the model
(Table 3.5, panels (a) and (b), column (3)). After two children, having one son
reduces the fertility hazard by 30%, relative to a woman with no sons. Women
with two sons show only a reduction of 27%, suggesting some taste for a mixed
family. After three children fertility reduces with each son, from 35% to 45%
compared to a woman with three daughters. The dummies are significant at 1%
in each case and are not (jointly) significantly different, implying that, for the
sample as a whole, having one son is more important than the number of sons.
However, Table 3.4 suggests this taste varies considerably by country. Nonethe-
less, throughout this paper all results presented are robust to using presence of
a son as a regressor instead of the number of sons (variable SONS).
26exp(3 ∗ −0.181) = 0.58.
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3.4.3 Country differences
Table 3.6 reports relative birth hazard rates for women at parities 1–3 with
country fixed effects.27 The regression specification is
log λi = β′Xi +
∑
c
γcdic + δSONSi +
∑
c
δcSONSi ∗ dic
dic indicates that woman i comes from country c. Column 1 in each panel
includes only country dummies; since the Cox model reports hazard rates rel-
ative to an unspecified baseline hazard, one country dummy variable must be
omitted. For ease of comparison, I omit the same country in each specification:
India, the largest group. Country coefficients thus represent differences in fe-
cundity between each group and India. In line with Chapter 2 and Ferna´ndez
and Fogli [2005, 2006], these dummies are generally significant, indicating that
women of different origins indeed have differing fertility objectives.
Including SONS and Country*SONS interaction terms (Table 3.6, Column
(2)) allows son preferences to be identified for each group. The coefficient on
SONS itself measures the degree of son preference of Indian women, which is
significant at 1% in each regression. The effect is large: having three sons
reduces the future birth hazard rate by 67% relative to having three daughters.
Of the six largest country groups,28 Bangladeshi women show significantly
less son preference at all parities (Bangladesh dummy is positive), and Pakistan,
Germany and Somalia show less in two of the three regressions.29 For every
country the signs are the same at each parity. Finally, whilst Kenyan women do
not show preferences significantly different to Indian women, their preferences
are significantly different from zero at all parities (5% or better). After three
sons, fecundity is just a quarter of that after three daughters.
27Only selected coefficients are reported in Tables 3.6–3.9. Full regressions are given in
Appendix B.3, Tables B.1–B.12 (pp. 156).
28Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Germany and Somalia appear in each regression.
29Dubuc and Coleman [2007] suggest that son preferences amongst Indian women in the
UK are stronger than those for Pakistanis since they have fewer children overall, yet still want
to have a son. This hypothesis is consistent with my results, since the Pakistan coefficient
is positive (significant at 1%) in each regression, as is SONS*Pakistan (10% significance for
parities 2 and 3).
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Table 3.6: Birth hazard rate regressions for immigrant women in the UK with
country fixed effects and country son preference effects. Selected coefficients
only; full results in appendix, Tables B.1–B.3 (pp. 156).
(a) Parity 1
(1) (2)
AGE 0.164∗∗∗ (0.0197) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.0197)
AGE2 -0.00385∗∗∗ (0.000366) -0.00388∗∗∗ (0.000367)
DEGREE 0.181∗∗∗ (0.0396) 0.174∗∗∗ (0.0397)
AL -0.0514 (0.0449) -0.0526 (0.0450)
FE 0.0427 (0.0470) 0.0372 (0.0471)
GCSE 0.0489 (0.0369) 0.0456 (0.0370)
Kenya 0.0309 (0.0526) 0.0445 (0.0764)
Nigeria 0.247∗∗∗ (0.0674) 0.149 (0.0948)
Bangladesh 0.386∗∗∗ (0.0446) 0.268∗∗∗ (0.0662)
Pakistan 0.438∗∗∗ (0.0386) 0.386∗∗∗ (0.0562)
Germany -0.117∗∗ (0.0520) -0.308∗∗∗ (0.0753)
Somalia 0.628∗∗∗ (0.0783) 0.333∗∗∗ (0.113)
SONS -0.261∗∗∗ (0.0530)
SONS*Kenya -0.0214 (0.105)
SONS*Nigeria 0.169 (0.134)
SONS*Bangladesh 0.209∗∗ (0.0884)
SONS*Pakistan 0.0875 (0.0770)
SONS*Germany 0.348∗∗∗ (0.103)
SONS*Somalia 0.568∗∗∗ (0.156)
Observations 13223 13223
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(b) Parity 2
(1) (2)
AGE -0.0140 (0.0371) -0.00997 (0.0372)
AGE2 -0.00141∗∗ (0.000664) -0.00149∗∗ (0.000665)
DEGREE 0.0739 (0.0765) 0.0583 (0.0766)
AL -0.198∗∗ (0.0834) -0.214∗∗ (0.0836)
FE -0.146∗ (0.0883) -0.174∗∗ (0.0886)
GCSE -0.188∗∗∗ (0.0660) -0.193∗∗∗ (0.0662)
Kenya -0.0527 (0.0931) 0.242 (0.149)
Nigeria 0.792∗∗∗ (0.0974) 0.721∗∗∗ (0.173)
Bangladesh 0.857∗∗∗ (0.0629) 0.677∗∗∗ (0.109)
Pakistan 0.922∗∗∗ (0.0560) 0.783∗∗∗ (0.0960)
Germany 0.0185 (0.0906) -0.148 (0.155)
Somalia 1.162∗∗∗ (0.0996) 1.069∗∗∗ (0.176)
SONS -0.280∗∗∗ (0.0634)
SONS*Kenya -0.303∗∗ (0.133)
SONS*Nigeria 0.0798 (0.144)
SONS*Bangladesh 0.183∗∗ (0.0882)
SONS*Pakistan 0.141∗ (0.0796)
SONS*Germany 0.168 (0.125)
SONS*Somalia 0.0982 (0.145)
Observations 7704 7704
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(c) Parity 3
(1) (2)
AGE -0.110∗ (0.0652) -0.105 (0.0654)
AGE2 0.000569 (0.00110) 0.000473 (0.00110)
DEGREE -0.681∗∗ (0.265) -0.695∗∗∗ (0.266)
AL -0.436∗ (0.230) -0.486∗∗ (0.230)
FE -0.304 (0.229) -0.317 (0.230)
GCSE -0.497∗∗∗ (0.178) -0.494∗∗∗ (0.178)
Kenya 0.0755 (0.192) 0.0848 (0.302)
Nigeria 0.759∗∗∗ (0.172) 0.527∗ (0.312)
Bangladesh 0.907∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.628∗∗∗ (0.204)
Pakistan 1.021∗∗∗ (0.0972) 0.742∗∗∗ (0.186)
Germany -0.0502 (0.201) -0.817∗ (0.442)
Somalia 1.453∗∗∗ (0.142) 1.045∗∗∗ (0.288)
SONS -0.369∗∗∗ (0.100)
SONS*Kenya -0.0931 (0.215)
SONS*Nigeria 0.148 (0.197)
SONS*Bangladesh 0.205∗ (0.122)
SONS*Pakistan 0.198∗ (0.114)
SONS*Germany 0.504∗∗ (0.238)
SONS*Somalia 0.282∗ (0.169)
Observations 2343 2343
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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The full tables B.1–B.3 show significant differences from India for 12, 7 and
4 countries at parities 1, 2 and 3, respectively (out of 39, 25 and 6 groups).
Of the remainder at parity 1, five show preferences different to zero (including
Kenya, as discussed). The SONS*Country interactions are jointly significant at
1% for the first two regressions (χ2 test).
In an alternative specification, I control for family composition with dum-
mies indicating the number of sons (Appendix B.3, Tables B.4 and B.5, pp.
159).30 Of countries showing significant preferences, two patterns emerge: sim-
ilar magnitude coefficients on each of the dummies suggests a preference for a
son. Conversely, differing values implies women care about the number of sons,
or want a mix of sexes. For example, Kenya and Pakistan show preferences for
having a single boy at parities 2 and 3, with significant coefficients on all dum-
mies. Interestingly, these country groups show lowest birth hazards for women
with two sons and a daughter. By contrast, at parity 3, Indian and Bangladeshi
women show hazard rates declining with the number of sons, suggesting they
want as many sons as possible. German woman are the opposite, with a prefer-
ence for daughters, though they show a significant taste for mixed families after
the second child. Australian women also show a significant taste for having
a daughter; after two boys they are two-and-a-half times more likely to have
another child than after two girls.31
The varying degrees of observed son preference amongst the groups suggests
that individuals’ origins — and hence, cultural values — play a definitive role
in shaping preferences over family composition. In the following experiments I
attempt to rule out some alternative explanations.
30In order to compare preferences within country groups, I omit non-interacted composi-
tion dummies. Coefficients therefore measure the hazard rates relative to a compatriot with
no sons. (In all other specifications, coefficients measure hazards relative to an Indian woman,
controlling for the number of sons. This presentation emphasises differences between coun-
tries.)
31exp(0.918) = 2.50.
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3.4.4 Income
Possibly, income could explain differences in son preference between groups.
Perhaps poor women of all groups have preferences for sons, and the previous
regressions are explained by differences in earnings. To exclude such stories, I
construct regressions with income dummies for each country. As discussed in
Section 3.3, I use husband’s income. This is more often reported than women’s
income and raises fewer endogeneity concerns: female earnings are likely co-
related with childrearing decisions. In any case, the major results do not depend
on this choice of regressor.
My regression model is:
log λi = β′Xi +
∑
c
γPc POORi ∗ dic + γRICHi +
∑
c
γRc RICHi ∗ dic
+ δPSONSi ∗ POORi +
∑
c
δPc SONSi ∗ POORi ∗ dic
+δRSONSi ∗ RICHi +
∑
c
δRc SONSi ∗ RICHi ∗ dic
RICH indicates above-median income, and POOR is its complement; the me-
dian is taken at the sample level, not per country. This specification, including
POOR interaction terms as well as RICH, allows son preference to be com-
pared at each income level. India dummies are omitted, as before. I am less
concerned with differences between the rich and poor of any country than in
comparing, say, rich Germans with rich Indians. With my chosen specification,
the coefficient on SONS*RICH*Germany measures exactly this.
Table 3.7 gives selected coefficients. In Column(1), only country dummies
are included. The coefficient on RICH is negative and significant at Parity
1, implying that birth hazards are generally lower for richer women. This is
not predicted in the literature, as fertility is usually found to increase in male
earnings (see also the theoretical model of Galor and Weil [1996]). However it
is very likely that assortative matching explains this finding, since educational
dummies become insignificant in all of these regressions. The explanation is that
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Table 3.7: Birth hazard rate regressions with country fixed effects and country
son preference effects, split by income at sample median. Selected coefficients
only; full results in Tables B.6–B.7 (pp. 162).
(a) Parity 1
(1) (2)
AGE 0.280∗∗∗ (0.0483) 0.286∗∗∗ (0.0485)
AGE2 -0.00574∗∗∗ (0.000887) -0.00583∗∗∗ (0.000890)
DEGREE 0.0885 (0.0848) 0.0880 (0.0854)
AL -0.0341 (0.104) -0.0305 (0.105)
FE 0.135 (0.115) 0.147 (0.116)
GCSE -0.0190 (0.0840) -0.0175 (0.0843)
POOR*Kenya -0.177 (0.132) -0.208 (0.204)
POOR*Bangladesh 0.663∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.450∗∗∗ (0.148)
POOR*Pakistan 0.397∗∗∗ (0.0992) 0.226 (0.139)
POOR*Germany -0.330∗∗∗ (0.125) -0.428∗∗ (0.172)
RICH -0.161∗ (0.0932) -0.388∗∗∗ (0.137)
RICH*Kenya 0.0745 (0.129) 0.192 (0.185)
RICH*Bangladesh 0.184 (0.221) 0.186 (0.309)
RICH*Pakistan 0.387∗∗∗ (0.132) 0.661∗∗∗ (0.194)
RICH*Germany 0.0530 (0.119) 0.0330 (0.173)
SONS*POOR -0.369∗∗∗ (0.118)
SONS*POOR*Kenya 0.106 (0.267)
SONS*POOR*Bangladesh 0.416∗∗ (0.202)
SONS*POOR*Pakistan 0.327∗ (0.197)
SONS*POOR*Germany 0.167 (0.249)
SONS*RICH 0.0540 (0.143)
SONS*RICH*Kenya -0.228 (0.258)
SONS*RICH*Bangladesh 0.00685 (0.442)
SONS*RICH*Pakistan -0.473∗ (0.264)
SONS*RICH*Germany 0.0432 (0.236)
Observations 2399 2399
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(b) Parity 2
(1) (2)
AGE -0.0789 (0.0980) -0.0921 (0.0982)
AGE2 -0.000190 (0.00175) 0.00000580 (0.00175)
DEGREE 0.269 (0.200) 0.285 (0.202)
AL -0.247 (0.224) -0.287 (0.225)
FE 0.0876 (0.239) 0.0523 (0.242)
GCSE -0.0348 (0.159) -0.0162 (0.159)
POOR*Kenya -0.0479 (0.260) 0.495 (0.453)
POOR*Bangladesh 0.913∗∗∗ (0.161) 0.943∗∗∗ (0.261)
POOR*Pakistan 1.098∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.750∗∗∗ (0.267)
POOR*Germany 0.251 (0.228) 0.540 (0.354)
RICH -0.265 (0.165) -0.0825 (0.284)
RICH*Kenya 0.0970 (0.227) 0.376 (0.367)
RICH*Bangladesh 0.913∗∗∗ (0.261) 0.593 (0.457)
RICH*Pakistan 1.123∗∗∗ (0.174) 0.912∗∗∗ (0.290)
RICH*Germany 0.323 (0.206) 0.202 (0.354)
SONS*POOR -0.225 (0.164)
SONS*POOR*Kenya -0.552 (0.429)
SONS*POOR*Bangladesh -0.0324 (0.224)
SONS*POOR*Pakistan 0.347 (0.219)
SONS*POOR*Germany -0.334 (0.327)
SONS*RICH -0.400∗∗ (0.182)
SONS*RICH*Kenya -0.295 (0.340)
SONS*RICH*Bangladesh 0.308 (0.418)
SONS*RICH*Pakistan 0.197 (0.252)
SONS*RICH*Germany 0.126 (0.303)
Observations 1180 1180
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Birth hazard rate regressions with country fixed effects and country
son preference effects, split by income at (1) first quartile, (2) sample median,
and (3) third quartile. Selected coefficients only; full results in Tables B.8 and
B.9 (pp. 164).
(a) Parity 1
(1) (2) (3)
SONS*POOR -0.308∗ (0.172) -0.369∗∗∗ (0.118) -0.307∗∗∗ (0.0990)
SONS*POOR*Kenya 0.582 (0.399) 0.106 (0.267) -0.0367 (0.208)
SONS*POOR*Bangladesh 0.367 (0.245) 0.416∗∗ (0.202) 0.334∗ (0.185)
SONS*POOR*Pakistan 0.302 (0.265) 0.327∗ (0.197) 0.261 (0.168)
SONS*POOR*Germany 0.0398 (0.394) 0.167 (0.249) 0.170 (0.193)
SONS*RICH -0.160 (0.107) 0.0540 (0.143) 0.211 (0.230)
SONS*RICH*Kenya -0.189 (0.208) -0.228 (0.258) -0.0170 (0.398)
SONS*RICH*Bangladesh 0.167 (0.335) 0.00685 (0.442) 0.598 (0.748)
SONS*RICH*Pakistan -0.147 (0.199) -0.473∗ (0.264) -1.247∗∗∗ (0.470)
SONS*RICH*Germany 0.174 (0.189) 0.0432 (0.236) 0.0553 (0.362)
Observations 2399 2399 2399
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(b) Parity 2
(1) (2) (3)
SONS*POOR -0.370∗ (0.221) -0.225 (0.164) -0.292∗∗ (0.135)
SONS*POOR*Kenya 0.501 (0.728) -0.552 (0.429) -0.180 (0.305)
SONS*POOR*Bangladesh 0.106 (0.271) -0.0324 (0.224) 0.0222 (0.202)
SONS*POOR*Pakistan 0.373 (0.298) 0.347 (0.219) 0.294 (0.183)
SONS*POOR*Germany -0.868 (0.744) -0.334 (0.327) -0.225 (0.283)
SONS*RICH -0.319∗∗ (0.145) -0.400∗∗ (0.182) -0.388 (0.285)
SONS*RICH*Kenya -0.533∗ (0.291) -0.295 (0.340) -0.923∗ (0.527)
SONS*RICH*Bangladesh 0.217 (0.344) 0.308 (0.418) 0.492 (0.566)
SONS*RICH*Pakistan 0.312 (0.197) 0.197 (0.252) 0.330 (0.386)
SONS*RICH*Germany -0.0364 (0.242) 0.126 (0.303) 0.110 (0.389)
Observations 1180 1180 1180
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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higher skilled men are both wealthier and have higher skilled partners; while
their wealth relaxes the household budget constraint allowing for more children,
the increased opportunity cost of childrearing time more than offsets this. The
empirical story is unclear in larger families: the RICH coefficient becomes in-
significant at parity 2.32 The educational dummies remain insignificant, and the
pattern is robust to using the first and third quartiles as split points in place of
median income (see Table 3.8).
Some significant differences between the country groups are seen, notably
Pakistan, different from India amongst both income groups at parity 1 (10%),
though not many other groups show significant coefficients. The small sample
size may explain this. However, the son preference coefficients are jointly sig-
nificant to zero for the poor groups at parity 1 (p = 0.052, χ2 test), and for the
rich group at parity 2 (p = 0.066).33
Whilst this analysis is not conclusive, the evidence suggests that sex pref-
erence behaviour is significantly different across country groups, regardless of
income. That is, at a given income, behaviours are comparatively similar within
groups relative to other groups, and this is robust to the choice of the income
group split, indicating that cultural values shared by the group may dominate
price-side (ie, environmental) factors when it comes to parental sex preferences.
3.4.5 Time of arrival
The literature on cultural transmission (reviewed in Chapter 1) suggests that,
if cultural values are a dominant cause of son-preferring behaviour, then these
values must have been picked up — learnt — early in life. My identification
strategy depends on the assumption that women from different countries have
picked up different values before coming to the UK. Feasibly, a longer exposure
to the prevailing culture in a woman’s country of origin would lead her to hold
32Only Indian and Pakistani women would be included at parity 3 so I restrict attention to
parities 1 and 2.
33Only the Pakistani dummy appears at parity 3; this coefficient is significant at 5% as
described (p = 0.043).
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those values more strongly. Here, I test whether arrival in Britain at a young
age results in weaker son preferences.
The LFS contains data the years of arrival in the UK for immigrants. This
allows me to perform an analogue of the previous exercise, splitting the sam-
ple by age at arrival (AGECAME). I use this to define an indicator variable
YOUNG, equal to one for women arriving before a certain age, zero other-
wise, with OLD being the complement. YOUNG*Country and OLD*Country
interactions are included to capture fecundity effects associated with arriving
young/arriving later for each country group, along with SONS interactions to
capture sex preferences. These regressions are found in Table 3.9.34
In each panel, Column (1) reports regressions with the split point at ten
years. Women arriving before their tenth birthday show insignificant son pref-
erence. Of the largest five country groups,35 no SONS*YOUNG*Country coef-
ficient is significant except for Nigeria at parity 2, implying that son preferring
behaviour is not particularly different across these groups. The YOUNG inter-
action terms show significance jointly for only parity 2, at 10%.
Conversely, women arriving after the age of ten do show significant son
preference at each parity. Moreover, differences between groups are significant.
Bangladeshi women show less son preference at all three parities, and Pakistani
and German women less for two of the three. For each country all signs match
except for Nigeria at parity 2, and the coefficients are jointly significant at at
least 5% in each regression.
For SONS*OLD*Country coefficients, the signs are usually positive except
for Kenya (usually negative), suggesting that some countries consistently exhibit
son preference. Conversely, the signs for SONS*YOUNG*Country coefficients
34The regression equation is
log λi = β
′Xi +
X
c
γOc OLDi ∗ dic + γYOUNGi +
X
c
γYc YOUNGi ∗ dic
+ δOSONSi ∗OLDi +
X
c
δOc SONSi ∗OLDi ∗ dic
+δYSONSi ∗YOUNGi +
X
c
δYc SONSi ∗YOUNGi ∗ dic
35Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Germany appear in each regression.
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Table 3.9: Birth hazard rate regressions with country fixed effects and country
son preference effects, split by age on immigration to the UK. Column (1) split
at age 10, Column (2) at age 15. Selected coefficients only; full results in Tables
B.10–B.12 (pp. 162).
(a) Parity 1
(1) (2)
SONS*OLD -0.285∗∗∗ (0.0583) -0.250∗∗∗ (0.0609)
SONS*OLD*Kenya -0.0168 (0.121) -0.0379 (0.140)
SONS*OLD*Nigeria 0.174 (0.142) 0.141 (0.145)
SONS*OLD*Bangladesh 0.233∗∗ (0.0952) 0.167∗ (0.101)
SONS*OLD*Pakistan 0.132 (0.0838) 0.0784 (0.0874)
SONS*OLD*Germany 0.372∗∗ (0.159) 0.348∗∗ (0.174)
SONS*YOUNG -0.101 (0.133) -0.294∗∗∗ (0.110)
SONS*YOUNG*Kenya -0.0794 (0.218) 0.0735 (0.171)
SONS*YOUNG*Nigeria -0.0870 (0.424) 0.123 (0.361)
SONS*YOUNG*Bangladesh 0.0493 (0.254) 0.360∗ (0.189)
SONS*YOUNG*Pakistan -0.180 (0.205) 0.134 (0.168)
SONS*YOUNG*Germany 0.171 (0.173) 0.360∗∗ (0.153)
Observations 13112 13112
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(b) Parity 2
(1) (2)
SONS*OLD -0.273∗∗∗ (0.0704) -0.253∗∗∗ (0.0733)
SONS*OLD*Kenya -0.282∗ (0.154) -0.476∗∗ (0.189)
SONS*OLD*Nigeria -0.0183 (0.152) -0.0110 (0.155)
SONS*OLD*Bangladesh 0.171∗ (0.0962) 0.129 (0.100)
SONS*OLD*Pakistan 0.147∗ (0.0872) 0.146 (0.0906)
SONS*OLD*Germany 0.0613 (0.218) 0.0150 (0.238)
SONS*YOUNG -0.217 (0.149) -0.305∗∗ (0.130)
SONS*YOUNG*Kenya -0.367 (0.284) -0.0876 (0.209)
SONS*YOUNG*Nigeria 1.153∗∗ (0.587) 0.594 (0.457)
SONS*YOUNG*Bangladesh 0.127 (0.235) 0.298 (0.190)
SONS*YOUNG*Pakistan -0.0392 (0.210) 0.00775 (0.176)
SONS*YOUNG*Germany 0.146 (0.197) 0.237 (0.180)
Observations 7630 7630
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(c) Parity 3
(1) (2)
SONS*OLD -0.411∗∗∗ (0.110) -0.368∗∗∗ (0.115)
SONS*OLD*Kenya -0.120 (0.248) -0.263 (0.295)
SONS*OLD*Nigeria 0.194 (0.200) 0.140 (0.203)
SONS*OLD*Bangladesh 0.243∗ (0.132) 0.207 (0.139)
SONS*OLD*Pakistan 0.267∗∗ (0.125) 0.218∗ (0.131)
SONS*OLD*Germany 1.219∗∗∗ (0.415) 1.071∗∗ (0.464)
SONS*YOUNG -0.130 (0.255) -0.383∗ (0.209)
SONS*YOUNG*Kenya -0.172 (0.500) 0.0762 (0.353)
SONS*YOUNG*Nigeria -0.656 . 2.277 (1.839)
SONS*YOUNG*Bangladesh -0.00885 (0.395) 0.189 (0.270)
SONS*YOUNG*Pakistan -0.169 (0.297) 0.181 (0.242)
SONS*YOUNG*Germany -0.00803 (0.384) 0.357 (0.337)
Observations 2317 2317
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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are mixed. Therefore, though these lower significance levels may result from
reduced power due to small group sizes, the data is consistent with less variation
in son preference for younger arrivals.
Column (2) in each panel moves the age split point to fifteen. Son prefer-
ence becomes significant for young arrivals in all three regressions. Since the
number of these young arrivals is only increased by 35% (parities 1 and 2), the
extra power of the tests does not solely explain the higher significance. The
OLD*SONS coefficients remain significant at 1%, but are reduced in each case.
Also, the SONS*YOUNG coefficients are larger in magnitude for all parities.
At parity one, the number of significant SONS*YOUNG*Country coefficients
rises from three to six (see Table B.10). Some of the OLD interactions become
insignificant, and the joint p-value of the SONS*OLD*County coefficients at
parity 3 increases to 0.11. These findings suggest that women arriving when
younger display less son preference, and that the 10–15 age range may be a
cut-off point. This range coincides roughly with high school education in the
UK. Girls arriving before ten could be expected to receive at least six years
of education in Britain and hence receive considerable exposure to prevailing
values.
Overall, the results presented here can be taken as marginal evidence that
immersion in another country diminishes the cultural influence of individuals’
countries of origin. It is likely that arriving in a foreign environment at a
young age in fact exposes individuals more strongly to the prevailing culture,
particularly though education. The evidence is consistent with this story.
3.5 Conclusion
Previous work has not provided clear explanation for the causes of son preference
in many countries worldwide. The evidence presented in here is supportive of a
cultural explanation for cross-country differences in sex preferences. Conversely,
the theoretical results derived from my model imply that price-side effects are
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an unlikely explanation for the variation in parental behaviour observed in my
sample. In any case, this paper provides the first estimates of underlying son
preferences that can be compared across countries. Aggregate sex ratios are not
suitable for this purpose.
Sample selection biases may be of some concern. Aside from selection into
the survey itself, the decision to emigrate to the UK may differ between groups
studies. For example, a Dutch woman may have very different reasons than
an Iranian. However, selection effects could conceivably reinforce the results: if
women are more likely to emigrate to Britain if they are ‘culturally similar’, then
migrants might display less variation than a representative sample of foreign
women.
Whilst son preference has the attention of policy-makers, there is currently
no consensus about potential policy interventions. That will remain the case
until a coherent theory of parental sex preferences is established. The present
work seeks to advance the debate by highlighting the importance of cultural
factors.
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Son preference and sex
ratios: How many ‘missing
women’ are missing?
When parents prefer sons, heterogeneity in the probability of having sons
can lead to excess girls. I argue that this may lead to under-counting
the number of ‘missing women’. First, I prove that relaxing assumptions
on population homogeneity means that son preference can lead to skewed
sex ratios. Second, I measure significant heterogeneity in the sex ratio at
birth: ten percent of women have probabilities of having boys that are less
than 42% or more than 61%. Third, existing work measures significant
differences in parents’ son preferences between countries. I exploit these
differences in parental behaviour to simulate sex ratios in the presence of
heterogeneity. I measure that parents’ son preferences account for 1.5%
of differences between sex ratios worldwide (significant at 10%). The
presence of this effect may imply that sex ratios are more biased than
previously estimated, since previous comparisons use benchmarks that
already contain too few girls. Therefore there may be more women missing
due to discrimination than we thought.
4.1 Introduction
Since recognition of the ‘missing women’ problem by Sen [1989], several expla-
nations have been made for the high proportion of boys in a number of countries.
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Recent work has highlighted biological factors as a possible cause of differences
in sex ratios (the number of boys per girl), notably the Hepatitis-B virus [Os-
ter, 2005]. Conversely, a majority of authors conclude that social norms are
the proximate cause, as these lead to lower survival rates for girls.1 To date,
however, the effect of son preference in fertility decisions has been neglected,
despite evidence that parents’ sex preferences are mainly determined by cultural
background (see Chapter 3).
This paper estimates the effect of parental fertility decisions on sex ratios
worldwide when women are heterogeneous in the probability of bearing sons. If
women in a population have boys with differing probabilities, then son-preferring
fertility behaviour will lead to excess girls. The extra girls borne by women that
are more likely to have girls outnumber the reduction of girls borne to women
likely to have boys. Previous theoretical work [Weiler, 1959; Goodman, 1961;
Yamaguchi, 1989] has recognised this phenomenon in principle; I know of no
attempt to quantify the effect in practice.
A growing body of biological research suggests that women are indeed het-
erogeneous in the probability with which they have sons.2,3 The majority of
demographic work has considered the first-order implications of such phenom-
ena in affecting the aggregate sex ratio.4 However, many of these mechanisms
also imply that populations will be heterogeneous; they have a second-order
effect. This paper focusses on the implications of that heterogeneity on the sex
1Proponents of cultural explanations include Sen [1992]; Das Gupta et al. [2002]; Aroki-
asamy [2004]; Das Gupta [2005]; Qian [2006]; Chamarbagwala and Ranger [2006] and Lin
et al. [2008].
2Graffelman and Hoekstra [2000] outline some of the possible causes:
[M]ore than 30 factors . . . could affect the sex ratio. Among these are family size,
age of the parents, age difference of the parents, birth order of the child, race, in-
cest, blood groups, season, frequency of sexual intercourse, socioeconomic status
of the parents, legality of the child, climatological conditions, profession of the
parents, pollution, use of the contraceptive pill, nutrition, hormonal treatments,
type and timing of fertilization, urbanity, several diseases, handedness of the
parents, stress.
3The existence of many of these phenomena can be explained in an evolutionary context:
the aim is to maximise the reproductive fitness of one’s offspring. For example, beautiful
people are relatively more likely to have daughters since good looks confer a greater advantage
to girls than to boys [Miller and Kanazawa, 2007].
4Eg, Graffelman and Hoekstra [2000]; Oster [2005].
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ratio in the presence of a cultural preference for boys.
Like previous authors [reviewed in James, 2000], I find significant hetero-
geneity in the probability of having a son, suggesting that ten percent of women
have boys with probabilities outside the interval [0.42, 0.61]. Accounting for
parental behaviour, this heterogeneity leads to sex ratios in the range 1.043–
1.051, explaining 1.5% of differences worldwide (significant at the 10% level).
As the theory suggests, son preference is associated with excess girls. Thus,
since previous estimates of missing women have used comparisons without ac-
counting for these excess girls at birth, the number of women missing due to
explicit discrimination may have been under-counted.
Chapter 3 provides theoretical and empirical evidence that parents’ prefer-
ence for sons is mainly driven by cultural factors. I provide uniquely compa-
rable estimates of son preference between countries, based on the behaviour of
foreign-born women in the UK. Figure 4.1 plots son preference after two chil-
dren versus sex ratios in those women’s countries of origin. The correlation is
significant and negative (and robust to omission of outliers). This suggests that
culturally-driven son preference may lead to a reduction in the sex ratio.
Consider an extreme example: women continue to have children until they
have a son. If boys and girls are equally likely for every women, the sex ratio in
aggregate will be 1 [Weiler, 1959; Goodman, 1961; Sheps, 1963]. However, if half
of women only ever have boys and half only girls, the former will obtain their son
at the first birth. The latter will continue to have girls until some maximum
family size is reached, and girls will outnumber boys. I prove a more general
form of this result in Section 4.2. The phenomenon relies on the existence of
heterogeneity in the probability of a son.
Figure 4.2 suggests that within-population heterogeneity of probability of
having a son is indeed a possibility. In Section 4.3, I provide estimates of such
heterogeneity, and find homogeneity is rejected at the 0.01% level. I derive an
estimator based on modelling childbirth as a limited dependent variable problem
with random effects. A woman i has an unobserved factor Xi, and child j is a
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Figure 4.1: Son preference of immigrant women versus sex ratios in their coun-
tries of origin. Son preference (after two children) is estimated from a birth-
hazard regression for foreign-born women in the UK grouped by country of
origin. Child sex ratio is derived from World Development Indicators (1997),
under-15 male population divided by under-15 female population. Correlation
is significant at 5% (robust to inclusion/exclusion of outliers).a
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aSon preference is −δc from the Cox Proportional Hazards regression log λi = β′Xi +P
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P
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relative to the (unspecified) baseline θ0(t). See Section 3.4, page 92. Countries with son
preference coefficients absolutely greater than 0.5 are omitted here for clarity.
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Figure 4.2: Family composition (5 children) under a binomial model (B ∼
Bernoulli(0.5)), versus actual data (see Table 4.1). The data show more dis-
persion than predicted by the model with homogeneous probabilities of having
sons.
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boy if Xi+ ij > 0, with ij being drawn from an independent standard normal
distribution. Thus, woman i gives birth to boys with probability Φ(Xi).5 By
assuming a distributional form for X, parameters may be obtained by maxi-
mum likelihood estimation. I find significant heterogeneity amongst a sample
of 116,513 British-born women: 10% of women have boys with probabilities
outside [0.42, 0.61]. My measurements are closely in line with previous work,
despite the difference in estimation technique.
In Section 4.4, I simulate the effect of son preferences on aggregate sex
ratios, using the estimates for heterogeneity derived in Section 4.3. To obtain
preferences for sons, I estimate the son preferences of immigrant women in
the UK. By grouping the women by country of origin, I measure the fertility
behaviour in response to their existing family compositions. I can then calculate
the sex ratio that would emerge in a population of women behaving this way.
5Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF).
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This simulated sex ratio is then compared with the sex ratio in the women’s
countries of origin.
The contribution of this paper is to establish that fertility behaviour does
feasibly affect sex ratios in practice. Moreover, the bias is towards the less-
favoured sex. Therefore, even though the effect I find is likely outweighed by
discriminatory behaviour (such as selective abortion, infanticide or neglect), it
is important because missing women cannot be measured correctly unless sex
ratios at birth are properly accounted for. This reinforces the arguments made
by Mayer [1999] and Griffiths et al. [2000], that sex ratios alone should be treated
with caution as a measure of women’s position in society: I maintain sex ratios
must be treated with care when measuring the number of missing women.
Related Literature
There have been numerous attempts to quantify the number of missing women
worldwide, notably Dre`ze and Sen [1989], who arrive at a figure of 100 million,
and Coale [1991] finding a reduced figure of 60 million. Oster [2005] takes
account of Hepatitis-B and its effect on the probabilities of having sons, coming
to a still lower figure of 32 million. All three works take probabilities of sons to
be homogeneous within countries.6
Meanwhile, there is a growing literature that implies within-population het-
erogeneity in the probability of having boys. Factors thought to affect the
‘parental’ sex ratio include status and personal traits such as dominance [Kem-
per, 1994; James, 1994; Grant, 1996, cited in Edlund, 1999], parental percep-
tion of the adult sex ratio [James, 1995], times of war [Graffelman and Hoek-
stra, 2000], Hepatitis B [Oster, 2005, 2006], maternal partnership status [Nor-
berg, 2004] and maternal diet [Matthews et al., 2008]. Further, Lindsey and
Altham [1998] find that a binomial model, as implied by homogeneity in son-
probabilities, has a poor fit to family composition data. They find the number of
6Nonetheless, Oster’s work does in fact imply heterogeneity with at least two types: virus
carriers and non-carriers.
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sons in families is ‘overdispersed’, suggesting heterogeneity. The demographic
literature on probability heterogeneity is comprehensively surveyed by James
[2000]. The theoretical result that population heterogeneity creates a link be-
tween son preference and aggregate sex ratios is not new, going back to Weiler
[1959] and Goodman [1961], but the finding is not recognised in the economic
literature.
There is wide acknowledgement that cultural factors such as son preferences
and the status of women drive mortality-rate differentials and incentivise female
infanticide and selective abortion [Sen, 1992; Das Gupta et al., 2002, for exam-
ple]. Despite this recognition, no one has yet attempted to measure the effect
of parents’ fertility decisions on sex ratios. This omission surely results from an
awareness of the fact that with homogeneous probabilities of having boys, son
preference will have no effect on the sex ratio in large populations [Sheps, 1963;
Leung, 1988].
The present paper sits at the juncture of two strands of literature. The
first strand considers sex ratios and the biological factors affecting an individual
woman’s probability of having boys. However, instead of accounting for bio-
logical differences amongst women from different countries (as in Oster [2005]),
I treat biological differences as unobserved but existing within every popula-
tion. In this paper, differences between countries are cultural. Here, I follow
the new literature on cultural differences between countries, such as [Ferna´ndez
and Fogli, 2005, 2006], which determine that cultural background is a significant
predictor of fertility outcomes. Of particular relevance to the present work is
Chapter 3, which finds strong evidence that son preferences amongst immigrant
women in the UK is driven by cultural factors, rather than economic mecha-
nisms. This accords with Chamarbagwala and Ranger [2006], who argue that
several cultural aspects such as religious composition and caste structure ex-
plain in part the high sex ratios found in some parts of India. Their suggested
mechanism relies on selective abortion, infanticide and neglect of girls leading
to an increase in the sex ratio (an excess of boys).
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The results of this paper imply that son preferences lead to an excess of girls.
This finding is of compatible with the results of Coale [1991]; Chamarbagwala
and Ranger [2006] and others if discrimination outweighs the contribution of
fertility decisions. In fact, the work here reinforces previous studies. I demon-
strate the existence of a mechanism that opposes the effect of discrimination
on the sex ratio. Thus, previous estimates may understate the importance of
discrimination, and the number of missing women may be under-measured.
4.2 Theory
In this section I prove that parents’ fertility decisions can affect population sex
ratios, with a bias against the favoured sex. A necessary and sufficient condition
is that the probability of a son is heterogeneous within the population.7 This
finding dates back to Weiler [1959] and Goodman [1961, both papers cited in
Yamaguchi, 1989]; my proof is presented here for clarity and to support the
intuition. In this paper, I focus on lexis variation, whereby women differ in their
probabilities of having sons, but each woman’s probability does not change over
time.8
4.2.1 Background
Much existing research has focussed on homogeneous populations. In large
samples, homogeneity entails that the population sex ratio matches the ‘natural’
ratio of boys to girls — the ratio which would prevail if parents only cared about
the size of their families, not their sexes [Sheps, 1963; Leung, 1988]. With
homogeneity, the probability that a further child is a boy is independent of the
current family composition. Why you choose to have a child doesn’t affect the
probability you’ll have a son. (This argument establishes that heterogeneity is
7Throughout this paper, the ‘probability of having a son’ refers only to the biological
chance of conceiving and bearing a boy. I assume that selective abortion never occurs. In the
empirical sections, child mortality is also ignored (following Gangadharan and Maitra [2003]).
Neither of these factors are likely to affect my results, since these phenomena are uncommon
in the UK. (However, see Dubuc and Coleman [2007].)
8James [2000] discusses in detail the implications of different types of variation.
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necessary for son preference to affect sex ratios.)
Heterogeneity implies that the composition of a family is not independent
of its size. When one sex is preferred, a woman’s childbearing decisions are
co-related to the probability she has boys.
Without loss of generality, let parents prefer sons. Then, those having boys
are more likely to cease having children than those having girls. So those likely
to have sons will, on average, have smaller families than those likely to have
daughters. The difference in family sizes gives an excess of girls relative to the
case without sex preferences.
4.2.1.1 Progression Rates
Of women with a certain number of children, the proportion going on to have
further children is known as the progression rate. Rates can be compared be-
tween women who have different family compositions. Usually, women having
boys are found to have lower progression rates, indicating a preference for sons9
and this is rationalised by the microeconomic models of Leung [1991] and Chap-
ter 3. For the model here, I choose the most extreme form of this behaviour:
women have children until they bear a son (this may be called a 1-boy stopping
rule). This formulation simplifies the algebra considerably, but is not necessary
for the intuition.10
4.2.2 Model
4.2.2.1 Homogeneity
First, consider the case of homogeneous probabilities. Let there be N women,
each with natural probability p of having a boy at any birth. Since each woman
i continues bearing children until a son is born, the number of boys in each
family (bi) will be one. Thus, the number of boys in the population will be
9See, for example, Leung [1988]; Gangadharan and Maitra [2003]; Das Gupta [2005].
10Any n-boy stopping rule would yield exactly the same bias in the sex ratio (proof omitted).
The effect of mixed-family stopping rule (eg, n boys,m girls) would be smaller but qualitatively
similar (as long as n > m). The intuition is unchanged provided that after a son a woman is
less likely to continue having children than after a daughter.
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B
def
=
N∑
i=1
bi = N
The number of girls in each family takes a geometric distribution.11 gi ∼
Geom(p). The total number of girls, G
def
=
∑N
i=1 gi, tends to N
(1−p)
p as N →∞,
because the expected number of girls in each family is 1−pp . Therefore the sex
ratio BG converges to
p
1−p , as when parents have no son preference. Equivalently,
B
B+G → p.
4.2.2.2 Heterogeneity
Now, consider a mean preserving spread in the probabilities, with a fraction α
having boys with probability p1, and the remainder with probability p2 = p−αp11−α .
With no son preference, childbearing ends independently of the composition of
each family and (hence) independently of the woman’s type. The population
sex ratio will again be p1−p .
With son preference, each woman still has one son, so B˜ = N . However the
distribution of girls is not the same for all women, since gi ∼ Geom(pi), and
E[gi] = 1−pipi . Thus, as N →∞,
G˜
def
=
N∑
i=1
gi → Nα1− p1
p1
+N(1− α)1− p2
p2
Hence the population sex ratio is:
B˜
G˜
→
(
α
1− p1
p1
+ (1− α)1− p2
p2
)−1
=
p1p2
α(1− p1)p2 + (1− α)p1(1− p2)
=
p1p2
(1− α)p1 + αp2 − p1p2
B˜
G˜
is necessarily smaller than the sex ratio with no preference, as the follow-
ing theorem shows.
11I take the geometric defined as the number of failures before a success, not the number
of attempts. fGeom(p)(g) = (1− p)gp.
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Theorem 1. In a large population of women, let a proportion α have boys with
probability p1, and the remainder have boys with probability p2. Then B˜/G˜ <
B/G if and only if p1 6= p2. Heterogeneity is a necessary and sufficient condition
for son preference to bias in the population sex ratio.
Proof. I begin with the following inequality, due to Cauchy (it is also implied by
Jensen’s inequality). 2p1p− 2 ≤ p21+ p22 holds with equality only when p1 = p2,
ie, the case of homogeneity. Otherwise, the inequality is strict:
2p1p2 < p21 + p
2
2
(2α− 2α2)p1p2 < α(1− α)(p21 + p22)
(1− (1− α)2 − α2)p1p2 < α(1− α)(p21 + p22)
p1p2 < α(1− α)p21 + (1− α)2p1p2
+ α2p1p2 + α(1− α)p22
p1p2 − αp21p2 − (1− α)p1p22 < α(1− α)p21 + (1− α)2p1p2
+ α2p1p2 + α(1− α)p22
− αp22p2 − (1− α)p1p22
p1p2(1− αp1 − (1− α)p2) < (αp1 + (1− α)p2)((1− α)p1 + αp2 − p1p2)
p1p2
(1− α)p1 + αp2 − p1p2 <
αp1 + (1− α)p2
1− αp1 − (1− α)p2
∴ B˜
G˜
<
B
G
Therefore the sex ratio is biased in favour of girls. Note that, under homogeneity
of probabilities, each of the inequalities becomes an equality. The parental
decisions only affect the sex ratio under heterogeneity.
We see that a mean preserving spread in the probability of having sons skews
the sex ratio in favour of girls when parents prefer boys. In the next sections, I
take this theoretical result and estimate the magnitude of the effect in reality.
One caveat must be noted. Here, I treat women as biologically heterogeneous
but socially identical: they share the same preferences and behave the same.
This is unlikely to be the case in practice. No work to date has considered
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heterogeneity in son preference within groups, despite evidence of variations
between groups (see Chapter 3). However, heterogeneity in behaviour would
likely result in a averaged outcome; the effects modelled here would apply for
any subgroups behaving similarly. The overall effect would be an aggregate of
the subgroup effects.
4.3 Estimating Heterogeneity
In this section, I attempt to estimate within-population heterogeneity in the
probability of having a son. Previous work by economists has considered child-
bearing as a Bernoulli trial with a probability p of bearing a son, and 1 − p of
bearing a daughter; authors have allowed p to differ between populations but
not within them. Here, this restriction is reversed: p varies within populations,
but the distribution is the same across countries.
I assume that, throughout their life, each woman has the same probability
of having sons. In other words, I assume only lexis variation. Therefore, since
I observe multiple outcomes (children) for some women, I am able to estimate
the underlying distribution of probabilities, given some functional assumptions.
4.3.1 Empirical model
Consider a population of women, with each woman i having some underlying
factor Xi which affects the likelihood that she bears a son when she has a child.
For simplicity, let X be distributed as a normal random variable with mean µ
and variance σ2:
Xi ∼ N(µ, σ2)
When woman i bears a child j, an independent, identically distributed draw
is made. I take this ij also to be Gaussian, and without loss of generality,
normalise the mean and variance to 0 and 1 respectively:
ij ∼ N(0, 1)
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A boy is born if the sum of X and  is greater than zero. That is, if Bij is
a random variable indicating birth of a boy,
Bij
def
=
 0 if Xi + ij ≤ 01 if Xi + ij > 0
Let Φ and φ be the cumulative distribution and probability density functions
of the standard normal distribution.12 The probability of woman i having a boy
at any birth is
pi = P[Xi + ij > 0]
= P[ij < −Xi]
= 1− Φ(−Xi)
= Φ(Xi)
Thus, Bij may be treated as a Bernoulli trial with probability of success
pi = Φ(Xi).13
4.3.2 Likelihood functions
If Xi were known, the likelihood of observing a certain family composition
for woman i can be easily computed. Suppose observed sons are indicated by
12When necessary, the CDF and PDF of X will be denoted ΦX and φX .
13This ‘Probit’ derivation is inherently isomorphic to the formulation Bij ∼ Bernoulli(pi)
with p having CDF ΦX(Φ
−1(p)). Whilst somewhat arbitrary, the approach taken here is easily
comprehensible, treating X as an unobserved variable in an LDV problem. An alternative
method would be to estimate a distribution for p directly: possible distributions include
the Beta, Kumaraswamy, Raised Cosine, Triangular, Truncated Normal, and Uniform (the
support must be inside [0,1]). As well as being analytically simple, my chosen functional form
gives p to be distributed on the whole of [0,1] with extreme values being unlikely, regardless
of parametrisation. None of these other distributions display this property.
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bi1 . . . biki . Then, since individual births are independent,
L(bij |Xi) def= P[Bij = bij for j = 1 . . . ki]
=
ki∏
j=1
P[Bij = bij ]
=
ki∏
j=1
Φ(Xi)bij (1− Φ(Xi))(1−bij)
= Φ(Xi)k
B
i (1− Φ(Xi))kGi
kBi and k
G
i are the numbers of boys and girls borne by women i. (k
B
i +k
G
i = ki.)
Since only the numbers of boys and girls matter, the likelihood may be rewritten
L(kBi , kGi |Xi) =
(kBi +kGi
kBi
)
Φ(Xi)k
B
i (1 − Φ(Xi))kGi , with the combination factor
accounting for the number of different ways that composition can occur.14
The unconditional likelihood is obtained by integrating over X, given its
distribution:
Li = L(kBi , kGi ;µ, σ) =
(
kBi + k
G
i
kBi
)∫
R
Φ(x)k
B
i (1− Φ(x))kGi dΦX(x) (4.1)
The sample likelihood is the product of the women’s individual likelihoods,
L(µ, σ) =∏i Li, because the Xi are independent. Estimates of the parameters
of the distribution of X may be made by maximising this likelihood: (µˆ, σˆ) =
argmax
µ
L(µ, σ).15
4.3.3 Data and Estimations
Using data from the UK Labour Force Survey 1996–2005, I construct fertility
histories for 116,513 British-born women aged 16–55. When a household enters
the survey, a matrix of household relationships is recorded, so I match women
with their natural children under the age of 16.16 Table 4.1 records the compo-
14Under the assumption of only lexis variation (constant probabilities for each woman),
including uncompleted families does not affect the estimator.
15Recall that µ and σ parameterise the distribution of X. They appear in Equation 4.1 via
the integrating density, dΦX(x).
16The survey is conducted as a rolling panel with households appearing in the survey for five
quarters. I use only the households’ first-quarter responses. Birth histories ignore mortality
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Number of Boys
Children 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 24526 25710 – – – – – – – – –
2 11205 24283 12014 – – – – – – – –
3 1812 5100 5394 2182 – – – – – – –
4 233 744 1188 904 328 – – – – – –
5 29 108 193 200 114 31 – – – – –
6 2 14 30 56 32 14 7 – – – –
7 0 1 9 7 10 9 4 1 – – –
8 0 0 4 2 4 3 2 0 0 – –
9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 –
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Table 4.1: Family composition data from the UK Labour Force Survey 1996–
2005. British-born women aged 16–55.
Table 4.2: Maximum likelihood estimates of distribution of X ∼ N(µ, σ2) from
family composition data. The underlying probability that a woman has sons is
p = Φ(X). Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis (200 samples).
Estimate Std. Dev. 90% CI
µˆ 0.0305 (0.00285) [0.0258, 0.0351]
σˆ 0.145 (0.0165) [0.118, 0.172]
sitions of these families. As can be seen in Equation 4.1, my estimator requires
only the number of boys and girls in each household.
My estimates of the parameters underlying X are derived by Maximum
Likelihood Estimation, as outlined in the previous section, and standard errors
by the bootstrap method (200 bootstrap samples). Baseline estimates are shown
in Table 4.2, with Figure 4.3 giving estimated values for the bootstrap samples.
Two implications are immediate: first, the median woman has natural prob-
ability of Φ(µ) = 0.512 of giving birth to a boy, yielding a ‘natural’ sex ratio of
1.050 boys per girl. This figure is lower than the usually cited ratio of 1.06 and
the difference is statistically different at the 5% level.17 However, my estimate
lies within the range 1.03–1.06 given by Edlund [1999] as ‘biologically normal’.
The coherence of my estimate µˆ with existing studies acts as a ‘sanity check’ on
and the possibility some children are absent from the household. I expect these omissions to
have only minor effects on my results. I take the oldest child under the age of 16 to be the
woman’s first, following the example of Gangadharan and Maitra [2003]. The same caveats
apply to the birth histories used in Section 4.4.2.
17The median probability will be different from the mean, EX Φ(X). However, in this case
they are identical to three significant figures.
120
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
Figure 4.3: Bootstrap estimates for parameters µ and σ of X ∼ N(µ, σ2) (200
samples from family composition data, Table 4.1). Probability of a son is p =
Φ(X).
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my methodology.
The second implication is more important: the variation in X, and hence
p, is large. The baseline estimate gives a standard deviation for X of 0.145.
This implies a 90% confidence interval (CI) of [0.42 , 0.61] for p. Five percent of
women are likely to have a boy with a greater than 61% chance, and five percent
of women are likely to have a boy with a less than 42% chance. Even taking a
minimal value of σ (at the lower end of the 90% CI interval, σ = 0.118) yields
a 90% confidence interval of [0.44, 0.59] for p.
I test for the significance of this heterogeneity with a likelihood ratio test.
Homogeneity entails that X takes a degenerate distribution with value µ. Then
all women would have boys with probability Φ(µ). This case is equivalent to
σ = 0, though now the likelihood function in Equation 4.1 is not well defined.
However, the likelihood of a family comprising kBi boys and k
G
i girls nonetheless
121
Culture, Fertility, and Son Preference
exists:
L(kBi , kGi ;µ) =
(
kBi + k
G
i
kBi
)
Φ(µ)k
B
i (1− Φ(µ))kGi
The restricted sample likelihood is analogous to the sample likelihood, being
L(µ) = ∏i L(kBi , kGi ;µ). MLE on this restricted model yields an estimate of
µˇ = 0.0303. Thus, the likelihood ratio statistic can be computed:
Λ =
max
µ
L(µ)
max
µ,σ
L(µ, σ)
The restricted likelihood reduces the dimension of the problem by one, so the
we have (asymptotically) −2 log Λ ∼ χ21. I am able to reject the null hypothesis
that there is no heterogeneity at the 0.01% significance level (−2 log Λ = 16.8).
This result suggests that my model does indeed perform better than one in
which all women have the same probability of having sons, as can be seen in
Figure 4.4.
Lindsey and Altham [1998] find significant ‘overdispersion’ in family com-
position relative to a binomial model, as I do. Using their data, I am able to
make a second estimate of heterogeneity in the probability of having sons.18
Their data gives µˆ′ = 0.0367 and σˆ′ = 0.127. The mean is significantly different
from my original estimate at the 1% significance level, but the standard devi-
ation estimate is not significantly different. Predicted son-probabilities are not
practically dissimilar, with a 90% CI for p of [0.43, 0.60].
James [2000] surveys a variety of estimates of the standard deviation of p,
centred on 0.05. My original estimates (µˆ = 0.0305,σˆ = 0.145) give a standard
deviation of 0.0572, and my estimates with the Lindsey and Altham data give
0.0502.
I can also compare Lindsey and Altham’s model with my own. Under a
fixed parametrisation with respect to family size, their Beta-Binomial model
performs very similarly using Pearson’s χ2 test. However, as they note, they
18Theirs is a sample of almost one million families from Saxony in the period 1876–1885,
collected by Arthur Geissler.
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Figure 4.4: Family composition (3 children): under (a) binomial model,
B ∼ Bernoulli(Φ(0.0303)); (b) under ‘probit’ form heterogeneity, B ∼
Bernoulli(Φ(X)), X ∼ N(0.0305, 0.1452); and (c) actual data (Table 4.1).
0 1 2 3
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Boys in family: Binomial model versus data
Boys in family
P r
o p
o r
t i o
n  
o f
 f a
m
i l i
e s
Binomial model
Observed
Probit model
merely perform a data-fitting exercise and they highlight the lack of biological
explanation behind their results. My model is perhaps more amenable to a
biological explanation, since it is based on individual effects for each woman.
Lindsey and Altham’s model performs better than mine when parameters are
allowed to vary with family size. They suggest that sex preferences are not the
cause, since final children are omitted from their sample, though it is impossible
to test this assertion with their data. In Appendix C.1, I propose a robustness
check to deal with this concern.
Since Lindsey and Altham find family-size effects, women may not have
constant probabilities of bearing sons over throughout their lives. This implies
some Markov variation in the probabilities of birth [James, 2000], with p chang-
ing (monotonically) with birth order. My estimation technique does not account
for such effects.
In sum, I conclude [after James, 2000] that lexis variation does exist in
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women’s probability of having sons. In the next section I use my estimates
to calculate the effect of parents’ son preferences on the aggregate sex ratio in
practice.
4.4 Sex ratio simulation
If parents have preferences for sons, heterogeneity in the chance that individual
women have boys will lead to a skew in the sex ratio, as proved in Section 4.2.
Here I attempt to calibrate the size of this effect using a simulation.
4.4.1 Procedure
I construct predictions of the sex ratio in countries worldwide based on two
pieces of data: first, the underlying distribution of probabilities of having sons
(estimated in the previous section), and the observed sex preferences of women
from a variety countries (following Chapter 3).
Two assumptions underlie this calibration. First, I take as given that my
heterogeneity estimates apply to women from all countries. My justification is
that estimates from recent UK data (1996–2005) are similar to estimates based
on data from Saxony in the late 19th century [Lindsey and Altham, 1998]. Both
sets of estimates fall in line with previous estimations of lexis variation in the
probability of having sons James [2000].
Second, and more problematically, it is necessary to assume that the fertility
behaviour of immigrants to the UK is the same as that of women in their
countries of origin. This assertion somewhat stretches the external validity
of Chapter 3. Problems include: (1) emigrants being unrepresentative, (2)
cost differences between childrearing in the UK and elsewhere, and (3) cultural
assimilation within the UK. However, the first and third of these concerns are
likely to bias measures of son preference down, relative to what they would be
in the countries of origin. Women moving to the UK may be more likely to
have preferences similar to British women, and absorption of local norms will
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reduce son preference (British women appear to show little son preference —
see Appendix C.1).
The second concern — price differentials — may bias the measure up if girls
cost more to raise than boys (see Section 3.2, page 76). Women already having
girls may reduce their fertility due to a wealth effect. However, in light of the
large cultural effects found in that paper, it is likely that son preferences of
immigrant women in the UK are less extreme than those of their compatriots.
Therefore the effects predicted in this section may give a lower bound for the
effect of parents’ preferences on sex ratios worldwide.
Initially I generate a population of women (i = 1 . . . N) and assign them
probabilities of having sons (pi) using the distribution derived in Section 4.3.
Then, for each woman, I construct a latent family composition (B¯ij for j =
1 . . . k; B¯ij indicates woman i’s jth child would be a son). This gives the sexes
of the women’s (first) k children. This is the ‘biological’ population, which stays
the same throughout the simulation.
pi = Φ(Xi) with Xi ∼ N(µˆ, σˆ)
B¯ij ∼ Bernoulli(pi)
I then allow the fertility behaviour to vary by country. Let qbj be the pro-
portion of women from a given country who continue to have children, after
having b boys amongst j children. (I measure these qbj in Section 4.4.2, below.)
For example, I take Indian women who have a boy and two girls and measure
the proportion who go on to have a fourth child. This measurement is qINDIA13 .
Finally, I simulate each woman’s fertility decisions according to the observed
patterns the data. I simulate the sex ratios for each country separately. I use
the q probabilities to generate ‘actual’ birth histories for each woman in the
simulation. If woman already has j children and b boys, child j+1 is born with
probability qbj . This continues until the woman fails to have a child. I denote
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a birth of a jth child to woman i by Cij .
Cij+1 ∼
 Bernoulli(qbiji) if Cij′ = 1 for all j
′ ≤ j
0 otherwise
Bij+1 =
 B¯ij+1 if Cij+1 = 1[missing] otherwise
This procedure provides me with a simulated sample of birth histories based
on the sex preferences of women from each country. The ratio of boys to girls
in this sample is easy to compute, and I compare this with the child sex ratios
found in reality. Country data is taken from the World Development Indicators
(1997), with the sex ratio being the under-15 male population divided by the
under-15 female population.
4.4.2 Fertility Behaviour
4.4.2.1 Estimation method
Estimates of parental behaviour are derived from the birth histories of foreign-
born women, grouping women by country of origin. For each possible family
composition (up to three children), I calculate the asymptote of the Kaplan-
Meier failure rate (KMFR). The KMFR is a non-parametric measure of the
proportion of women who go on to have another child. The na¨ıve progression
rate, defined as the number of women observed to have a further child, does
not account for the time women remain under observation (ie, censoring when
the survey happens shortly after a birth). Thus, the KMFR is a more robust
measure of true continuation rates.
Here, I consider childbirth as an absorbing transition from one state to an-
other. Women either ‘survive’ with the number of children they have, or ‘fail’,
and have another at some time. Alternatively, they may exit the dataset be-
fore failure (censoring). The asymptotic Kaplan-Meier failure rate is defined as
follows [Jenkins, 2005b, p. 55]. Let t1 < . . . < tm < . . . < tM be the observed
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transition times for women from a given country with a given family compo-
sition. For simplicity, assume transitions are never contemporary. Let nm be
the number of women at risk of making a transition immediately prior to tm.
This does not include women no longer under observation. The Kaplan-Meier
estimate of the proportion surviving to time t is then:
Sˆ(t)
def
=
∏
m|tm<t
(
1− 1
nm
)
The proportion of women surviving by t1 is simply one minus proportion
who have made a transition, which is estimated by the number of exits (one)
divided by the number at risk, n1. So Sˆ(t1) = 1− 1n1 . Similarly, the proportion
surviving from t1 to t2 is 1− 1n2 , so the overall proportion surviving to t2 is thus
the product of these: Sˆ(t1) = 1− ( 1n1 )( 1n1 ).
I am interested in the proportion of women, q, who have a child at any point
in the future, ie, the asymptote of 1− S(t) as t→∞. Therefore I have:
q
def
= 1− Sˆ(∞) = 1−
∏
m
(
1− 1
nm
)
4.4.2.2 Data
Data is taken from the UK Labour Force Survey 1996–2005. Household com-
position records are available, so parents can be matched with their natural
children and birth histories compiled. Table 4.3 gives estimated continuation
rates for women from 55 countries for which more than 30 records are present
at the second birth.19
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, considerable variation in behaviour is seen
amongst the women from different countries. For example, Australian women
show some preference for daughters: 50% of those having two sons have a third
child, compared with 37% of those with two daughters. Those with mixed
19Not all countries of origin in the LFS are identified uniquely. Five groups of countries
appear in my regressions; I define the sex ratio for these to be total boys over total girls. The
groups are:
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families are more likely to stop. On the other hand, Singapore shows a different
pattern: 33% of those with three daughters have a fourth child compared with
none of those with three sons.
4.4.3 Simulation results
Using the fertility behaviour for women from different countries, I compute
expected sex ratios for those countries. I use three sets of estimates for the
underlying likelihoods of having sons: my benchmark derived in Section 4.3
(µ = 0.0305, σ = 0.145), my estimate using data from Lindsey and Altham
[1998] (µ = 0.0367, σ = 0.127), and a conservative estimate of the heterogeneity
in my sample, at the bottom of the 90% CI (µ = 0.0305, σ = 0.118). I simulate
births for one million women (the same latent birth histories are used for each
country estimate). Results are presented in Table 4.4, alongside the child sex
ratio from the World Development Indicators (under-15 male population divided
by under-15 female population).
Simulated sex ratios range from 1.043 (Colombia) to 1.051 (Australia) in my
benchmark model. The ranges are similar for all three sets of estimates, though
they are higher overall for the estimates with Lindsey and Altham’s data. The
larger estimate for µ shifts the whole distribution in favour of having sons.
Figure 4.5 plots my simulated sex ratios against the data and fitted values
from the regression SRPREDICTED = α + βSRDATA. R2 is 0.053, and the
estimate βˆ = 0.015 is significantly different to zero at the 10% level, suggesting
that parents’ preferences do indeed have an effect on country sex ratios due to
heterogeneity in the probability of having a son. However, the intercept, αˆ is
Grp02 ‘Other Caribbean Commonwealth’: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica,
Grenada, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines.
Grp04 ‘Other Africa’: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Togo.
Grp07 ‘Other South America’: Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname
Grp08 ‘Other Middle East’: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen.
Grp12 Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal.
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Table 4.3: Kaplan-Meier birth continuation rates by family composition.
Foreign-born women in the UK LFS are grouped by country of origin. Statistics
give the proportion of women having a further child given they already have b
boys of j children.
1 child 2 children 3 children
Country 0 boys 1 boy 0 boys 1 boy 2 boys 0 boys 1 boy 2 boys 3 boys
AGO 0.93 0.88 0.67 0.33 0.33 – – – –
AUS 0.76 0.78 0.37 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.13 0.34 1.00
BGD 0.91 0.93 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.61
BRB 0.62 0.70 0.43 0.22 0.55 – – – –
CAN 0.76 0.75 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.60
CHN 0.58 0.60 0.40 0.34 0.07 – – – –
COL 0.65 0.66 0.37 0.77 0.00 – – – –
CYP 0.76 0.76 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.50 0.27 0.24 0.40
DEU 0.71 0.73 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.12 0.29 0.35 0.30
EGY 0.66 0.71 0.35 0.52 0.46 – – – –
ESP 0.64 0.63 0.37 0.48 0.27 – – – –
FRA 0.71 0.74 0.41 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.11 0.21 0.50
GHA 0.81 0.74 0.61 0.62 0.57 0.43 0.28 0.61 0.50
GRP02 0.68 0.59 0.15 0.38 0.28 – – – –
GRP04 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.64 0.49 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.50
GRP07 0.78 0.82 0.43 0.37 0.27 – – – –
GRP08 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.73 0.58 0.75 0.45 0.55 0.55
GRP12 0.90 0.93 1.00 0.69 0.63 – – – –
GUY 0.67 0.64 0.25 0.38 0.54 – – – –
HKG 0.76 0.67 0.47 0.32 0.35 0.53 0.20 0.19 0.30
IND 0.81 0.75 0.59 0.39 0.39 0.53 0.31 0.27 0.22
IRN 0.80 0.69 0.14 0.28 0.12 – – – –
IRQ 1.00 0.81 0.73 0.56 0.75 – – – –
ITA 0.56 0.72 0.45 0.33 0.20 – – – –
JAM 0.57 0.65 0.71 0.43 0.30 0.70 0.41 0.28 0.53
JPN 0.67 0.64 0.44 0.22 0.13 – – – –
KEN 0.83 0.75 0.64 0.29 0.31 0.53 0.19 0.20 0.21
LBY 0.85 0.71 0.55 0.69 0.72 – – – –
LKA 0.73 0.70 0.16 0.29 0.41 – – – –
MAR 0.91 0.81 0.34 0.53 0.75 – – – –
MLT 0.76 0.62 0.52 0.38 0.41 – – – –
MUS 0.68 0.65 0.30 0.33 0.61 – – – –
MWI 0.91 0.76 0.64 0.59 0.42 – – – –
MYS 0.86 0.75 0.42 0.32 0.46 0.00 0.42 0.27 0.38
NGA 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.60 0.68 0.73 0.47 0.53 0.55
NLD 0.76 0.77 0.40 0.39 0.74 – – – –
NZL 0.71 0.62 0.52 0.37 0.46 – – – –
PAK 0.92 0.87 0.84 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.68 0.65 0.76
PHL 0.54 0.71 0.21 0.25 0.21 – – – –
POL 0.58 0.49 0.05 0.29 0.47 – – – –
PRT 0.71 0.63 0.55 0.26 0.53 – – – –
SGP 0.76 0.76 0.38 0.39 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.00
SLE 0.75 0.56 0.54 0.42 0.40 – – – –
SOM 0.91 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.92 0.79 0.81 0.90
SWE 0.82 0.82 0.00 0.33 0.24 – – – –
TTO 0.66 0.67 0.55 0.21 0.61 – – – –
TUR 0.82 0.83 0.57 0.46 0.50 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.38
TZA 0.79 0.63 0.54 0.30 0.24 0.40 0.15 0.14 0.33
UGA 0.78 0.74 0.52 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.37 0.38
USA 0.78 0.71 0.43 0.39 0.49 0.25 0.41 0.44 0.20
VNM 0.79 0.88 0.41 0.40 0.56 – – – –
YUG 0.84 0.77 0.49 0.43 0.58 – – – –
ZAF 0.76 0.73 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.25 0.00 0.32 0.25
ZMB 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.48 0.53 0.25 0.52 0.18 1.00
ZWE 0.71 0.69 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.33 0.37 0.19 0.25
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Table 4.4: Simulation of sex ratios worldwide, accounting for son preference
and heterogeneity in the probability of having sons. Three different estimates
of the underlying distribution of sexes are used: my benchmark, estimates from
Lindsey and Altham’s 1998 data, and a conservative estimate from my data.
Parental behaviour is taken from UK LFS data (Table 4.3). Actual country sex
ratios (under-15 male population divided by the under-15 female population)
are taken from the World Development Indicators (1997).
Predicted Values
µ = 0.0305 µ = 0.0376 µ = 0.0305
Country Data σ = 0.145 σ = 0.127 σ = 0.118
AGO 1.002 1.047 1.060 1.048
AUS 1.051 1.052 1.063 1.051
BGD 1.046 1.049 1.061 1.049
BRB 1.000 1.051 1.062 1.050
CAN 1.048 1.051 1.063 1.051
CHN 1.066 1.048 1.060 1.049
COL 1.038 1.047 1.060 1.048
CYP 1.062 1.049 1.061 1.049
DEU 1.054 1.049 1.060 1.049
EGY 1.048 1.049 1.061 1.049
ESP 1.060 1.049 1.061 1.050
FRA 1.048 1.049 1.061 1.050
GHA 1.010 1.049 1.061 1.049
GRP02 1.070 1.049 1.061 1.049
GRP04 1.035 1.047 1.059 1.048
GRP07 1.032 1.047 1.059 1.048
GRP08 1.042 1.047 1.060 1.048
GRP12 1.038 1.049 1.061 1.049
GUY 1.020 1.049 1.061 1.049
HKG 1.012 1.046 1.059 1.047
IND 1.066 1.047 1.059 1.048
IRN 1.036 1.048 1.061 1.049
IRQ 1.045 1.048 1.060 1.049
ITA 1.058 1.048 1.060 1.049
JAM 1.029 1.046 1.059 1.048
JPN 1.050 1.047 1.059 1.048
KEN 1.022 1.045 1.058 1.047
LBY 1.045 1.048 1.060 1.048
LKA 1.097 1.049 1.061 1.049
MAR 1.038 1.051 1.063 1.051
MLT 1.062 1.048 1.061 1.049
MUS 1.027 1.051 1.063 1.051
MWI 1.005 1.046 1.059 1.047
MYS 1.055 1.048 1.060 1.049
NGA 1.007 1.048 1.060 1.049
NLD 1.045 1.051 1.062 1.050
NZL 1.057 1.047 1.060 1.048
PAK 1.040 1.047 1.060 1.048
PHL 1.051 1.049 1.061 1.049
POL 1.051 1.049 1.061 1.049
PRT 1.063 1.048 1.061 1.049
SGP 1.072 1.048 1.060 1.048
SLE 0.995 1.046 1.059 1.048
SOM 1.007 1.049 1.061 1.049
SWE 1.050 1.051 1.062 1.050
TTO 1.031 1.050 1.062 1.050
TUR 1.043 1.049 1.061 1.049
TZA 1.009 1.045 1.058 1.046
UGA 1.006 1.048 1.060 1.048
USA 1.048 1.049 1.062 1.050
VNM 1.039 1.051 1.063 1.051
YUG 1.070 1.049 1.062 1.050
ZAF 0.994 1.050 1.062 1.050
ZMB 1.016 1.048 1.060 1.048
ZWE 1.004 1.047 1.060 1.048
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Figure 4.5: Simulated sex ratios and country data. Simulation is based on het-
erogeneity in the probability of a son as derived in Section 4.3 (µ = 0.0305, σ =
0.145). Parental behaviour is given in Table 4.3.
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1.033, and is significantly different from one at 0.1%, implying that my model
does not capture the whole story. Regressions with the other distributional
estimates produce similar results.
The estimated slope, 0.015, is shallow. It suggests that parental behaviour
and underlying heterogeneity accounts for 1.5% of the difference in sex ratios
between countries. There are several possible reasons for this small figure. First
is data quality. Aside from the usual noise issues, I have used child sex ratios,
not birth sex ratios. If son-preferring fertility behaviour is correlated with dis-
criminatory behaviour (as is likely), countries that are expected to have excess
girls at birth will also have high female mortality, reducing the number of girls
as I measure them. Under this assumption, my estimate of 1.5% will be biased
downwards, since mortality due to discrimination lowers the excess of girls I
am looking for. Data quality would be one area in which this study could be
improved.
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My two identifying assumptions may be incorrect: behaviour of immigrants
to the UK may not represent countries of origin in terms of preferences, or the
underlying distribution of ‘natural’ probabilities of sons is not identical across
countries for biological or social reasons [cf. Oster, 2005; Matthews et al., 2008].
However, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, the former of these caveats may work
against finding a positive result, if immigrants in the UK prefer sons less than
their compatriots. The second concern is allayed by James [2000] and others
who find similar levels of heterogeneity.
Finally, in a model simulating at most four children, the theoretical minimum
and maximum sex ratios are 1.030 and 1.068 respectively (under my benchmark
son-probability estimates). These ratios occur when parents practice extremely
selective behaviour: stopping only after one son or daughter. The range seen
in the data is [0.994, 1.097], so child mortality plainly plays a larger role in
affecting sex ratios than parental preferences do.
Nonetheless, 1.5% very probably represents a lower bound on the effect of
parental preferences on aggregate sex ratios. Most importantly, mortality dif-
ferences between girls and boys in the countries of origin will likely bias my
estimate downwards. Moreover, parental behaviour of immigrants to the UK is
likely to be less extreme than women in their originating countries.
4.5 Discussion
For almost fifty years, it has been recognised that parental preferences can influ-
ence aggregate sex ratios when women have heterogeneous ‘natural’ probabilities
of having boys [Yamaguchi, 1989]. However, the literature on ‘missing women’
has, to date, failed to account for such effects. In the present paper I attempt
to calibrate the size of this effect.
My simulation gives that 1.5% of differences in country sex ratios are ex-
plained by parental preferences. However, as I discuss in Section 4.4.3, this
figure is likely to be a lower bound on the potential effect. The major causes
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are attenuated preferences amongst immigrants to the UK and the limitation of
using child sex ratios rather than birth sex ratios. My estimates of heterogeneity
in son-probability are broadly in line with previous work by Lindsey and Altham
[1998] and authors surveyed by James [2000], suggesting that misspecifiction of
that distribution is not a concern.
Due to limited data and the caveats given above, I do not compute any
adjusted estimates of the number of missing women worldwide. Nonetheless,
the implications of my findings are not heartening: there may be more missing
women than previously thought. My model predicts that a country with strong
son preferences will have a low sex ratio at birth, because heterogeneity in the
probability of having a son leads to excess girls, relative to homogeneity. Pre-
vious comparisons have used a baseline that is not biased towards girls. Thus,
countries such as China or India which are known to favour boys [Das Gupta
et al., 2002] are missing more girls than we had believed. At the very least, the
results presented here should caution the use of aggregate sex ratios as a mea-
sure of attitudes, particularly in light of the negative correlation with parental
preferences (Figure 4.1).
As Das Gupta [2005] notes, social and cultural preferences for sons play a
prime role in skewing sex ratios in several developing countries, whether due
to selective abortion, infanticide, or higher mortality rates for girls. I present
evidence that fertility decisions guided by the same parental preferences can
also lead to biased sex ratios in aggregate. Since son preferences bias the ratio
downward, previous estimates of the number of missing women may be too low.
Future work should aim to better account for the effect of parents’ preferences.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Country Groupings
Due to the agglomeration in the Labour Force Survey of several countries under
some country codes, I do not have perfect resolution for the country of origin
variable. I hence take population-weighted means for my proxy data, as listed
in Table 2.2. The members of these groups are given below.
GRP01 Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
GRP02 ‘Other Caribbean Commonwealth’: Antigua and Barbuda, Ba-
hamas, The, Dominica, Grenada, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
GRP03 ‘Other New Commonwealth’: Fiji, Tonga
GRP04 ‘Other Africa’: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep., Cote
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sene-
gal, Togo
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GRP05 ‘Other Caribbean’: Aruba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nether-
lands Antilles, Puerto Rico
GRP06 ‘Other Central America’: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama
GRP07 ‘Other South America’: Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Suri-
name
GRP08 ‘Other Middle East’: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates,
West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Rep.
GRP09 ‘Other Asia’: Brunei, Comoros, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea
GRP10 France and Monaco
GRP11 French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, Samoa, Vanuatu,
American Samoa, Cayman Islands, Faeroe Islands, Guam, Ko-
rea, Dem. Rep., Marshall Islands, Mayotte, Northern Mariana
Islands, Palau, Virgin Islands (U.S.), Timor-Leste
GRP12 Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal
GRP13 Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan
GRP14 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan
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Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Sex Ratio Comparisons
A reasonable amount of research into fertility determinants has used country-
level or regional fertility rates. This appendix argues that aggregate sex ratio
statistics are not an appropriate analogue to fertility rates when studying son
preferences.
The concept underlying sex ratio comparisons is that, if parents have a
preference for children of a given sex, that sex will be more prevalent, due
to a combination of fertility decisions and mortality due to discrimination.1
However, whilst differential mortality due to discrimination has an unambiguous
effect on population sex ratios, the major obstacle for this type of analysis is
the ambiguity of the effect of individuals’ fecundity decisions.
A natural (ie, physiological) sex ratio of 1.06 (106 boys for every 100 girls)
is given by many authors. However, various other factors are believed to affect
this ratio, notably times of war [Graffelman and Hoekstra, 2000], Hepatitis B
[Oster, 2005, 2006], maternal partnership status [Norberg, 2004] and maternal
diet [Matthews et al., 2008]. Though Oster’s work is not conclusive, a secondary
1This discrimination may be either pre- or post-natal, possibly taking the form of selective
abortions [Goodkind, 1999], infanticide, or neglect — either explicit or implicit. Lin et al.
[2008] find that the trade-off between abortion rates and female neonatal mortality to be high
in Taiwan.
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argument gives that the figure of 1.06 may not be common to all ethnic groups,
notably the Chinese.
B.1.1 Parental decisions
The simplest means of controlling the sex composition of one’s family is what
might be called a stopping rule. This sets some criterion for ceasing childbearing,
such as having a boy, or having children of both sexes.
Under a stopping rule or some similar mechanism (including that resulting
from the model presented in Section 3.2), the sex ratio is likely to converge to
its natural rate when surveying a large number of homogeneous families. This
result is demonstrated by Leung [1988], and is proved for a general class of
stopping rules by Sheps [1963, cited in Leung, 1988]. However, the homogeneity
condition is necessary: if women have differing probabilities of having boys, a
stopping rule favouring boys leads to an excess of girls. This is because the
sex ratio converges in large samples to the harmonic mean of the individuals’
natural sex ratios, since the mean number of girls is inversely proportional to
the probability of having a girl. Finally, the harmonic mean is less than the
arithmetic mean. Chapter 4 provides an explicit proof and provides an estimate
of the size of the effect in reality. I find that the preferences of immigrants to
the UK do significantly predict sex ratios in their countries of origin.
Finally, Leung suggests that the presence of incomplete families will likely
bias downward the observed number of boys [p. 100]. His logic is that, if par-
ents favour boys, incomplete families will contain fewer boys than complete ones,
since parents are more likely to cease having children after having boys. How-
ever, this argument is fallacious: if any given birth is a boy with homogeneous
probability p, then the sex ratio for any given birth parity is p1−p . Thus the
overall sex ratio must equal p1−p . The flaw in Leung’s argument stems from an
incorrect partition of families in to ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ — these cate-
gories are not independent of the sex composition of the family. Below, I prove
that the sex ratio in a population containing incomplete families must converge
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to p1−p .
Theorem 2. In a large homogeneous population having boys with probability p
and practising a one-boy stopping rule, the ratio of girls to boys converges to
p
1−p , even when incomplete families are counted.
Proof. Consider a population of families who practice a one-boy stopping rule.
Boys are born with common probability p. At the time of survey, not all families
have had the opportunity to complete their fertility. Family i has had the
opportunity to have ki children at most (ki ∈ N).
Let Bk =
∑
ki=k
bi be the number of boys in families limited to size k, and
similarly Gk =
∑
ki=k
gi be the number of girls. If Nk is the number of such
families, then:
Bk → Nk
[
1− (1− p)k]
Gk → Nk
k(1− p)k + k−1∑
j=1
j(1− p)jp

The first expression follows from the fact that families continue having children
until they have a boy; the number of boys is Nk times the expected chance of
having a boy within k attempts.
To derive the second expression, note that a given family has probability (1−p)jp
of having j < k girls, and a probability (1− p)k of k girls.
Manipulation of the second term yields:
Gk → Nk
[
k(1− p)k + 1− p
p
− (1− p)
k(kp+ (1− p))
p
]
→ Nk 1− p
p
[
1− (1− p)k]
Thus we have Gk → 1−pp Bk for each k. Therefore in large populations, the sex
ratio BG will approach the natural ratio
p
1−p . Leung’s assertion [1988, p. 100] is
incorrect.
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B.1.2 Implications
Due to the reasons outlined above, macro-level measures of sex bias should come
under tough scrutiny. Though, as Leung admits, severely skewed sex ratios
may indicate sex preferences amongst parents, the magnitude — and even the
direction — of these preferences will remains unclear. With parental decisions
being impossible to control for, even measurement of the ‘biologically normal
population sex ratio’ [Edlund, 1999, p. 1275] is tenuous.
These arguments present a bar on the feasibility of cross-sectional compar-
ison of aggregate sex ratios, such as Oster [2005].2 However, to date no study
has sought to perform any micro-level investigation of son preferences between
country groups. This partly stems from a lack of appropriate data: the focus on
aggregate sex ratios results from the easily access to these statistics. I intend
this paper to close this gap in the literature, using a survey of immigrant women
in the United Kingdom with different countries of origin.
B.2 Empirical Methodology
B.2.1 Hazard rate estimation
This paper uses hazard rate estimation to measure the dependence of childbear-
ing on existing family composition. These techniques sidestep the problems of
measuring tastes for sons with aggregate statistics and allow this unique cross-
country comparison of parental sex preferences.
In essence, a birth is considered to be an absorbing transition from one state
(eg, birth parity k) to another (parity k+1). This transition is probabilistic, and
survival analysis presents a set of tools for assessing how various factors affect
the likelihood of this transition at any given time. Jenkins [2005b,a] provides
a complete theoretical exposition, along with full notes on implementation of
2Possible exceptions to this critique include Dubuc and Coleman [2007] and Lin et al.
[2008], which use sex ratios at birth in time-series. While the issues discussed here are still
pertinent when considering sex ratios absolutely, analyses of changes in sex ratios should be
more robust to these concerns. Moreover, the focus of these papers — sex-selective abortion
— has unambiguous effects on the sex ratio.
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these techniques in the statistical package Stata.
Consider that the time to transition (next birth) for a woman is T , dis-
tributed with cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (·). P (T ≤ t) = F (t).
F (·) is named the failure function; conversely, S(t) = 1 − F (t) is the survivor
function, denoting the probability of surviving in the current state until time
t.3
Denoting the probability density function (PDF) by f = F ′, the hazard rate
θ(·) is given by
θ(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) =
f(t)
S(t)
Loosely, θ describes the transition intensity at any time Jenkins [2005b, p. 15].
As opposed to unconditional probability of transition at time t, it reflects the
probability of transition at time t given survival to time t. Recall that S(t) is
the probability of surviving to time t; the derivation of the hazard rate follows
from Bayes’ rule.
With data on transition times and the time to survey, parametric estimation
of θ can be performed by the maximum likelihood method (MLE). Let Ci indi-
cate that transition is observed, otherwise the record is censored at the time of
survey.
Ci =
 1 if the spell is complete0 if the spell is censored
Ti denotes the time at risk for woman i. This is the total time for which the
woman is observed, until she exits the sample through transition or is censored at
the time of survey. If transition is observed, the likelihood is given by Li = f(Ti),
since this is the instantaneous probability of transition. Otherwise, in the case
of censoring, the likelihood function for woman i is given by Li = S(Ti); this is
3I treat transition time as a continuous variable. In the data, time is measured in months
(records are anonymised by removing day of birth information). Whilst a discrete model
might be appropriate, with months corresponding to menstrual cycles, fertility spacing is
sufficient that continuous time models are a valid approximation. I therefore follow the existing
literature.
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the probability that she survives to the time of survey. Therefore the likelihood
functions may be written as follows.
Li = Cif(Ti) + (1− Ci)S(Ti)
= Ciθ(Ti)S(Ti) + (1− Ci)S(Ti)
logLi = Ci log θ(Ti) + logS(Ti)
logL =
∑
i
[Ci log θ(Ti) + logS(Ti)]
B.2.2 Estimation specifications
In order to conduct estimation of hazard functions, some parametric assump-
tions must be made. Under the Proportional Hazards (PH) assumption, the
hazard function θ takes the form
θi(t) = θ0(t) exp(β′Xi)
As its name suggests, the hazard rate is proportionally higher for some in-
dividuals at all points in time. λi
def
= exp(β′Xi) denotes the proportion for
individual i. β captures the effects of the factors in X on the hazard rate,
with a unit change in X(k) representing a proportional change in θ of exp(β(k)).
The conventional method for estimating β is to specify a distribution for θ0
and estimate its parameters, as in Leung [1988] and Gangadharan and Maitra
[2003]. They use the Weibull distribution, which is parameterised (following
Jenkins [2005b, §3, p. 26]) as θ0 = αtα−1, where α > 0 gives the shape of the
distribution, and is estimated as a free parameter.4
4Gangadharan and Maitra [2003] in fact use a Gamma distribution in some sections of their
work; this is a generalisation of the Weibull distribution, additionally using a second param-
eter to define the shape of the hazard function. However, identifying this second parameter
empirically requires a large data set, making this approach infeasible for some subgroups in
my sample.
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B.2.3 The Cox PH model
However, an alternative method is the Cox Proportional Hazards model due to
Cox [1972].5 This leaves the underlying hazard function θ0 undetermined and
uses the ratio of hazard rates of different individuals to estimate parameters
[Jenkins, 2005b]. This is a more general approach and is thus preferable in
theory. For the regressions in this paper, analogous estimations with the Weibull
model give near-identical results for βˆ and are therefore not reported.
The Cox model is estimated using a Partial Likelihood (PL) method, rather
than maximum likelihood estimation. The sample partial likelihood is
LP =
K∏
k=1
Lk
Here, k indexes transition events, not individuals. I use index i = 1 . . . N
to index individuals, ordered by time at risk Ti. Thus, when individual ik
experiences event k at time Tik , individuals ik +1 . . . N remain at risk (the rest
have exited either through transition or censoring).
Lk is defined as the probability that ik undergoes transition at time Tik ,
conditional on being in the risk set at that time. That is,
Lk = P[ik experiences event k|ik remains at risk]
From the derivation of the hazard rate, recall that the probability of a tran-
sition occurring in the time period [t, t+ dt) is f(t)dt = θ(t)S(t)dt. So define
Pi˜
def
= P
 event k is experienced by i˜
and not by i = ik . . . i˜− 1, i˜+ 1 . . . N

In particular, Pik = P[event k is experienced by ik and not by i = ik +
1 . . . N ].
5This exposition follows that of Jenkins [2005b].
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We have then that, since transitions are independent,
Pi˜ = fi˜
∏
i 6=i˜
Si(Tik)
= [θi˜(Tik)Sik(Tik)]
∏
i 6=i˜
Si(Tik)
Now Lk can be computed:
Lk = Pik
Pik + Pik+1 + · · ·+ PN
=
θik(Tik)
θik(Tik) + θik+1(Tik) + · · ·+ θN (Tik)
The first line follows naturally from the definition of Lk as a conditional
probability, and the second from the evaluation of the Pis; the survivor functions
cancel. Applying the proportional hazards assumption, θi(t) = θ0(t)λi, yields
Lk = θ0(Tik)λik(∑N
i=ik
θ0(Tik)λi
)
=
λik(∑N
i=ik
λi
)
For any estimate βˆ, this derivation provides a computation of the partial
likelihood LP . (Recall that λi = exp(β′Xi).) The Cox estimator maximises
this partial likelihood:
βˆCox = argmax
β
{
K∏
k=1
Lk
}
= argmax
β

K∏
k=1
λik(∑N
i=ik
λi
)

B.2.4 Interpretation of coefficients
Coefficients arising from the Cox PH estimator have exactly the same interpreta-
tion as those derived from fully parametric estimators under the PH assumption,
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save for the exclusion of any constant term, reflecting the fact that the baseline
hazard is undefined. In a fully parametric model the shape of the baseline haz-
ard must be estimated. However, since the shape parameters define the baseline
hazard at a normalised level, an intercept term is needed.
The lack of a need for an intercept term with the Cox model becomes clear
on consideration that only the order of the transitions k = 1 . . .K matters;
all exposure times could be scaled up linearly without affecting the estimated
coefficients.
The PH specification is also known as the ‘multiplicative hazards’ or ‘log rel-
ative hazard’ model. Recall, the PH imposition is θ(t,Xi) = θ0(t) exp(β′Xi) =
θ0(t)λi. This implies that absolute differences in X give proportionate differ-
ences in the hazard rate at all times:
θ(t,Xi)
θ(t,Xj)
= exp(β′Xi − β′Xj) = exp(β′(Xi −Xj))
Alternately:
log
θ(t,Xi)
θ(t,Xj)
= β′(Xi −Xj)
Supposing that Xi and Xj differ only on dimension q (ie, Xip = Xjp for all
p 6= q), then it can be seen that
log
θ(t,Xi)
θ(t,Xj)
= β′q(Xiq −Xjq)
Hence
βq =
∂ log θ(t,X)
∂Xq
In vector terms, β = ∇X log θ(t,X).
B.2.5 Son preference
It is estimates of these β terms that are reported in Section 3.4. Positive terms
correspond to higher hazard rates and, in this application, higher onward fertil-
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ity.
I shall use the term ‘observed son preference’ to label the phenomenon where
women reduce their onward fertility in response to having sons.6 This is mea-
sured as a negative coefficient on the variable SONS, denoting the number of
male children a woman has had at the parity in question. The proportional ef-
fect on the hazard rate is expβSONS, so coefficients of -0.5, -0.1 and -0.05 reflect
reductions in the hazard rate by factors of 0.61, 0.9 and 0.95 respectively per
son.
B.3 Full Regression Tables
Table B.1: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 1 for immigrant women in
the UK. Country fixed effects and country son preference effects.
(1) (2)
AGE 0.164∗∗∗ (0.0197) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.0197)
AGE2 -0.00385∗∗∗ (0.000366) -0.00388∗∗∗ (0.000367)
DEGREE 0.181∗∗∗ (0.0396) 0.174∗∗∗ (0.0397)
AL -0.0514 (0.0449) -0.0526 (0.0450)
FE 0.0427 (0.0470) 0.0372 (0.0471)
GCSE 0.0489 (0.0369) 0.0456 (0.0370)
Australia 0.155∗ (0.0838) -0.0688 (0.118)
Canada 0.0677 (0.0934) -0.112 (0.139)
New Zealand 0.0302 (0.128) -0.112 (0.190)
Kenya 0.0309 (0.0526) 0.0445 (0.0764)
Uganda -0.0455 (0.0785) -0.150 (0.112)
Tanzania -0.107 (0.103) 0.0101 (0.140)
Zambia 0.0684 (0.116) -0.152 (0.179)
Zimbabwe -0.186∗ (0.0952) -0.359∗∗ (0.145)
Ghana -0.0510 (0.0806) -0.100 (0.110)
Nigeria 0.247∗∗∗ (0.0674) 0.149 (0.0948)
Jamaica -0.559∗∗∗ (0.0688) -0.787∗∗∗ (0.101)
Grp02 -0.498∗∗∗ (0.125) -0.560∗∗∗ (0.176)
Bangladesh 0.386∗∗∗ (0.0446) 0.268∗∗∗ (0.0662)
Sri Lanka -0.0667 (0.0862) -0.0916 (0.127)
HK & China -0.168∗∗ (0.0771) -0.254∗∗ (0.117)
Malaysia 0.202∗∗ (0.0894) 0.210∗ (0.123)
Singapore 0.0123 (0.0884) -0.148 (0.126)
Cyprus -0.130∗ (0.0758) -0.252∗∗ (0.115)
Malta -0.210∗ (0.119) -0.190 (0.171)
Mauritius -0.345∗∗∗ (0.124) -0.440∗∗∗ (0.169)
SA 0.0156 (0.0727) -0.0954 (0.103)
Grp04 -0.0168 (0.0940) -0.203 (0.134)
US 0.176∗∗∗ (0.0672) 0.0812 (0.0915)
Pakistan 0.438∗∗∗ (0.0386) 0.386∗∗∗ (0.0562)
China -0.491∗∗∗ (0.125) -0.676∗∗∗ (0.184)
Japan -0.0162 (0.131) -0.189 (0.187)
Philippines -0.281∗∗∗ (0.0898) -0.641∗∗∗ (0.141)
Iran -0.160 (0.107) -0.0831 (0.161)
Grp08 0.395∗∗∗ (0.0945) 0.270∗∗ (0.136)
France 0.00998 (0.0885) -0.123 (0.127)
Italy -0.275∗∗∗ (0.0967) -0.581∗∗∗ (0.144)
Netherlands 0.270∗∗ (0.118) 0.0188 (0.165)
Germany -0.117∗∗ (0.0520) -0.308∗∗∗ (0.0753)
Poland -0.701∗∗∗ (0.125) -0.688∗∗∗ (0.176)
Portugal -0.434∗∗∗ (0.108) -0.582∗∗∗ (0.151)
Spain -0.261∗∗ (0.129) -0.404∗∗ (0.181)
Serbia & Montenegro 0.0487 (0.116) -0.0931 (0.167)
Turkey -0.158∗ (0.0848) -0.311∗∗ (0.130)
Somalia 0.628∗∗∗ (0.0783) 0.333∗∗∗ (0.113)
ctd. ctd.
6The theory set out in Section 3.2 suggests that, providing boys are no more expensive
than girls, observed son preference does indeed imply an underlying preference for sons in a
neoclassical consumption-fertility model.
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(1) ctd. (2) ctd.
SONS -0.261∗∗∗ (0.0530)
SONS*Australia 0.428∗∗ (0.167)
SONS*Canada 0.325∗ (0.187)
SONS*New Zealand 0.256 (0.257)
SONS*Kenya -0.0214 (0.105)
SONS*Uganda 0.181 (0.156)
SONS*Tanzania -0.247 (0.207)
SONS*Zambia 0.394∗ (0.234)
SONS*Zimbabwe 0.308 (0.192)
SONS*Ghana 0.0589 (0.161)
SONS*Nigeria 0.169 (0.134)
SONS*Jamaica 0.415∗∗∗ (0.137)
SONS*Grp02 0.0955 (0.250)
SONS*Bangladesh 0.209∗∗ (0.0884)
SONS*Sri Lanka 0.0487 (0.172)
SONS*HK & China 0.157 (0.156)
SONS*Malaysia -0.0373 (0.177)
SONS*Singapore 0.290∗ (0.176)
SONS*Cyprus 0.215 (0.153)
SONS*Malta -0.0382 (0.237)
SONS*Mauritius 0.151 (0.249)
SONS*SA 0.192 (0.145)
SONS*Grp04 0.339∗ (0.188)
SONS*US 0.155 (0.134)
SONS*Pakistan 0.0875 (0.0770)
SONS*China 0.333 (0.251)
SONS*Japan 0.316 (0.262)
SONS*Philippines 0.649∗∗∗ (0.182)
SONS*Iran -0.107 (0.216)
SONS*Grp08 0.223 (0.189)
SONS*France 0.239 (0.176)
SONS*Italy 0.573∗∗∗ (0.194)
SONS*Netherlands 0.493∗∗ (0.234)
SONS*Germany 0.348∗∗∗ (0.103)
SONS*Poland -0.0430 (0.250)
SONS*Portugal 0.259 (0.216)
SONS*Spain 0.254 (0.258)
SONS*Serbia & Montenegro 0.250 (0.233)
SONS*Turkey 0.269 (0.171)
SONS*Somalia 0.568∗∗∗ (0.156)
Observations 13223 13223
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.2: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2 for immigrant women in
the UK. Country fixed effects and country son preference effects.
(1) (2)
AGE -0.0140 (0.0371) -0.00997 (0.0372)
AGE2 -0.00141∗∗ (0.000664) -0.00149∗∗ (0.000665)
DEGREE 0.0739 (0.0765) 0.0583 (0.0766)
AL -0.198∗∗ (0.0834) -0.214∗∗ (0.0836)
FE -0.146∗ (0.0883) -0.174∗∗ (0.0886)
GCSE -0.188∗∗∗ (0.0660) -0.193∗∗∗ (0.0662)
Australia 0.243 (0.151) -0.501∗ (0.284)
Canada -0.0594 (0.178) -0.198 (0.288)
Kenya -0.0527 (0.0931) 0.242 (0.149)
Uganda 0.00941 (0.140) -0.228 (0.244)
Zimbabwe 0.00204 (0.173) -0.322 (0.329)
Ghana 0.699∗∗∗ (0.119) 0.556∗∗∗ (0.205)
Nigeria 0.792∗∗∗ (0.0974) 0.721∗∗∗ (0.173)
Jamaica 0.0607 (0.118) 0.261 (0.200)
Bangladesh 0.857∗∗∗ (0.0629) 0.677∗∗∗ (0.109)
Sri Lanka -0.112 (0.186) -0.925∗∗ (0.369)
HK & China -0.117 (0.141) -0.143 (0.248)
Malaysia 0.113 (0.166) -0.375 (0.296)
Singapore -0.264 (0.173) -0.617∗ (0.316)
Cyprus -0.00306 (0.131) -0.261 (0.251)
SA 0.00418 (0.137) -0.120 (0.233)
Grp04 0.543∗∗∗ (0.137) 0.473∗∗ (0.234)
US 0.256∗∗ (0.117) -0.0418 (0.197)
Pakistan 0.922∗∗∗ (0.0560) 0.783∗∗∗ (0.0960)
Philippines -0.314 (0.219) -0.694∗ (0.417)
Grp08 0.781∗∗∗ (0.130) 0.731∗∗∗ (0.223)
France 0.153 (0.173) -0.00482 (0.284)
Italy -0.188 (0.191) -0.183 (0.295)
Germany 0.0185 (0.0906) -0.148 (0.155)
Turkey -0.203 (0.153) -0.471 (0.295)
Somalia 1.162∗∗∗ (0.0996) 1.069∗∗∗ (0.176)
SONS -0.280∗∗∗ (0.0634)
SONS*Australia 0.753∗∗∗ (0.224)
SONS*Canada 0.139 (0.234)
SONS*Kenya -0.303∗∗ (0.133)
SONS*Uganda 0.234 (0.203)
SONS*Zimbabwe 0.322 (0.273)
SONS*Ghana 0.143 (0.172)
SONS*Nigeria 0.0798 (0.144)
SONS*Jamaica -0.197 (0.177)
SONS*Bangladesh 0.183∗∗ (0.0882)
SONS*Sri Lanka 0.736∗∗∗ (0.251)
SONS*HK & China 0.0464 (0.196)
SONS*Malaysia 0.481∗∗ (0.226)
SONS*Singapore 0.345 (0.240)
SONS*Cyprus 0.257 (0.189)
SONS*SA 0.122 (0.196)
SONS*Grp04 0.0403 (0.222)
SONS*US 0.297∗ (0.163)
SONS*Pakistan 0.141∗ (0.0796)
SONS*Philippines 0.363 (0.303)
SONS*Grp08 0.0572 (0.184)
SONS*France 0.151 (0.245)
SONS*Italy -0.0266 (0.259)
SONS*Germany 0.168 (0.125)
SONS*Turkey 0.262 (0.234)
SONS*Somalia 0.0982 (0.145)
Observations 7704 7704
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.3: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 3 for immigrant women in
the UK. Country fixed effects and country son preference effects.
(1) (2)
AGE -0.110∗ (0.0652) -0.105 (0.0654)
AGE2 0.000569 (0.00110) 0.000473 (0.00110)
DEGREE -0.681∗∗ (0.265) -0.695∗∗∗ (0.266)
AL -0.436∗ (0.230) -0.486∗∗ (0.230)
FE -0.304 (0.229) -0.317 (0.230)
GCSE -0.497∗∗∗ (0.178) -0.494∗∗∗ (0.178)
Kenya 0.0755 (0.192) 0.0848 (0.302)
Nigeria 0.759∗∗∗ (0.172) 0.527∗ (0.312)
Bangladesh 0.907∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.628∗∗∗ (0.204)
Pakistan 1.021∗∗∗ (0.0972) 0.742∗∗∗ (0.186)
Germany -0.0502 (0.201) -0.817∗ (0.442)
Somalia 1.453∗∗∗ (0.142) 1.045∗∗∗ (0.288)
SONS -0.369∗∗∗ (0.100)
SONS*Kenya -0.0931 (0.215)
SONS*Nigeria 0.148 (0.197)
SONS*Bangladesh 0.205∗ (0.122)
SONS*Pakistan 0.198∗ (0.114)
SONS*Germany 0.504∗∗ (0.238)
SONS*Somalia 0.282∗ (0.169)
Observations 2343 2343
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table B.4: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2 for immigrant women in
the UK. Country fixed effects and family composition interactions. Note that
non-interacted family composition dummies are not included, to allow easy
comparison of coefficients for each country. Each interaction coefficient measures
the hazard relative to a compatriot with no sons.
(1)
AGE -0.0136 (0.0373)
AGE2 -0.00144∗∗ (0.000668)
DEGREE 0.0583 (0.0770)
AL -0.219∗∗∗ (0.0838)
FE -0.173∗ (0.0889)
GCSE -0.190∗∗∗ (0.0663)
Australia -0.541∗ (0.326)
Bangladesh 0.596∗∗∗ (0.120)
Canada -0.283 (0.312)
Cyprus -0.278 (0.289)
France -0.0191 (0.300)
Germany -0.150 (0.166)
Ghana 0.331 (0.243)
Grp04 0.484∗∗ (0.243)
Grp08 0.577∗∗ (0.256)
HK & China -0.0877 (0.263)
Italy -0.451 (0.343)
Jamaica 0.252 (0.212)
Kenya 0.275∗ (0.153)
Malaysia -0.296 (0.312)
Nigeria 0.751∗∗∗ (0.186)
Pakistan 0.686∗∗∗ (0.105)
Philippines -1.131∗ (0.583)
SA -0.181 (0.255)
Singapore -0.989∗∗ (0.416)
Somalia 1.106∗∗∗ (0.190)
Sri Lanka -1.126∗∗ (0.455)
Turkey -0.391 (0.326)
Uganda -0.110 (0.249)
US -0.150 (0.220)
Zimbabwe -0.402 (0.387)
ONEBOY*Australia 0.294 (0.377)
TWOBOYS*Australia 0.918∗∗ (0.415)
ONEBOY*Bangladesh -0.218∗∗ (0.110)
TWOBOYS*Bangladesh -0.208∗ (0.120)
ONEBOY*Canada -0.285 (0.410)
TWOBOYS*Canada -0.277 (0.437)
ONEBOY*Cyprus -0.247 (0.332)
TWOBOYS*Cyprus -0.105 (0.347)
ONEBOY*France -0.426 (0.388)
TWOBOYS*France -0.211 (0.441)
ctd.
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(1) ctd.
ONEBOY*Germany -0.428∗∗ (0.190)
TWOBOYS*Germany -0.231 (0.202)
ONEBOY*Ghana 0.0218 (0.272)
TWOBOYS*Ghana -0.286 (0.334)
ONEBOY*Grp04 -0.560∗ (0.293)
TWOBOYS*Grp04 -0.316 (0.391)
ONEBOY*Grp08 -0.197 (0.298)
TWOBOYS*Grp8 -0.446 (0.349)
ONEBOY*HK & China -0.671∗∗ (0.332)
TWOBOYS*HK & China -0.503 (0.339)
ONEBOY*India -0.588∗∗∗ (0.103)
TWOBOYS*India -0.535∗∗∗ (0.117)
ONEBOY*Italy -0.00131 (0.422)
TWOBOYS*Italy -0.704 (0.558)
ONEBOY*Jamaica -0.761∗∗∗ (0.251)
TWOBOYS*Jamaica -0.888∗∗∗ (0.307)
ONEBOY*Kenya -1.043∗∗∗ (0.186)
TWOBOYS*Kenya -1.040∗∗∗ (0.212)
ONEBOY*Malaysia -0.289 (0.403)
TWOBOYS*Malaysia 0.338 (0.397)
ONEBOY*Nigeria -0.529∗∗ (0.208)
TWOBOYS*Nigeria -0.396∗ (0.238)
ONEBOY*Pakistan -0.233∗∗∗ (0.0839)
TWOBOYS*Pakistan -0.282∗∗∗ (0.0943)
ONEBOY*Philippines 0.573 (0.646)
TWOBOYS*Philippines 0.326 (0.690)
ONEBOY*SA -0.329 (0.308)
TWOBOYS*SA -0.305 (0.355)
ONEBOY*Singapore 0.463 (0.466)
TWOBOYS*Singapore 0.215 (0.517)
ONEBOY*Somalia -0.538∗∗ (0.217)
TWOBOYS*Somalia -0.376 (0.239)
ONEBOY*Sri Lanka 0.573 (0.532)
TWOBOYS*Sri Lanka 0.950∗ (0.521)
ONEBOY*Turkey -0.404 (0.379)
TWOBOYS*Turkey -0.106 (0.414)
ONEBOY*Uganda -0.622∗ (0.318)
TWOBOYS*Uganda -0.0751 (0.338)
ONEBOY*US -0.0517 (0.259)
TWOBOYS*US 0.0357 (0.295)
ONEBOY*Zimbabwe -0.0587 (0.437)
TWOBOYS*Zimbabwe 0.0774 (0.518)
Observations 7704
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.5: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 3 for immigrant women in
the UK. Country fixed effects and family composition interactions. Note that
non-interacted family composition dummies are not included, to allow easy
comparison of coefficients for each country. Each interaction coefficient measures
the hazard relative to a compatriot with no sons.
(1)
AGE -0.109∗ (0.0659)
AGE2 0.000515 (0.00111)
DEGREE -0.707∗∗∗ (0.266)
AL -0.459∗∗ (0.231)
FE -0.320 (0.230)
GCSE -0.506∗∗∗ (0.178)
Bangladesh 0.489∗ (0.276)
Germany -0.886 (0.735)
Kenya 0.0554 (0.332)
Nigeria 0.470 (0.374)
Pakistan 0.710∗∗∗ (0.232)
Somalia 1.141∗∗∗ (0.362)
ONEBOY*Bangladesh -0.308 (0.216)
TWOBOYS*Bangladesh -0.308 (0.215)
THREEBOYS*Bangladesh -0.662∗∗∗ (0.252)
ONEBOY*Germany -0.0402 (0.770)
TWOBOYS*Germany 0.121 (0.765)
THREEBOYS*Germany 0.289 (0.818)
ONEBOY*India -0.724∗∗∗ (0.240)
TWOBOYS*India -0.911∗∗∗ (0.248)
THREEBOYS*India -1.204∗∗∗ (0.325)
ONEBOY*Kenya -0.871∗∗ (0.404)
TWOBOYS*Kenya -1.294∗∗∗ (0.489)
THREEBOYS*Kenya -0.970∗ (0.567)
ONEBOY*Nigeria -0.439 (0.392)
TWOBOYS*Nigeria -0.686∗ (0.409)
THREEBOYS*Nigeria -0.476 (0.549)
ONEBOY*Pakistan -0.362∗∗ (0.144)
TWOBOYS*Pakistan -0.670∗∗∗ (0.144)
THREEBOYS*Pakistan -0.362∗∗ (0.171)
ONEBOY*Somalia -0.597 (0.365)
TWOBOYS*Somalia -0.418 (0.344)
THREEBOYS*Somalia -0.526 (0.451)
Observations 2343
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.6: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 1. Country fixed effects and
country son preference effects, split by income at sample median.
(1) (2)
AGE 0.280∗∗∗ (0.0483) 0.286∗∗∗ (0.0485)
AGE2 -0.00574∗∗∗ (0.000887) -0.00583∗∗∗ (0.000890)
DEGREE 0.0885 (0.0848) 0.0880 (0.0854)
AL -0.0341 (0.104) -0.0305 (0.105)
FE 0.135 (0.115) 0.147 (0.116)
GCSE -0.0190 (0.0840) -0.0175 (0.0843)
POOR*Australia 0.0532 (0.213) -0.251 (0.281)
POOR*Kenya -0.177 (0.132) -0.208 (0.204)
POOR*Bangladesh 0.663∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.450∗∗∗ (0.148)
POOR*Sri Lanka -0.0525 (0.173) -0.577∗ (0.314)
POOR*SA 0.0277 (0.202) -0.587∗ (0.344)
POOR*US -0.149 (0.244) 0.220 (0.364)
POOR*Pakistan 0.397∗∗∗ (0.0992) 0.226 (0.139)
POOR*Philippines -0.539∗∗∗ (0.187) -0.856∗∗∗ (0.301)
POOR*France -0.220 (0.285) -0.609 (0.457)
POOR*Germany -0.330∗∗∗ (0.125) -0.428∗∗ (0.172)
RICH -0.161∗ (0.0932) -0.388∗∗∗ (0.137)
RICH*Australia 0.228 (0.163) 0.163 (0.224)
RICH*Kenya 0.0745 (0.129) 0.192 (0.185)
RICH*Bangladesh 0.184 (0.221) 0.186 (0.309)
RICH*Sri Lanka -0.237 (0.208) 0.0130 (0.298)
RICH*SA 0.299∗∗ (0.136) 0.460∗∗ (0.193)
RICH*US 0.308∗∗ (0.129) 0.342∗ (0.187)
RICH*Pakistan 0.387∗∗∗ (0.132) 0.661∗∗∗ (0.194)
RICH*Philippines -0.255 (0.203) -0.446 (0.321)
RICH*France -0.0318 (0.159) 0.113 (0.235)
RICH*Germany 0.0530 (0.119) 0.0330 (0.173)
SONS*POOR -0.369∗∗∗ (0.118)
SONS*POOR*Australia 0.652 (0.432)
SONS*POOR*Kenya 0.106 (0.267)
SONS*POOR*Bangladesh 0.416∗∗ (0.202)
SONS*POOR*Sri Lanka 0.861∗∗ (0.375)
SONS*POOR*SA 1.092∗∗ (0.425)
SONS*POOR*US -0.495 (0.490)
SONS*POOR*Pakistan 0.327∗ (0.197)
SONS*POOR*Philippines 0.566 (0.384)
SONS*POOR*France 0.700 (0.583)
SONS*POOR*Germany 0.167 (0.249)
SONS*RICH 0.0540 (0.143)
SONS*RICH*Australia 0.173 (0.327)
SONS*RICH*Kenya -0.228 (0.258)
SONS*RICH*Bangladesh 0.00685 (0.442)
SONS*RICH*Sri Lanka -0.446 (0.413)
SONS*RICH*SA -0.309 (0.272)
SONS*RICH*US -0.0613 (0.258)
SONS*RICH*Pakistan -0.473∗ (0.264)
SONS*RICH*Philippines 0.339 (0.413)
SONS*RICH*France -0.258 (0.318)
SONS*RICH*Germany 0.0432 (0.236)
Observations 2399 2399
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.7: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2. Country fixed effects and
country son preference effects, split by income at sample median.
(1) (2)
AGE -0.0789 (0.0980) -0.0921 (0.0982)
AGE2 -0.000190 (0.00175) 0.00000580 (0.00175)
DEGREE 0.269 (0.200) 0.285 (0.202)
AL -0.247 (0.224) -0.287 (0.225)
FE 0.0876 (0.239) 0.0523 (0.242)
GCSE -0.0348 (0.159) -0.0162 (0.159)
POOR*Kenya -0.0479 (0.260) 0.495 (0.453)
POOR*Bangladesh 0.913∗∗∗ (0.161) 0.943∗∗∗ (0.261)
POOR*Pakistan 1.098∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.750∗∗∗ (0.267)
POOR*Germany 0.251 (0.228) 0.540 (0.354)
RICH -0.265 (0.165) -0.0825 (0.284)
RICH*Kenya 0.0970 (0.227) 0.376 (0.367)
RICH*Bangladesh 0.913∗∗∗ (0.261) 0.593 (0.457)
RICH*Pakistan 1.123∗∗∗ (0.174) 0.912∗∗∗ (0.290)
RICH*Germany 0.323 (0.206) 0.202 (0.354)
SONS*POOR -0.225 (0.164)
SONS*POOR*Kenya -0.552 (0.429)
SONS*POOR*Bangladesh -0.0324 (0.224)
SONS*POOR*Pakistan 0.347 (0.219)
SONS*POOR*Germany -0.334 (0.327)
SONS*RICH -0.400∗∗ (0.182)
SONS*RICH*Kenya -0.295 (0.340)
SONS*RICH*Bangladesh 0.308 (0.418)
SONS*RICH*Pakistan 0.197 (0.252)
SONS*RICH*Germany 0.126 (0.303)
Observations 1180 1180
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.8: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 1 with country fixed effects
and country son preference effects, split by income at (1) first quartile, (2)
sample median, and (3) third quartile.
(1) (2) (3)
AGE 0.286∗∗∗ (0.0484) 0.286∗∗∗ (0.0485) 0.273∗∗∗ (0.0481)
AGE2 -0.00583∗∗∗ (0.000889) -0.00583∗∗∗ (0.000890) -0.00563∗∗∗ (0.000882)
DEGREE 0.0537 (0.0843) 0.0880 (0.0854) 0.0605 (0.0848)
AL -0.0630 (0.105) -0.0305 (0.105) -0.0288 (0.105)
FE 0.124 (0.116) 0.147 (0.116) 0.152 (0.117)
GCSE -0.0533 (0.0842) -0.0175 (0.0843) 0.00259 (0.0847)
POOR*Australia -1.580 (1.008) -0.251 (0.281) -0.340 (0.221)
POOR*Kenya -0.552∗ (0.316) -0.208 (0.204) -0.128 (0.152)
POOR*Bangladesh 0.451∗∗ (0.182) 0.450∗∗∗ (0.148) 0.379∗∗∗ (0.136)
POOR*Sri Lanka -0.796∗ (0.465) -0.577∗ (0.314) -0.437∗ (0.254)
POOR*SA -0.255 (0.719) -0.587∗ (0.344) -0.222 (0.216)
POOR*US 0.313 (1.008) 0.220 (0.364) -0.313 (0.230)
POOR*Pakistan 0.127 (0.188) 0.226 (0.139) 0.253∗∗ (0.120)
POOR*Philippines -0.546 (0.465) -0.856∗∗∗ (0.301) -0.640∗∗∗ (0.235)
POOR*France -0.749 (0.593) -0.609 (0.457) -0.271 (0.280)
POOR*Germany -0.493∗ (0.274) -0.428∗∗ (0.172) -0.334∗∗ (0.136)
RICH -0.264∗ (0.148) -0.388∗∗∗ (0.137) -0.577∗∗∗ (0.177)
RICH*Australia 0.0671 (0.178) 0.163 (0.224) 0.628∗∗ (0.292)
RICH*Kenya 0.107 (0.149) 0.192 (0.185) 0.323 (0.291)
RICH*Bangladesh 0.181 (0.232) 0.186 (0.309) 0.562 (0.530)
RICH*Sri Lanka -0.154 (0.243) 0.0130 (0.298) 0.175 (0.411)
RICH*SA 0.143 (0.166) 0.460∗∗ (0.193) 0.738∗∗∗ (0.260)
RICH*US 0.215 (0.162) 0.342∗ (0.187) 0.971∗∗∗ (0.244)
RICH*Pakistan 0.529∗∗∗ (0.145) 0.661∗∗∗ (0.194) 1.134∗∗∗ (0.356)
RICH*Philippines -0.704∗∗∗ (0.249) -0.446 (0.321) -0.924 (0.600)
RICH*France -0.0513 (0.215) 0.113 (0.235) 0.266 (0.312)
RICH*Germany -0.139 (0.135) 0.0330 (0.173) 0.167 (0.264)
SONS*POOR -0.308∗ (0.172) -0.369∗∗∗ (0.118) -0.307∗∗∗ (0.0990)
SONS*POOR*Australia 1.546 (1.239) 0.652 (0.432) 0.622∗ (0.335)
SONS*POOR*Kenya 0.582 (0.399) 0.106 (0.267) -0.0367 (0.208)
SONS*POOR*Bangladesh 0.367 (0.245) 0.416∗∗ (0.202) 0.334∗ (0.185)
SONS*POOR*Sri Lanka 1.290∗∗ (0.575) 0.861∗∗ (0.375) 0.588∗ (0.311)
SONS*POOR*SA 1.496∗ (0.802) 1.092∗∗ (0.425) 0.531∗ (0.290)
SONS*POOR*US -0.504 (1.168) -0.495 (0.490) 0.156 (0.315)
SONS*POOR*Pakistan 0.302 (0.265) 0.327∗ (0.197) 0.261 (0.168)
SONS*POOR*Philippines 0.176 (0.597) 0.566 (0.384) 0.296 (0.307)
SONS*POOR*France -0.180 (1.169) 0.700 (0.583) 0.231 (0.352)
SONS*POOR*Germany 0.0398 (0.394) 0.167 (0.249) 0.170 (0.193)
SONS*RICH -0.160 (0.107) 0.0540 (0.143) 0.211 (0.230)
SONS*RICH*Australia 0.361 (0.268) 0.173 (0.327) -0.0983 (0.428)
SONS*RICH*Kenya -0.189 (0.208) -0.228 (0.258) -0.0170 (0.398)
SONS*RICH*Bangladesh 0.167 (0.335) 0.00685 (0.442) 0.598 (0.748)
SONS*RICH*Sri Lanka 0.0531 (0.310) -0.446 (0.413) -0.772 (0.603)
SONS*RICH*SA 0.0323 (0.236) -0.309 (0.272) -0.480 (0.372)
SONS*RICH*US -0.00183 (0.226) -0.0613 (0.258) -0.414 (0.345)
SONS*RICH*Pakistan -0.147 (0.199) -0.473∗ (0.264) -1.247∗∗∗ (0.470)
SONS*RICH*Philippines 0.542∗ (0.319) 0.339 (0.413) 1.496∗∗ (0.716)
SONS*RICH*France 0.0393 (0.285) -0.258 (0.318) -0.379 (0.464)
SONS*RICH*Germany 0.174 (0.189) 0.0432 (0.236) 0.0553 (0.362)
Observations 2399 2399 2399
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.9: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2 with country fixed effects
and country son preference effects, split by income at (1) first quartile, (2)
sample median, and (3) third quartile.
(1) (2) (3)
AGE -0.100 (0.0988) -0.0921 (0.0982) -0.109 (0.0984)
AGE2 0.000103 (0.00176) 0.00000580 (0.00175) 0.000208 (0.00176)
DEGREE 0.291 (0.201) 0.285 (0.202) 0.287 (0.206)
AL -0.272 (0.226) -0.287 (0.225) -0.289 (0.226)
FE 0.0423 (0.243) 0.0523 (0.242) 0.0415 (0.240)
GCSE -0.00791 (0.160) -0.0162 (0.159) 0.00774 (0.159)
POOR*Kenya -0.157 (0.900) 0.495 (0.453) 0.190 (0.345)
POOR*Bangladesh 0.571∗ (0.333) 0.943∗∗∗ (0.261) 0.895∗∗∗ (0.235)
POOR*Pakistan 0.597 (0.365) 0.750∗∗∗ (0.267) 0.808∗∗∗ (0.217)
POOR*Germany 1.038 (0.855) 0.540 (0.354) 0.293 (0.309)
RICH -0.499 (0.323) -0.0825 (0.284) -0.152 (0.357)
RICH*Kenya 0.508∗ (0.302) 0.376 (0.367) 0.955∗ (0.504)
RICH*Bangladesh 0.728∗ (0.390) 0.593 (0.457) 0.738 (0.565)
RICH*Pakistan 0.826∗∗∗ (0.234) 0.912∗∗∗ (0.290) 0.819∗ (0.464)
RICH*Germany 0.381 (0.273) 0.202 (0.354) 0.613 (0.457)
SONS*POOR -0.370∗ (0.221) -0.225 (0.164) -0.292∗∗ (0.135)
SONS*POOR*Kenya 0.501 (0.728) -0.552 (0.429) -0.180 (0.305)
SONS*POOR*Bangladesh 0.106 (0.271) -0.0324 (0.224) 0.0222 (0.202)
SONS*POOR*Pakistan 0.373 (0.298) 0.347 (0.219) 0.294 (0.183)
SONS*POOR*Germany -0.868 (0.744) -0.334 (0.327) -0.225 (0.283)
SONS*RICH -0.319∗∗ (0.145) -0.400∗∗ (0.182) -0.388 (0.285)
SONS*RICH*Kenya -0.533∗ (0.291) -0.295 (0.340) -0.923∗ (0.527)
SONS*RICH*Bangladesh 0.217 (0.344) 0.308 (0.418) 0.492 (0.566)
SONS*RICH*Pakistan 0.312 (0.197) 0.197 (0.252) 0.330 (0.386)
SONS*RICH*Germany -0.0364 (0.242) 0.126 (0.303) 0.110 (0.389)
Observations 1180 1180 1180
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.10: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 1. Country fixed effects and
country son preference effects, split by age on immigration to the UK. Column
(1) split at age 10, Column (2) at age 15.
(1) (2)
AGE 0.162∗∗∗ (0.0199) 0.162∗∗∗ (0.0199)
AGE2 -0.00382∗∗∗ (0.000369) -0.00382∗∗∗ (0.000370)
DEGREE 0.151∗∗∗ (0.0404) 0.149∗∗∗ (0.0403)
AL -0.0821∗ (0.0460) -0.0870∗ (0.0460)
FE 0.00541 (0.0482) 0.00408 (0.0482)
GCSE 0.00901 (0.0385) 0.00363 (0.0388)
OLD*Australia -0.0729 (0.148) -0.0381 (0.156)
OLD*Canada -0.0995 (0.191) 0.0538 (0.213)
OLD*New Zealand -0.141 (0.234) -0.161 (0.240)
OLD*Kenya 0.0110 (0.0889) -0.0624 (0.104)
OLD*Uganda -0.244∗ (0.129) -0.317∗∗ (0.154)
OLD*Tanzania -0.0222 (0.157) -0.211 (0.182)
OLD*Zambia -0.181 (0.213) -0.227 (0.228)
OLD*Zimbabwe -0.414∗∗ (0.164) -0.391∗∗ (0.168)
OLD*Ghana -0.0957 (0.115) -0.0597 (0.117)
OLD*Nigeria 0.211∗∗ (0.101) 0.227∗∗ (0.103)
OLD*Jamaica -0.831∗∗∗ (0.119) -0.764∗∗∗ (0.149)
OLD*Grp02 -0.394∗ (0.218) -0.0270 (0.240)
OLD*Bangladesh 0.298∗∗∗ (0.0712) 0.319∗∗∗ (0.0757)
OLD*Sri Lanka -0.0726 (0.135) -0.0567 (0.136)
OLD*HK & China -0.229∗ (0.130) -0.196 (0.136)
OLD*Malaysia 0.301∗∗ (0.140) 0.339∗∗ (0.145)
OLD*Singapore -0.616∗ (0.319) -0.393 (0.337)
OLD*Cyprus -0.350∗∗ (0.164) -0.333∗ (0.173)
OLD*Malta -0.423 (0.336) -0.766∗ (0.411)
OLD*Mauritius -0.449∗∗ (0.182) -0.438∗∗ (0.185)
OLD*SA -0.0369 (0.117) -0.0140 (0.122)
OLD*Grp04 -0.193 (0.140) -0.204 (0.144)
OLD*US 0.138 (0.0992) 0.195∗ (0.103)
OLD*Pakistan 0.386∗∗∗ (0.0614) 0.411∗∗∗ (0.0645)
OLD*China -0.595∗∗∗ (0.188) -0.609∗∗∗ (0.194)
OLD*Japan -0.203 (0.191) -0.206 (0.194)
OLD*Philippines -0.622∗∗∗ (0.142) -0.612∗∗∗ (0.143)
OLD*Iran -0.127 (0.170) -0.121 (0.173)
OLD*Grp8 0.406∗∗ (0.162) 0.415∗∗ (0.168)
OLD*France -0.0639 (0.138) -0.0622 (0.140)
OLD*Italy -0.756∗∗∗ (0.182) -0.690∗∗∗ (0.185)
OLD*Netherlands 0.0816 (0.177) 0.0804 (0.180)
OLD*Germany -0.298∗∗∗ (0.115) -0.289∗∗ (0.126)
OLD*Poland -0.697∗∗∗ (0.179) -0.707∗∗∗ (0.185)
OLD*Portugal -0.573∗∗∗ (0.157) -0.573∗∗∗ (0.161)
OLD*Spain -0.425∗∗ (0.194) -0.437∗∗ (0.198)
OLD*Serbia & Montenegro -0.0782 (0.168) -0.0631 (0.168)
OLD*Turkey -0.313∗∗ (0.134) -0.303∗∗ (0.136)
OLD*Somalia 0.344∗∗∗ (0.114) 0.359∗∗∗ (0.115)
YOUNG 0.110 (0.104) 0.141 (0.0896)
YOUNG*Australia -0.107 (0.203) -0.157 (0.184)
YOUNG*Canada -0.181 (0.215) -0.289 (0.191)
YOUNG*New Zealand -0.161 (0.347) -0.113 (0.326)
YOUNG*Kenya 0.0984 (0.157) 0.0978 (0.121)
YOUNG*Uganda 0.231 (0.229) 0.0324 (0.170)
YOUNG*Tanzania 0.182 (0.317) 0.440∗∗ (0.223)
YOUNG*Zambia -0.0880 (0.330) -0.0294 (0.288)
YOUNG*Zimbabwe -0.0886 (0.316) -0.213 (0.288)
YOUNG*Ghana 0.400 (0.458) -0.146 (0.362)
YOUNG*Nigeria -0.00724 (0.284) 0.00636 (0.249)
YOUNG*Jamaica -0.610∗∗∗ (0.203) -0.850∗∗∗ (0.148)
YOUNG*Grp02 -0.812∗∗∗ (0.304) -0.990∗∗∗ (0.262)
YOUNG*Bangladesh 0.0911 (0.186) 0.108 (0.137)
YOUNG*Sri Lanka -0.140 (0.366) -0.156 (0.362)
YOUNG*HK & China -0.364 (0.267) -0.423∗ (0.232)
YOUNG*Malaysia -0.0560 (0.260) -0.0706 (0.232)
YOUNG*Singapore -0.114 (0.161) -0.191 (0.151)
YOUNG*Cyprus -0.187 (0.179) -0.228 (0.165)
YOUNG*Malta -0.170 (0.214) -0.0997 (0.198)
YOUNG*Mauritius -0.302 (0.457) -0.332 (0.416)
YOUNG*SA -0.285 (0.218) -0.290 (0.193)
YOUNG*Grp04 -0.335 (0.509) -0.0746 (0.416)
YOUNG*US -0.153 (0.243) -0.266 (0.208)
YOUNG*Pakistan 0.418∗∗∗ (0.143) 0.313∗∗∗ (0.117)
YOUNG*China -1.776∗ (1.005) -1.032∗ (0.583)
YOUNG*Japan 2.185∗∗ (1.005) 0.954 (0.712)
YOUNG*Philippines 1.015 (1.005) -0.425 (1.004)
YOUNG*Iran 0.876∗ (0.509) 0.696 (0.454)
YOUNG*Grp8 -0.0316 (0.254) 0.00425 (0.232)
YOUNG*France -0.239 (0.317) -0.184 (0.300)
YOUNG*Italy -0.246 (0.243) -0.423∗ (0.232)
YOUNG*Netherlands -0.459 (0.509) -0.319 (0.454)
YOUNG*Germany -0.372∗∗∗ (0.124) -0.385∗∗∗ (0.109)
YOUNG*Poland 1.237 (1.005) -0.0192 (0.583)
YOUNG*Portugal -0.386 (0.585) -0.368 (0.454)
YOUNG*Spain -0.113 (0.509) 0.00685 (0.454)
YOUNG*Serbia & Montenegro 1.067 (1.005) 0.727 (0.712)
YOUNG*Turkey -0.133 (0.713) -0.134 (0.583)
YOUNG*Somalia 3.300∗∗∗ (1.005)
ctd. ctd.
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(1) ctd. (2) ctd.
SONS*OLD -0.285∗∗∗ (0.0583) -0.250∗∗∗ (0.0609)
SONS*OLD*Australia 0.615∗∗∗ (0.212) 0.639∗∗∗ (0.221)
SONS*OLD*Canada 0.361 (0.251) 0.414 (0.275)
SONS*OLD*New Zealand 0.130 (0.307) 0.242 (0.315)
SONS*OLD*Kenya -0.0168 (0.121) -0.0379 (0.140)
SONS*OLD*Uganda 0.254 (0.179) 0.322 (0.206)
SONS*OLD*Tanzania -0.249 (0.232) -0.151 (0.268)
SONS*OLD*Zambia 0.606∗∗ (0.278) 0.545∗ (0.312)
SONS*OLD*Zimbabwe 0.241 (0.219) 0.185 (0.228)
SONS*OLD*Ghana 0.0490 (0.170) -0.0244 (0.174)
SONS*OLD*Nigeria 0.174 (0.142) 0.141 (0.145)
SONS*OLD*Jamaica 0.528∗∗∗ (0.161) 0.523∗∗∗ (0.200)
SONS*OLD*Grp02 0.0523 (0.298) -0.461 (0.369)
SONS*OLD*Bangladesh 0.233∗∗ (0.0952) 0.167∗ (0.101)
SONS*OLD*Sri Lanka 0.0929 (0.185) 0.0622 (0.186)
SONS*OLD*HK & China 0.116 (0.177) -0.0411 (0.188)
SONS*OLD*Malaysia -0.314 (0.216) -0.361 (0.223)
SONS*OLD*Singapore 1.029∗∗ (0.418) 0.916∗∗ (0.445)
SONS*OLD*Cyprus 0.317 (0.220) 0.210 (0.239)
SONS*OLD*Malta -0.0964 (0.489) 0.224 (0.560)
SONS*OLD*Mauritius 0.0718 (0.273) 0.0348 (0.285)
SONS*OLD*SA 0.143 (0.169) 0.132 (0.176)
SONS*OLD*Grp04 0.276 (0.201) 0.282 (0.205)
SONS*OLD*US 0.209 (0.146) 0.161 (0.150)
SONS*OLD*Pakistan 0.132 (0.0838) 0.0784 (0.0874)
SONS*OLD*China 0.272 (0.257) 0.220 (0.266)
SONS*OLD*Japan 0.419 (0.265) 0.402 (0.268)
SONS*OLD*Philippines 0.664∗∗∗ (0.184) 0.624∗∗∗ (0.186)
SONS*OLD*Iran -0.00827 (0.225) -0.0396 (0.229)
SONS*OLD*Grp8 0.272 (0.223) 0.232 (0.235)
SONS*OLD*France 0.227 (0.189) 0.176 (0.192)
SONS*OLD*Italy 0.920∗∗∗ (0.241) 0.836∗∗∗ (0.247)
SONS*OLD*Netherlands 0.511∗∗ (0.251) 0.490∗ (0.256)
SONS*OLD*Germany 0.372∗∗ (0.159) 0.348∗∗ (0.174)
SONS*OLD*Poland -0.0536 (0.259) -0.0423 (0.263)
SONS*OLD*Portugal 0.248 (0.225) 0.204 (0.229)
SONS*OLD*Spain 0.294 (0.279) 0.285 (0.284)
SONS*OLD*Serbia & Montenegro 0.259 (0.235) 0.216 (0.237)
SONS*OLD*Turkey 0.284 (0.179) 0.250 (0.181)
SONS*OLD*Somalia 0.595∗∗∗ (0.158) 0.551∗∗∗ (0.159)
SONS*YOUNG -0.101 (0.133) -0.294∗∗∗ (0.110)
SONS*YOUNG*Australia 0.0746 (0.287) 0.253 (0.264)
SONS*YOUNG*Canada 0.163 (0.297) 0.262 (0.267)
SONS*YOUNG*New Zealand 1.148∗∗ (0.491) 0.474 (0.461)
SONS*YOUNG*Kenya -0.0794 (0.218) 0.0735 (0.171)
SONS*YOUNG*Uganda -0.147 (0.326) 0.0446 (0.251)
SONS*YOUNG*Tanzania -0.260 (0.457) -0.457 (0.330)
SONS*YOUNG*Zambia -0.0558 (0.441) 0.257 (0.364)
SONS*YOUNG*Zimbabwe 0.540 (0.405) 0.609∗ (0.364)
SONS*YOUNG*Ghana 0.0151 (0.586) 0.592 (0.470)
SONS*YOUNG*Nigeria -0.0870 (0.424) 0.123 (0.361)
SONS*YOUNG*Jamaica -0.0726 (0.279) 0.324 (0.206)
SONS*YOUNG*Grp02 -0.0308 (0.475) 0.530 (0.353)
SONS*YOUNG*Bangladesh 0.0493 (0.254) 0.360∗ (0.189)
SONS*YOUNG*Sri Lanka -0.226 (0.483) -0.0466 (0.470)
SONS*YOUNG*HK & China 0.181 (0.337) 0.557∗ (0.288)
SONS*YOUNG*Malaysia 0.484 (0.337) 0.580∗ (0.307)
SONS*YOUNG*Singapore -0.00264 (0.227) 0.241 (0.213)
SONS*YOUNG*Cyprus -0.0790 (0.238) 0.173 (0.217)
SONS*YOUNG*Malta -0.187 (0.297) -0.0958 (0.279)
SONS*YOUNG*Mauritius 0.712 (0.620) 0.449 (0.539)
SONS*YOUNG*SA 0.222 (0.294) 0.325 (0.263)
SONS*YOUNG*Grp04 0.967 (0.616) 0.609 (0.528)
SONS*YOUNG*US -0.159 (0.347) 0.105 (0.305)
SONS*YOUNG*Pakistan -0.180 (0.205) 0.134 (0.168)
SONS*YOUNG*Philippines 1.748 (1.230)
SONS*YOUNG*China 2.201∗ (1.232) 1.776∗∗ (0.772)
SONS*YOUNG*Japan -37.47 (35511541.9) -45.24 .
SONS*YOUNG*Iran -1.535∗ (0.877) -0.999 (0.680)
SONS*YOUNG*Grp8 -0.0187 (0.363) 0.235 (0.321)
SONS*YOUNG*France 0.128 (0.502) 0.488 (0.455)
SONS*YOUNG*Italy -0.223 (0.340) 0.168 (0.319)
SONS*YOUNG*Netherlands 0.556 (0.684) 0.636 (0.616)
SONS*YOUNG*Germany 0.171 (0.173) 0.360∗∗ (0.153)
SONS*YOUNG*Poland -0.669 (1.232) -0.187 (0.920)
SONS*YOUNG*Portugal 0.705 (0.827) 1.104 (0.680)
SONS*YOUNG*Spain -0.141 (0.684) -0.104 (0.616)
SONS*YOUNG*Turkey 0.0851 (0.793) 0.241 (0.661)
Observations 13112 13112
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.11: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2. Country fixed effects and
country son preference effects, split by age on immigration to the UK. Column
(1) split at age 10, Column (2) at age 15.
(1) (2)
AGE -0.00852 (0.0373) -0.00951 (0.0373)
AGE2 -0.00153∗∗ (0.000668) -0.00151∗∗ (0.000668)
DEGREE 0.0657 (0.0782) 0.0636 (0.0780)
AL -0.195∗∗ (0.0852) -0.203∗∗ (0.0853)
FE -0.183∗∗ (0.0916) -0.189∗∗ (0.0914)
GCSE -0.186∗∗∗ (0.0691) -0.185∗∗∗ (0.0691)
OLD*Australia -0.712∗ (0.408) -0.605 (0.418)
OLD*Canada -0.299 (0.421) 0.128 (0.429)
OLD*Kenya 0.225 (0.174) 0.279 (0.208)
OLD*Uganda -0.248 (0.272) -0.291 (0.327)
OLD*Zimbabwe -0.453 (0.374) -0.542 (0.394)
OLD*Ghana 0.632∗∗∗ (0.216) 0.644∗∗∗ (0.219)
OLD*Nigeria 0.893∗∗∗ (0.180) 0.866∗∗∗ (0.185)
OLD*Jamaica 0.426∗ (0.233) 0.426 (0.267)
OLD*Bangladesh 0.745∗∗∗ (0.118) 0.787∗∗∗ (0.124)
OLD*Sri Lanka -0.903∗∗ (0.405) -0.903∗∗ (0.407)
OLD*HK & China -0.120 (0.283) -0.102 (0.290)
OLD*Malaysia -0.371 (0.386) -0.199 (0.383)
OLD*Singapore 1.145∗∗ (0.506) 1.137∗∗ (0.515)
OLD*Cyprus -0.387 (0.391) -0.368 (0.417)
OLD*SA -0.150 (0.264) -0.188 (0.277)
OLD*Grp04 0.512∗∗ (0.241) 0.460∗ (0.251)
OLD*US -0.0392 (0.211) -0.0559 (0.219)
OLD*Pakistan 0.822∗∗∗ (0.106) 0.800∗∗∗ (0.111)
OLD*Philippines -0.715∗ (0.431) -0.718∗ (0.433)
OLD*Grp8 0.884∗∗∗ (0.267) 0.914∗∗∗ (0.271)
OLD*France 0.0122 (0.305) 0.0761 (0.305)
OLD*Italy -0.219 (0.351) -0.226 (0.353)
OLD*Germany -0.212 (0.259) -0.108 (0.286)
OLD*Turkey -0.309 (0.299) -0.378 (0.309)
OLD*Somalia 1.108∗∗∗ (0.180) 1.111∗∗∗ (0.182)
YOUNG 0.168 (0.192) 0.132 (0.169)
YOUNG*Australia -0.414 (0.422) -0.487 (0.399)
YOUNG*Canada -0.204 (0.413) -0.486 (0.399)
YOUNG*Kenya 0.129 (0.315) 0.0804 (0.235)
YOUNG*Uganda -0.000275 (0.547) -0.170 (0.369)
YOUNG*Zimbabwe 0.347 (0.717) 0.585 (0.638)
YOUNG*Ghana -0.371 (0.996) -0.0843 (0.792)
YOUNG*Nigeria -1.130 (0.811) -0.204 (0.574)
YOUNG*Jamaica -0.103 (0.395) 0.0733 (0.307)
YOUNG*Bangladesh 0.389 (0.294) 0.364 (0.234)
YOUNG*Sri Lanka -1.198 (0.932) -1.014 (0.901)
YOUNG*HK & China -0.266 (0.527) -0.307 (0.497)
YOUNG*Malaysia -0.441 (0.476) -0.636 (0.474)
YOUNG*Singapore -1.241∗∗∗ (0.424) -1.175∗∗∗ (0.407)
YOUNG*Cyprus -0.212 (0.349) -0.201 (0.327)
YOUNG*SA 0.0437 (0.516) 0.106 (0.448)
YOUNG*Grp04 1.202 (0.998) 1.242∗ (0.689)
YOUNG*US 0.00846 (0.586) 0.188 (0.464)
YOUNG*Pakistan 0.627∗∗∗ (0.241) 0.788∗∗∗ (0.198)
YOUNG*Philippines 2.478∗∗ (1.008) 2.293 (1.546)
YOUNG*Grp8 0.320 (0.430) 0.392 (0.400)
YOUNG*France -0.0636 (0.827) -0.416 (0.810)
YOUNG*Italy -0.140 (0.553) -0.0930 (0.544)
YOUNG*Germany -0.234 (0.236) -0.242 (0.212)
YOUNG*Turkey -2.446 (2.090) -0.305 (1.212)
SONS*OLD -0.273∗∗∗ (0.0704) -0.253∗∗∗ (0.0733)
SONS*OLD*Australia 0.753∗∗ (0.318) 0.779∗∗ (0.328)
SONS*OLD*Canada 0.0943 (0.336) -0.373 (0.379)
SONS*OLD*Kenya -0.282∗ (0.154) -0.476∗∗ (0.189)
SONS*OLD*Uganda 0.190 (0.235) 0.221 (0.272)
SONS*OLD*Zimbabwe 0.444 (0.309) 0.452 (0.323)
SONS*OLD*Ghana 0.0991 (0.183) 0.0550 (0.187)
SONS*OLD*Nigeria -0.0183 (0.152) -0.0110 (0.155)
SONS*OLD*Jamaica -0.342 (0.209) -0.450∗ (0.254)
SONS*OLD*Bangladesh 0.171∗ (0.0962) 0.129 (0.100)
SONS*OLD*Sri Lanka 0.651∗∗ (0.276) 0.642∗∗ (0.277)
SONS*OLD*HK & China 0.0595 (0.230) 0.0712 (0.242)
SONS*OLD*Malaysia 0.473 (0.308) 0.385 (0.304)
SONS*OLD*Singapore -1.216∗∗ (0.572) -1.263∗∗ (0.605)
SONS*OLD*Cyprus 0.271 (0.293) 0.226 (0.322)
SONS*OLD*SA 0.143 (0.222) 0.115 (0.234)
SONS*OLD*Grp04 0.0816 (0.224) 0.127 (0.231)
SONS*OLD*US 0.422∗∗ (0.174) 0.388∗∗ (0.179)
SONS*OLD*Pakistan 0.147∗ (0.0872) 0.146 (0.0906)
SONS*OLD*Philippines 0.371 (0.312) 0.370 (0.314)
SONS*OLD*Grp8 0.100 (0.217) 0.0804 (0.220)
SONS*OLD*France 0.109 (0.264) 0.00987 (0.271)
SONS*OLD*Italy 0.0984 (0.311) 0.146 (0.313)
SONS*OLD*Germany 0.0613 (0.218) 0.0150 (0.238)
SONS*OLD*Turkey 0.128 (0.248) 0.171 (0.252)
SONS*OLD*Somalia 0.0906 (0.148) 0.0702 (0.150)
SONS*YOUNG -0.217 (0.149) -0.305∗∗ (0.130)
SONS*YOUNG*Australia 0.762∗∗ (0.343) 0.782∗∗ (0.321)
ctd. ctd.
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(1) ctd. (2) ctd.
SONS*YOUNG*Canada 0.142 (0.344) 0.524∗ (0.316)
SONS*YOUNG*Kenya -0.367 (0.284) -0.0876 (0.209)
SONS*YOUNG*Uganda 0.159 (0.417) 0.250 (0.312)
SONS*YOUNG*Zimbabwe -0.339 (0.617) -0.301 (0.558)
SONS*YOUNG*Ghana 0.649 (0.641) 0.687 (0.521)
SONS*YOUNG*Nigeria 1.153∗∗ (0.587) 0.594 (0.457)
SONS*YOUNG*Jamaica -0.0202 (0.363) -0.0260 (0.271)
SONS*YOUNG*Bangladesh 0.127 (0.235) 0.298 (0.190)
SONS*YOUNG*Sri Lanka 1.429∗∗ (0.633) 1.299∗∗ (0.607)
SONS*YOUNG*HK & China 0.0101 (0.388) 0.0792 (0.356)
SONS*YOUNG*Malaysia 0.407 (0.349) 0.594∗ (0.349)
SONS*YOUNG*Singapore 0.647∗∗ (0.309) 0.725∗∗ (0.298)
SONS*YOUNG*Cyprus 0.168 (0.270) 0.259 (0.250)
SONS*YOUNG*SA -0.112 (0.435) 0.00767 (0.380)
SONS*YOUNG*Grp04 -1.807 (1.199) -1.489∗ (0.847)
SONS*YOUNG*US -0.500 (0.516) -0.188 (0.403)
SONS*YOUNG*Pakistan -0.0392 (0.210) 0.00775 (0.176)
SONS*YOUNG*Philippines -1.009 (1.176)
SONS*YOUNG*Grp8 -0.262 (0.394) -0.0709 (0.351)
SONS*YOUNG*France 0.352 (0.713) 0.817 (0.627)
SONS*YOUNG*Italy -0.346 (0.480) -0.335 (0.474)
SONS*YOUNG*Germany 0.146 (0.197) 0.237 (0.180)
SONS*YOUNG*Turkey 1.525 (1.165) 0.314 (0.808)
Observations 7630 7630
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.12: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 3. Country fixed effects and
country son preference effects, split by age on immigration to the UK. Column
(1) split at age 10, Column (2) at age 15.
(1) (2)
AGE -0.0995 (0.0658) -0.103 (0.0656)
AGE2 0.000373 (0.00111) 0.000435 (0.00111)
DEGREE -0.748∗∗∗ (0.275) -0.780∗∗∗ (0.277)
AL -0.516∗∗ (0.233) -0.543∗∗ (0.232)
FE -0.301 (0.233) -0.310 (0.232)
GCSE -0.521∗∗∗ (0.183) -0.535∗∗∗ (0.182)
OLD*Kenya 0.109 (0.347) 0.347 (0.410)
OLD*Nigeria 0.584∗ (0.317) 0.703∗∗ (0.323)
OLD*Bangladesh 0.662∗∗∗ (0.217) 0.756∗∗∗ (0.231)
OLD*Pakistan 0.702∗∗∗ (0.202) 0.790∗∗∗ (0.214)
OLD*Germany -1.560∗ (0.886) -1.370 (0.995)
OLD*Somalia 1.041∗∗∗ (0.296) 1.132∗∗∗ (0.302)
YOUNG 0.00543 (0.458) 0.438 (0.377)
YOUNG*Kenya 0.189 (0.719) -0.329 (0.506)
YOUNG*Nigeria -44.08 . -4.695 (3.798)
YOUNG*Bangladesh 0.289 (0.680) 0.165 (0.446)
YOUNG*Pakistan 0.852∗ (0.483) 0.482 (0.380)
YOUNG*Germany -0.573 (0.662) -1.038∗ (0.581)
SONS*OLD -0.411∗∗∗ (0.110) -0.368∗∗∗ (0.115)
SONS*OLD*Kenya -0.120 (0.248) -0.263 (0.295)
SONS*OLD*Nigeria 0.194 (0.200) 0.140 (0.203)
SONS*OLD*Bangladesh 0.243∗ (0.132) 0.207 (0.139)
SONS*OLD*Pakistan 0.267∗∗ (0.125) 0.218∗ (0.131)
SONS*OLD*Germany 1.219∗∗∗ (0.415) 1.071∗∗ (0.464)
SONS*OLD*Somalia 0.325∗ (0.175) 0.283 (0.179)
SONS*YOUNG -0.130 (0.255) -0.383∗ (0.209)
SONS*YOUNG*Kenya -0.172 (0.500) 0.0762 (0.353)
SONS*YOUNG*Nigeria -0.656 . 2.277 (1.839)
SONS*YOUNG*Bangladesh -0.00885 (0.395) 0.189 (0.270)
SONS*YOUNG*Pakistan -0.169 (0.297) 0.181 (0.242)
SONS*YOUNG*Germany -0.00803 (0.384) 0.357 (0.337)
Observations 2317 2317
Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Robustness of heterogeneity estimates
If parents base their fertility decisions on their current family composition, there
may be concerns that my estimates of heterogeneity in son-probability are bi-
ased. In particular, the measured heterogeneity might be a result of differences
in behaviour due to preferences over family composition. Here, I test for the ef-
fect of observed parental behaviour in a simulation. The exercise is very similar
to that of Section 4.4, however the outcome of interest if not the final sex ratio,
but the estimates of underlying heterogeneity.
Figure C.1 suggests there may be cause for concern when estimating het-
erogeneity. The homogeneous model without son preference performs relatively
badly, and is rejected at the 10% level using Pearson’s χ2 test. Including son
preference improves the fit slightly, and the difference from the data becomes
insignificant. However, once heterogeneity is introduced, the fit improves fur-
ther and the p-value increases to 0.97. This suggests that, although parents’
preferences can affect the overall ratios of families with given compositions,
variation in the probability of having sons is present nonetheless. The remain-
der of this section formally tests the robustness of my heterogeneity estimates
to the preferences of women in my sample.
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Figure C.1: Family composition, data versus simulations accounting for son
preferences. Where applied, son preferences are as reported in Table C.1. Het-
erogeneity model uses my benchmark estimates from Section 4.3.3 (µˆ = 0.303,
σˆ = 0.145). Homogeneity uses the restricted model, with a fixed probability of
0.512 of having boys (equivalent to µˇ = 0.0303).
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Table C.1: Kaplan-Meier birth continuation rates by family composition for
UK-born women. Sample selection is that in Section 4.3.3. Statistics give the
proportion of women having a further child given they already have b boys of j
children.
Children 0 boys 1 boy 2 boys 3 boys 4 boys 5 boys
1 0.70 0.69 – – – –
2 0.40 0.33 0.42 – – –
3 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.34 – –
4 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.31 –
5 0.58 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.34
Following the model of Section 4.2, suppose that the true distribution of the
underlying factor X were N(µ˜, σ˜2). I generate a population of such women and
also a latent family composition for each woman. Next, I simulate each woman’s
fertility decisions according to the observed patterns amongst the women in my
sample. If some woman has two boys and a girl, I set the probability of her
having a fourth child to be that observed amongst actual women with those
children, giving simulated birth histories for each of the women. See Section
4.4.1 for details.
The key step is to compute estimates µˆ and σˆ based on these simulated birth
histories by the MLE method of Section 4.3. By comparing µˆ and σˆ to µ˜ and
σ˜, the robustness of the estimator to parental fertility decisions can be assessed.
In the case where µˆ ≈ µ˜ and σˆ ≈ σ˜ for measured values, these estimates can be
considered robust to son and daughter preferences.
Table C.1 records birth progression rates for the UK-born women in my
sample, grouped by existing family composition. These estimates are computed
exactly as in Section 4.4.2. This data gives the proportion qbj of women who go
on to have another child if they already have b boys amongst j children.1
Figure C.2 gives estimated µˆ and σˆ based on various values of µ˜ and σ˜ in a
simulation with one million women. Tested values are encompass the parameter
1These British-born women appear to have preferences for mixed families: after two or
three children, progression rates are lowest with children of each sex. Conversely, after four
and five children some son preference is seen. It is feasible that these women having more
children are not representative, and both the larger family and son preference is driven by
some unobserved factor, such as being a second generation migrant.
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Figure C.2: Robustness check on heterogeneity estimates under observed
parental decisions. Estimated µˆ and σˆ based on different possible ‘true’ val-
ues µ˜ and σ˜. 1,000,000 women simulated, following the fertility behaviour given
in Table C.1.
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confidence intervals derived by the bootstrap procedure of Section 4.3.3. For
each parameter, estimates are very close to the posited values. Correlation in
either case is 1.00 (three significant figures), and the slopes are also very close
to one. I conclude that the preferences held by British-born women are very
unlikely to bias my estimates of heterogeneity in the probability of having sons.
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